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Using survey data and a multi-level time-lagged linear regression, we show that culturalvalues are primal in the human development sequence. The spread of advantageouscultural values —like respect for individual rights —predicts future economic development
and democracy.
The World and European Values Surveys (WEVS) are administered in 109 countries repre-
senting over 90% of the world’s population. They are designed to quantify cultural values and
facilitate comparative analysis on a global scale. We found nine underlying cultural factors in
the WEVS that can be compressed into three orthogonal cultural value components: Secular-
Rationality, Openness and Institutional Support. Furthermore, the 109 countries fall into one of
four clusters representing different cultural-histories: African-Islamic, Catholic, Western and
Communist-Confucian.
We find two independent modes of cultural value dynamics that have very different characters:
generational and opinion change. Generational change is persistent and steady and shows strong
links to human development. Opinion change, conversely, is rapid and transient and shows weak
links to human development. Opinion change dominates short run cultural value variation, but
generational change dominates in the long run.
Generational changes in cultural values precede those in human development. This makes it
unlikely that human development causes cultural values to change. Even though analysis using
the standard WEVS cross-sectional samples show that cultural values weakly predict human
development, cross-sectional dynamics are dominated by transient opinion change. Human
development is unaffected in the long run.
We show that cultural-history is not needed to explain human development inequalities once
past cultural values have been controlled for. However, cultural-history still influences the spread
of cultural values themselves. Finally, the surprising recent decline in Support for Institutions is
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Cultural values are the attitudes, opinions and beliefs shared by members of a society; it is the
central tendency of a group, around which we see variability in personality traits [Schwartz,
2006]. Cultural values are dynamic [Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005;
Norris, 2011] and have been linked to development outcomes such as economic development
[Norris, 2011; Putnam et al., 1993] and democracy [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Spaiser et al.,
2014].
However, past investigations into cultural values have relied on conceptual assumptions to
both derive the interpretable dimensions of a cultural value space [Inglehart and Baker, 2000;
Schwartz, 2008], and identify clusters of culturally similar countries [Basanez, 2016; Huntington,
1996; Inglehart and Baker, 2000]. In addition, researchers often use time series consisting
of representative cross-sectional samples; but they do so without adequately considering the
different modes of cultural value change and their differing effects on human development
[Hofstede et al., 2010; Norris, 2011; Welzel et al., 2003].
We use data from the World and European Values Surveys (WEVS) to measure cultural
values across 109 nations. In chapter three, we conduct a data driven exploratory analysis which
finds that nine cultural factors underly the WEVS data. This represents a more fine-grained
cultural value map than previous studies. Similarly, in chapter five we use exploratory methods
to identify four clusters of countries in our nine dimension cultural factor space. These reflect
cultural-historic variables such as language, religion and colonial history showing that the historic
non-independence of nations is important and, therefore, must be accounted for in subsequent
modeling. The findings in chapters three and five are of interest to students of cultural value
dynamics because they act as a comparison with more theoretically driven perspectives.
In chapter four we characterize the different modes of cultural value change: opinion and
generational. Opinion change is rapid, transient and drives change in the short term, whereas
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generational change is gradual, steady and drives change in the long term. In chapter six we see
that generational change shows stronger links with human development variables than opinion
change. Time series built from standard cross-sectional samples are often used in analyses of
cultural value dynamics [Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]), but we show they
are driven by opinion change, not generational change. Therefore, those interested in modeling
interactions between cultural values and human development in the long-term should focus on
generational changes instead.
In chapter seven we show that generational changes in secularization preceded those in
economic development. This provides strong evidence against models that assume economic
development causes secularization. Chapter eight shows that, in general, changes in cultural
values (Secular-Rationality and Openness) precede human development (economic development
and democratization). This will be of interest to development theorists who, by and large, believe
that cultural value change is a consequence, rather than a cause, of human development [Hofstede











2.1 What are Cultural Values?
Cultural values are preferences shared by a population and an indication of the composition
of social norms in a society [Gavrilets and Richerson, 2017]. They could be conceptualized as
shared stories [Harari, 2014], recipes [Bentley and O’Brien, 2017], procedures Henrich [2016],
shared meanings [Richerson and Boyd, 2005] or the rules of the social game [Hofstede et al.,
2010]. Perhaps the best metaphor is ‘the grammar of society’ [Bicchieri, 2005] because cultural
values are the software that dictate what we care about and how we interact with other people.
This, in turn, affects the network structures from which human development emerges.
Humans have, uniquely in the animal kingdom, developed the capacity to accumulate cultural
information in populations [Tomasello, 2001]. This ability means humans can more rapidly adapt
to changing environments compared to species that rely on genetic adaptations or individual
learning [Boyd et al., 2011]. The ability to distributively store information on social networks
has led to the exponential ratcheting up of technological diversity and complexity over millenia
[Arthur, 2014; Hidalgo, 2015]. Part of this are social technologies that enable the scaling-up of
stable social networks to take advantage of economies of scale and increasing returns [West,
2017]. Cultural values are an important component of this social technology.
Sciences like psychology tend to focus on the individual, hence they reasonably view prefer-
ences, attitudes and beliefs as personality traits [McCrae and Terracciano, 2005]. These prefer-
ences, attitudes and beliefs become cultural values when they are shared by entire populations.
Societies that have shared behavioral expectations, supported by the punishment of those who
violate these expectations [Boyd and Richerson, 1992], can form large stable networks of up to
a few thousand people. However, to scale up to the level of states (hundreds-of-thousands or
even millions of people) socialized monitoring and punishment is not practical. Hence these early
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states were nearly always theocratic [North et al., 2009] because omniscient moralizing gods,
with the power to punish after death, provided the threat of punishment [Norenzayan, 2013;
Norenzayan and Shariff, 2008; Shariff and Norenzayan, 2007]. Religious cultural values also
legitimized the stratification of political power and an economic system of tribute [Morris, 2015].
Large and stable differences in cultural values exist among the worlds nations [Inglehart
and Baker, 2000; Minkov and Hofstede, 2011], but why? Social learning is the mechanism that
makes cumulative culture possible and it is made more efficient by conformist bias (the tendency
to copy the majority in a group), hence they likely co-evolved [Henrich and Boyd, 1998]. Also
ethnic markers — such as language, religion and nationality — act to signal the reliability of
a potential collaborator [McElreath et al., 2003]. Conformity and ethnic markers act to create
discrete cultural groups that are robust to immigration. Hence the potential for between-group
cultural value diversity is born.
Cultural values are one component of the social technology that structures society, the others
are social norms and institutions. Social norms are the discrete rules of society — things that
you should, or should not, do. Adherence to a complex of social norms (or a custom) are reflected
in continuous cultural values. Institutions emerge only when society is politically hierarchical
because they are top-down complexes of formal laws imposed by a governing elite [Hodgson,
2002].
It is useful to distinguish top-down rules (formal laws) from bottom-up rules (social norms)
because they can be out-of-sync [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012]. Democratic societies have
mechanisms of accountability [Fukuyama, 2012] which force institutions to align with changing
cultural values. This means that, while cultural values change continuously, formal laws change
in punctuated bursts. Sometimes changes in the law occur in reaction to shifts in cultural values.
For example, the Civil Rights Act was passed in 1964 by the US federal government, but this is
some time after most of the population had turned against racial segregation [Lieberman, 2002].
Culture values often reflect institutions. Geert Hofstede [Hofstede et al., 2010] showed that
‘high power distance’ cultures tend to have deleterious institutional arrangements. Corruption is
rife because practices like nepotism and tribute payment are considered normal [Rose-Ackerman
and Palifka, 2016]. Media consumption is lower, leading to less trust and increased nationalism
[Norris and Inglehart, 2009]. Moreover, low trust societies tend to be less economically developed
because economic networks are smaller [Hidalgo, 2015]. Finally, conceding unlimited power to
elites tends to result in the persistence of extractive institutions (rules which only benefit elites)
[Acemoglu et al., 2001] and inhibits the development of rule of law [Fukuyama, 2012].
2.2 Human Development and the Bottom-up Approach
The second half of this thesis deals with the interactions between cultural values and measures
of human development. Where past investigations into cultural values have relied on conceptual
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assumptions to derive the interpretable dimensions of a cultural value space [Inglehart and
Baker, 2000; Schwartz, 2008], we have removed as many a priori assumptions as possible to
derive a new cultural space that is informed only by the global variance that exists in the entire
World and European Values dataset [EVS, 2011; WVS, 2017].
We compare the time evolution of cultural values to established measures of economic
development and democracy. This allows us to rule out certain classes of proposed causal models
by time ordering the changes in cultural values and human development [Hofstede et al., 2010;
Norris, 2011; Welzel et al., 2003].
2.2.1 Economic Development Emerges from Highly Connected Social
Networks
Conceptually, economic development is the process by which the wellbeing of individuals that
make up a society is improved by the cooperative actions of the whole society. Though this can
be broadly defined as including human and social capital [Coleman, 1988], often it is measured
more narrowly as material wealth. The material wealth of a society is usually measured using
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP), which is the quantity of goods and services exchanged
in the economy using the proxy of total income or total spending.
An important driver of sustainable economic growth is technological innovation [Arthur, 2014;
Hidalgo, 2015; Romer, 1990]. Through social learning, we acquire the information required to
create technology, but the body of knowledge and know-how accrued by societies is so large that
no one individual could have figured it out alone [Richerson and Boyd, 2005]. The capacity of a
single person to store information is limited by physical constraints in the brain. This means
accumulated knowledge and knowhow must be distributed in larger and larger social networks,
the computation of which creates increasingly complex products [Muthukrishna and Henrich,
2016]. However, growing economic networks requires over-coming many collective action problems
[Chudek and Henrich, 2011], using social technologies like prosocial institutions [Alesina and
Giuliano, 2015], civic cultural values [Newton and Norris, 2000] and enlightenment cultural
values [Pinker, 2018]. Forming these large productive economic networks offers increasing
returns to scale as economic development scales super-linearly with population size. In other
words, the larger the network, the wealthier the average person is [Bettencourt et al., 2007].
There are many different reasons GDP per capita increases, and some of these are unpro-
ductive; such as capital accumulation and resource extraction. Therefore, it is preferable to
isolate the proportion of productive GDP flowing from technological innovation. This can be done
by estimating the proportion of GDP that is extractive [World Bank, 2018] or by calculating
Total Factor Productivity [Gordon, 2016]. Nonetheless, we must use raw GDP per capita in our
analysis because one of the important methodological steps we have taken is the time ordering
of macro-level variables over a long time period (100 years. GDP per capita, unlike the other
measures of economic development, has been estimated for all years of the 20th century and for
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over 100 countries [Bolt et al., 2014].
2.2.2 Democracy and Political Stability
The nation state has emerged in the last few hundred years as the preeminent unit of social
organization. A state must have an administrative body that is granted a monopoly on power and
violence over a fixed geographical region [Weber, 1965]. States, for the bulk of human history,
have been characterized by political instability, where elite factions battle for for dominance,
often through violent means [Flannery and Marcus, 2012]. Innovations — such as the hereditary
inheritance of power — act to reduce violence by smoothing the power transitions between elite
regimes [Wright, 2006]. In modern societies, political stability has been further facilitated by
disembodying leadership roles [North et al., 2009]. For example, the role of king in medieval
Europe was clearly linked to a known individual, but the role of president of the United States
is an institutional role that individuals flow in and out of at preagreed intervals. An even more
recent political innovation is mass-participation democracy [Huntington, 1991], which too has
proven to be unstable outside of a handful of western countries [Marshall et al., 2017]. The
reasons for this are complex, but I explore some of them here.
Democratic institutions thrive in populations with cultural values of openness [Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005; Ruck et al., 2019]. However, democracy is highly contagious [Brinks and
Coppedge, 2006] and tends to diffuse to neighboring socieites from those that have been recently
democratized [Matthews et al., 2016]. This occurs whether or not their social technologies can
support it [Ruck et al., 2019]. Demographic transition may also play a role in the emergence
and stability of democracy. Older people are important for mediating conflicts, whereas young
populations, particularly those with a disproportionate number of young men, will have a greater
propensity for violent conflict [Huntington, 1996; Urdal, 2011]. This "youth bulge" effect has
been linked with autocracy and democratic recession [Cincotta and Doces, 2012; Farzanegan and
Witthuhn, 2017; Weber, 2013].
Democracy is a complex concept that makes it hard to measure. It helps to separate electoral
democracy from liberal democracy [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Electoral democracy is the
institutions that ensure fair elections and reasonable checks and balances on chief executives,
whereas liberal democracy also includes the cluster of rights we often associated with democratic
systems; like freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and an independent media [Mounk, 2018].
In this thesis we focus on electoral democracy, measured using the tried and tested Polity Index
[Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Marshall et al., 2017; Miguel et al., 2004; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014]
because it, not only provides conceptual clarity, but also historical depth and comprehensive
global coverage [Marshall et al., 2017].
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2.3 Using Surveys to Measure Cultural Values
For building scientific models and testing hypotheses it is essential to make explicit what we
mean by ‘cultural values’ using quantified data. Though cultural values may seem to have a
holistic and irreducible structure, there is a rich history of using survey data to discretize culture
into measurable cultural units.
2.3.1 Narrow Sampling
Between 1967 and 1973 Gert Hofstede administered surveys to 100,000 IBM employees from 40
different countries. Despite standardized training used for all IBM employees across all countries,
he still noticed a strong effect of national culture [Hofstede, 2001]. By comparing only IBM
employees, he ensured that the samples were comparable; this is called ‘narrow sampling’. The
shortcoming of narrow sampling is that we do not know if the sample is representative of the
entire population (highly educated IBM employees in particular are unlikely to be representative
of the national population). That said, the observed regularities have been externally validated
by repeating the study within other narrow samples from different industries [Hofstede, 2001].
Using factor analysis, Hofstede derived a four dimensional cultural value space which explains
the national level variation in the IBM values survey [Hofstede, 2001]. The first dimension is
‘Power Distance’: whether hierarchical structure is thought to be essential for the smooth running
of socieity. The second dimension is ‘Individualism vs Collectivism: the degree to which individuals
are concerned about wider society beyond their immediate family members. The third dimension
is ‘Uncertainty Avoidance’: how people handle uncertainty and so whether they favor rigid and
well defined laws. The fourth dimension is Masculinity vs Feminism’: where masculine societies
have a preference for gender roles.
In subsequent work, Hofstede and his colleagues have identified a fifth and sixth cultural
dimension. The fifth, ‘Long Term Orientation’, was discovered when they became concerned that
the contents of the survey was designed with a western bias. Using a survey created by Chinese
social scientists, ‘Long Term Orientation’ was discovered which is the time horizon on which
societies make decisions [Hofstede and Bond, 1988]. The sixth, 'Indulgence vs Self-Restraint’ was
discovered based on Micheal Minknov’s work using the World Values Survey. It measures how
comfortable the society is with short term gratification [Hofstede et al., 2010].
Hofstede takes a data driven approach, in that his cultural dimensions are statistically
extracted from raw survey data. On the other hand, another prominent cultural values scholar,
Shalom Schwartz, derived his cultural value space from psychological theory. He first defined
a cultural value space using theory, and then subsequently designed a survey to quantify the
hypothesized dimensions. Participants in the Schwartz Value Survey (SVS) were asked to place
a degree of importance on 56 abstract concepts which reflect seven fundamental values: Con-
servatism, Hierarchy, Mastery, Affective Autonomy, Intellectual Autonomy, Egalitarianism and
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Figure 2.1: The 56 items from the Shalom Schwartz values survey are plotted onto a two
dimensional space and clustered into the seven hypothesized cultural values which reduce to the
three dimensions of the Schwartz cultural value space. Taken from [Schwartz, 2008]
Harmony. Guttman-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis (SSA) confirms the 56 items cluster into the
seven prescribed fundamental values (see figure 2.1). Finally, through analysis of the correlation
structure, they identify three master dimensions on which nations are mapped [Schwartz, 2006].
The first of Schwartz’s dimensions is ‘Autonomy vs. Embeddedness’ and measures the empha-
sis placed on individual rights and autonomy compared to collective action and the importance
of rules. The second dimensions is ‘Egalitarianism vs Hierarchy’, where hierarchical societies
place importance on power stuctures and egalitarian ones favor loyalty and equality. The third
dimension is ‘Harmony vs Mastery’, it measures whether a society sees nature as something
to be preserved or something to be mastered [Schwartz, 2006]. As the description of Hofstede
and Schwatrz’s cultural dimensions suggest, regression analysis shows there is correspondence
between them [Hofstede, 2001].
Similar to Hofstede, Schwatrz used narrow samples to compare cultures. He collected data
from school teachers—an interesting choice of occupation because they play a significant role in
distributing culture to children. The results were externally validated using samples of university
students [Schwartz, 2006].
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2.3.2 Representative Sampling
The Eurobarometer survey has been administered to member states of the European Union since
1974 and is an early attempt at quantifying cultural values using representative samples. The
state of the art sampling and administrative techniques they employed inspired subsequent
global surveys like the World Values Survey and the European Values Survey.
Much of the early work using the Eurobarometer survey was by Ronald Inglehart and his
colleagues. They discovered large inter-generational cultural value trends in Western Europe
associated with political and economic variables [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Methodologically,
they expanded the temporal scope of the data by treating date of birth as a proxy for time period
(generational trends). This made use of 'socialization theory', which states that cultural values
are crystallized during formative years and that these generational trends persist through time
[Inglehart, 2008].
The representative sample survey technique was carried forward globally by the World Value
Survey [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Using samples from over 100 countries, Inglehart proposed
a causal framework which linked cultural value change to economic development and democrati-
zation: the ‘Human Development Sequence’ (HDS). It argues that economic development, through
industrialization, reduces gender differences and increases collective action through urbanization.
The result is a shift to post-materialist values —emphasizing principles like equality between
the sexes, democracy and freedom. Then, through mass mobilization, democratization can occur.
However, establishing true causation between these variables is difficult and alternative causal
pathways for the HDS have been suggested [Abdollahian et al., 2012; Spaiser et al., 2014]. Us-
ing the WVS, Inglehart suggests there are two important dimensions for understanding global
national variation in cultural values: ‘Secular-Rational vs Traditional’ (SR-T) and ‘Survival vs
Self-Expression’ (S-SE). These two dimensions comprise the Inglehart-Welzel (I-W) map in figure
2.2.
‘Secular-Rational vs Traditional’ reflects differences in the importance of religion, national
pride and a respect for authority and ‘Survival vs Self Expression’ reflects the priority given
to economic and physical security over political engagement and tolerance. The cultural value
migration associated with the ‘Human Development Sequence’ is from the bottom left of figure
2.2 to the top right. Industrialization results in a shift from traditional to secular-rational values
and the material security offered in a post-industrialized society causes a shift from survival to
self expression values.
In conjunction with Pippa Norris, Inglehart has used the WVS to address some more specific
sociological questions. Regarding the process of secularization, they argue religiosity persists
when existential security is scarce and that secularization, despite causing declining memberships
for established churches, could lead to an interest in personal spirituality [Norris and Inglehart,
2004]. They also address the paradox that, despite increasing globalization, heterogeneous
cultural values persist into the modern day. They argue that cultural diversity is maintained by
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Figure 2.2: The Inglehart-Welzel cultural map: the x axis is survival vs self-expression values
and the y is traditional vs secular/rational values. The axes are derived from the WEVS data
using confirmatory factor analysis. This figure is taken from www.worldvaluessurvey.org
barriers to information flow, such as no press freedom, poor access to media and a lack of global
trade [Norris and Inglehart, 2009].
2.3.3 Cross-Sectional Time Series and Modes of Cultural Value Change
The WEVS has been carried out multiple times resulting in repeated cross-sectional samples at
the country level. These cross-sectional time series have been used to study subjective wellbeing
[Easterlin et al., 2010; Inglehart et al., 2008], political engagement [Inglehart and Catterberg,
2002], institutional confidence [Van de Walle et al., 2008] and the dimensions of the Inglagert-
Welzel (I-W) cultural map [Inglehart and Baker, 2000]. The Eurobarometer survey, although only
administered in the European Union, offers a more detailed cross-sectional time series stretching
back to 1970 [European Commission, 2017]. It has been used to quantify changes in wellbeing
[Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000], support for the European Union [Anderson and Kaltenthale,
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1996] and support for democracy [Van de Walle et al., 2008].
All of the mentioned analyses look at changes in representative cross-sectional samples, but
we are also interested in the different modes which underlie this change: generational change,
opinion change and life-cycle effects. Generational trajectories in cultural values are seen as
persistent differences between birth cohorts [Inglehart, 1990]. A ‘life cycle’ effect is evident as
peoples values change as they age, such as the possible adoption of more right-leaning political
orientations [Down and Wilson, 2013].
The clear generational trends we see in cultural values [Foa et al., 2016; Inglehart, 1990,
2008] are explained by the socialization hypothesis. It states cultural values are formed during
our formative years and remain relatively fixed during our life time [Inglehart, 1990] Human
infants are, after all, voracious social learners enabling them to acquire the relevant social
information they need to function as adults [Henrich and Henrich, 2007]. However, the cultural
values of a socialized birth cohort can still change with time because of the aforementioned
life-cycle and opinion change, which we will discuss in more detail later. Cultural evolution
has accelerated during recent times due to technological innovation and rapid economic growth
[Bentley and O’Brien, 2017; Bettencourt et al., 2007], which explains the steep generational
gradient in post-materialist values seen in the last century or so [Inglehart, 2008].
Although life cycle effects do not seem to play a big role for post-materialism (figure 2.3), a
given generation still exhibits cultural value change: opinion change. These are changes that,
unique to a particular time, affect the entire population and are caused by exogenous events like
economic downturns [Easterlin et al., 2010; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Importantly though,
these changes are transient and eventually return to the socialized baseline determined during
formative years [Inglehart, 2008]. However, they can sometimes dominate over more persistent
generational trends over the short term [De Vries, 2005]; table 2.1 provides an example of a
nation’s survey responses broken down by time period and birth cohort.
2.4 Primacy of Generational Change
In this thesis we make the case that generational changes are the key to understanding the global
diversity in, not only cultural values, but also human development. A birth cohort is the unit of
study for generational cultural values change, yet will still have internal diversity. Therefore, the
cultural values within a birth cohort are best described as probability distributions. The average
cultural value of a birth cohort is the culturally determined socialized part; whereas the within
population variation around this average might be called personality traits [Schwartz, 2006].
As [Ryder, 1965] points out, generational differentials are essential for long run change in
cultural values to even occur. This is a a process where the old generations are replaced by
the young called ‘demographic metabolism’. Transient opinion change [Inglehart, 2008] is not
sufficient to explain the sustained long-term changes in cultural values implicit in the first
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Figure 2.3: Time series of post materialist values in Western Europe since 1970, split into
generations of 10 years. The trends are characterized by persistent generational changes, but
rapid and transient changes occur across all generations at particular time points. This figure is
taken from [Inglehart, 2008] and utilizes the Eurobarometer data.
g|p 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
1900
1910 0.46 (0.063) 0.63 (0.056)
1920 0.51 (0.04) 0.6 (0.04)
1930 0.39 (0.049) 0.49 (0.039) 0.45 (0.07) 0.37 (0.069)
1940 0.33 (0.045) 0.43 (0.038) 0.27 (0.06) 0.2 (0.046)
1950 0.21 (0.04) 0.37 (0.031) 0.13 (0.05) 0.1 (0.042)
1960 0.21 (0.044) 0.4 (0.032) 0.11 (0.06) -0.07 (0.047)
1970 0.14 (0.045) 0.12 (0.061) 0.02 (0.054)
1980 0.02 (0.077) -0.18 (0.055)
1990 -0.19 (0.086)
Table 2.1: The generation-period (g-p) breakdown of Religiosity (REL) for the USA. The rows
are generations and the columns are time periods. Each entry is the sample mean with the
standard error in brackets. A missing time period occurs due to non-participation in a WVS wave.
A missing generation occurs when it is underrepresented during a given time period (a sample of
less than 100).
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and second demographic transitions [Lesthaeghe, 2014]. Likewise, if the only source of cultural
value change were aging effects, then persistent change can only occur when the average age
of the population changes. Although it is true that western societies have been getting older
[Lesthaeghe, 2014], the cultural change observed during the same period is the opposite to what
a pure aging effect would predict. For example, the West has become less religious in recent
times [Inglehart and Oyserman, 2004], but old people tend to be more religious. Therefore, if
the population is getting older, then we should expect an increase in religiosity. The decrease in
religiosity is better explained by the continuous replacement of older generations with younger
ones with incrementally more secular cultural values.
Generational trends are caused by a gradually changing environment in which successive
generations form their cultural valus in the early years of life. Evidence from neuroscience
supports the idea that the first 3 decades of life are vital for cultural value formation. The
prefrontal cortex and the striatum are the predominant brain regions used for storing, accessing
and updating cultural values [Glimcher, 2016] and both of these regions mainly develop during
adolescence [Sowell et al., 1999]. Though a more recent study suggests limited synaptic pruning
continues into the third decade [Petanjek et al., 2011]. This leaves some ambiguity as to whether
to define formative years as the first 20, or first 30, years of life.
Although baseline cultural values are developed in adolescence, significant lifetime fluctua-
tions still do occur (opinion change). Unfortunately, statistically separating the effects of aging,
time period (opinion changes) and birth cohort (generational changes) on standard cross-sectional
cultural value samples is not possible with conventional linear regression. This is because these
three predictors are perfectly linearly dependent (period=cohort+age), meaning linear regression
is not identifiable. To obtain unique estimates, the linear dependency between age, period and
cohort must be broken. We need to impose a constraint to break this linear dependency, but often
no empirically justified constraint is available. There are a family of models which claim to pro-
vide valid estimates for age-period-cohort problems called Constrained Generalized Mixed Linear
(CGML) models [Luo, 2013], however they tend to surreptitiously impose arbitrary constraints
that are hard to validate.
One type of CGML model is the Intrinsic Estimator (IE). It provides estimates for age-period-
cohort regression that have desirable statistical properties (unbiased and consistent estimators)
[Yang et al., 2008]. However, IE is actually imposing a hidden constraint and simulation studies
have shown that IE only provides unbiased estimators under very specific data conditions
[Luo, 2013]. A second popular CGML approach is to coarse grain one or more of age, period
or cohort into categories of unequal interval size, thus breaking the perfect linear dependency
(period=cohort+age). This approach is often used with mixed models [Land and Yang, 2013] and
has been in studies using the WEVS [Hayward and Krause, 2015]. Although, similarly to IE, the
coarse-graining imposes hidden constraints that lead to biased results in simulation studies [Luo
and Hodges, 2016]. Therefore, in the absence of prior information about age, period and cohort
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changes, linear regression is unable to estimate their separate effects.
2.4.1 Generational trends or aging effects?
Given we have no empirically justified constraint to use to separate age, period and generational
effects, we must reason qualitatively about whether the persistent birth cohort differences (see
chapter four) are best explained by the socialization of birth cohorts or by aging effects. In chapter
five, we show that there are large global inequalities in the amount of generational cultural value
change that relate to cultural-historic variables. Countries with large west European descended
populations [Putterman and Weil, 2010], have transitioned to being open-access [North et al.,
2009] and WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic) [Henrich et al.,
2010] during the last few hundred years. This transition has not occurred in the majority of
African and Islamic countries [North et al., 2009]. It is easy to see how the steady emergence of a
new ecological niche could endow successive generations with steadily changing cultural values,
but less obvious why the same environmental changes could lead to an exaggerated aging effect.
The aging hypothesis becomes even more improbable when we look at the magnitude of the
generational changes (see chapter four). If these changes are predominately the result of aging
effects, then the average twenty year old Spaniard —with religiosity comparable to someone
from the Netherlands —can expect to become theologically more aligned with someone from
Bahrain by the time they are 100 (see the appendix for chapter six). A more sensible explanation
is that Spain experienced rapid modernization during the 20th century, and thus have the steep
generational changes in religiosity to show for it.
All this is not to say that aging effects do not exist. It simply seems unlikely that they
dominate over birth cohort effects in the case of cultural values.
2.4.2 Modeling the Influence of Generational Change
We have seen in the previous section that generational changes are the key to understanding
cultural value linkages with human development. Using generational time series instead of
cross sectional samples allows us to expand the time horizon of the study from the 25 years
offered by the standard cross-sectional samples in the WEVS, to 100 years based on birth cohorts
stretching back to the early 20th century. Although the generational change signal could be
detected in a cross-sectional time seres with a broad enough time span, we would still have to
control for the uncorrelated and transient opinion changes superimposed on it (see chapter four).
The generational time series can be viewed as a cleaner representation of the cultural value
dynamics that affect human development. Although this is not to say that opinion changes are
random noise; chapters seven and eight demonstrate that this is not the case.
It is easy to imagine how levels of human development affect socialized cultural values:
development leads to a more wealthy environment for successive generations of children and
their socialized cultural values will reflect this affluence [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. It is harder
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to see how socialized baseline cultural values can influence human development, especially
when we take into account the rapid and variable opinion changes that occur throughout life. To
understand this, it is important to note that opinion changes are transient.
In this view, we see opinion change as quasi-random. Hence the longer the time series we
possess, the more likely we will approximate the ‘true’ socialized baseline cultural values for
a given generation. We show in chapter four that opinion changes are high frequency (on the
order of 5 years or less), so the 25 year time span offered by the World Values Survey is long
enough to make a reasonable approximation of the socialized baseline cultural values for a given
generation.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the cultural value (Religiosity) evolution of a country. The red bars
represent the socialized Religiosity level for a given generation (defined as decade of birth) which
remains fixed relative to other generations. However the entire population is subject to opinion
change which is why the box (which represents the entire population) translates up-and-down as
time progresses. With each time step, the oldest generation dies and a new generation is added
with their own socialized levels of Religiosity.
Figure 2.4 also illustrates the two possible causal pathways between cultural values and
human development. If human development causes cultural value change, it does so by influencing
the socialization of generations during their formative years. The yellow part of each population
in figure 2.4 represents children in their formative years and levels of human development during
this time will determine their level of Religiosity. According to developmental neuroscience this
formative period lasts for twenty [Sowell et al., 1999] or thirty years [Petanjek et al., 2011].
On the other hand, should cultural values cause changes in human development, then we
must imagine how macro-level developmental variables can emerge as a product of a country’s
adult population and their cultural value configuration. It is possible that generations have
different levels of influence in society (we might imagine that the young and old do not have as
much influence as the middle aged for instance). But, for the sake of simplicity, we just assume
that all generations have equal influence and that the population average Religiosity has a direct
impact on human development. In practice, the WEVS does not provide us with whole historic
populations, just the cultural values of the the youngest generation. Fortunately, this measure
contains all the relevant information because the relative differences between generations are
fixed (see chapter four). Therefore, any change in the average population-level cultural values
must be proportional to that imparted by the new generation.
Finally, figure 2.4 shows that human development is evaluated at every time point and so
we might expect transient opinion change to have an influence. However, as we see will see in
chapters seven and eight, this is not the case. It appears that human development outcomes
are robust to short term fluctuations in cultural values implying a more diffuse influence that
averages out high frequency period changes.
High frequency and rapid opinion changes are caused by the entire population changing its
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values in response to environmental changes [Acerbi et al., 2013; Gelfand et al., 2011]. These
represent a change in survival strategy during times of insecurity, similar to those seen in other
primates [Dunbar et al., 2009; Hockings et al., 2015]. Humans tighten tried and tested norm
systems that emphasize religious belief [Greeley, 1994], confidence in government [Best et al.,
2006] and stricter punishment for norm-violators [Gelfand et al., 2011]. On the other hand,
during times of existential security, the traditional norm system can be relaxed, which provides
opportunities for innovation [Harrington and Gelfand, 2014] and economic development [Ruck
et al., 2018].
Conversely, generational differences are driven by changing childhood socialization during
formative years, a time when norms and values of the society are learned [House et al., 2013;
Sutter and Kocher, 2007]. A generation in their formative years will learn norms and values
from a number of different sources. One-to-many transmission pathways such as mass media
and universal education systems have the potential to facilitate rapid intergenerational change
[Mesoudi, 2011; Mesoudi et al., 2015]. These pathways have been effective in western countries
for the longest time [Norris and Inglehart, 2009], which might explain the particularly large value
change seen among western publics during the 20th century. However, vertical transmission from
parents [Grusec and Kuczynski, 1997] ensures that new generations are exposed to traditional
values too. This mediating effect explains why generational cultural value change is steady.
2.5 Culturally Similar Societies
In chapter five we use unsupervised statistics to identify four distinct clusters of countries in
cultural value space. Here we review some important past efforts at doing so. Importantly though,
none of these examples used unsupervised statistics to learn clusters from data. They all make
prior conceptual assumptions. Samuel Huntington, in his famous ‘Clash of Civilization’ thesis,
posited a number of world civilization clusters defined using deep rooted cultural characteristics
[Huntington, 1996]. He identified nine clusters —Western, Orthodox, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu,
African, Latin American, Sinic and Japanese —which are defined using ancient and persistent
cultural features like language, religion and geography. This clustering of countries has been
confirmed by survey data; some using matched data samples collected from particular companies
or industries [Gupta et al., 2002; Hofstede et al., 2010; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985] and, more
recently, using global representative samples from the WEVS [Inglehart and Baker, 2000]. That
said, a more parsimonious view is possible. These roughly nine clusters can be collated to just
three: cultures of achievement (Western, Sinica and Japanese), cultures of joy (Latin America,
Catholic Europe, Buddhist) and cultures of honor (Islamic, African, Orthodox) [Basanez, 2016].
Could super-national cultural values correlations exist as a result of shared history, language
or religion? Phylogenetic studies can shed light on this mystery. Cultural traits, like language
and religion, are key cultural identifiers with deep cultural evolutionary histories. We can use
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Figure 2.4: An illustration of cultural value change (using Religiosity as an example) and the
possible causal pathways with human development. Each box represents a population at a given
time, where the red bars are the socialized baseline Religiosity levels of each generation and
the yellow section consists of generations still in their formative years and not part of the active
adult population (each generation is labeled by their decade of birth). As time progresses the
box (population) moves to the right. With each time step the oldest generation dies and a new
one enters with their own level of socialized Religiosity. The entire population can collectively
increase or decrease in Religiosity (opinion change) by moving up or down. Human development
can change cultural values by acting on the part of the population still in their formative years
(the yellow box). Cultural values can change human development if we view the later as an
emergent property of the adult population and their socialized cultural values.
phylogenetic trees of language [Pagel et al., 2007] or religion [Matthews, 2012] as a proxy for
historical relationships between societies. Therefore, through the processes of socialization,it is
possible for two societies to have the same set of cultural values inherited from a shared ancestral
society.
Unfortunately, this simple view of cultural value transmission does not fit with our findings
(see chapter four), where we see large cultural value divergences in just the last 100 years.
However, cultural-history can still influence the distribution of cultural values over this shorter
time period. The preexisting differentials in stable cultural features like language and religion
can act like barriers to the diffusion of other information: such as cultural values. For example,
[Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016] showed the economic benefits of the industrial revolution, caused
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by the technological innovations originating in England, were next observed in countries that
were culturally similar to England. A similar pattern was noted for the spread of economic
and political shocks [Matthews et al., 2016]. It follows from this work that, if Ronald Inglehart
is correct and economic development leads to cultural value change [Inglehart and Welzel,
2005], then this same effect of cultural barriers might also explain cultural-historic divides we
observe in cultural values. In fact, such a pattern can emerge even without reference to economic
development, if the cultural values themselves are diffusive.
The Inglehart-Welzel cultural value map (I-W) uses the WEVS data to define its two di-
mensions (Survival vs Self-Expression and Tradition vs Secular-Rational) and has been used to
develop clusters of countries called ‘cultural zones’ [Inglehart and Klingemann, 2000]. However,
the cultural zones were not arrived at using a clustering algorithm or other objective method.
The countries were simply plotted and rough lines were drawn around historically similar groups.
Another problem is that, although these culturally similar countries are qualitatively convincing
in the two dimensions of the I-W map, they are not detectable in other cultural dimensions like
Prosociality [Minkov et al., 2013].
2.6 Does Economic Development Cause Secularization?
In chapters seven and eight we use our generational time trends, developed in the first half of
the thesis, and compare them statistically to equivalent time series for measures of economic
development and democracy.
In chapter six, we reveal a strong negative correlation between religiosity and economic
development. We are not the first to notice this [Crabtree, 2010; Norris and Inglehart, 2004];
in fact, debate about the link between economic development and religiosity has been raging
for a long time. Emile Durkheim proposed that the functions of religion become obsolete in the
face of economic and institutional modernization, so will fade in the wake of modernization
[Durkheim, 1912]; a perspective endorsed in more recent times [Norenzayan, 2013; Norris and
Inglehart, 2004]. In another view, Max Weber wrote that the productive capacity unleashed by the
‘Protestant work ethic’ explains why Protestant societies tend to be more economically advanced
[Weber, 1930]. These two classic hypotheses diverge on an important empirical prediction: for
Durkheim to be correct economic development must precede religious change, but if Weber is
correct then religious change must precede economic development.
Previous studies addressing this issue prove inconclusive. Some show development preceding
secularization [Hungerman, 2014], some show secularization preceding development [Becker and
Woessmann, 2013] and still others show a co-evolutionary process [Herzer and Strulik, 2017].
Our analysis not only employs a unique perspective on the data by using generational trends as
representative of historical time periods, but it is also more comprehensive in other important
ways.
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One shortcoming in the secularization literature is the limited geographical scope of cross-
national samples. Often the studies are limited to only western countries [Bettendorf and
Dijkgraaf, 2010; Franck and Iannaccone, 2014] or sometimes just a single country [Becker
et al., 2017; Becker and Woessmann, 2013]. One study we know of includes some non-western
countries [Ruiter and van Tubergen, 2009], but this is one of many which prefers instrumental
variable analysis to time series analysis [Becker et al., 2017; Franck and Iannaccone, 2014;
Paldam and Gundlach, 2013; Ruiter and van Tubergen, 2009]. One study spans 167 countries,
but only looks at behavioral change during the limited time span of Ramadan and focuses only
on Muslims [Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2013]. Therefore, our use of a truly global sample
(109 countries drawn from the complete socioeconomic spectrum) is unique.
A second shortcoming in the literature is the narrow definition of religiosity. Religiosity is
usually defined simply as ‘church attendance’ because this data is prevalent [Becker et al., 2017;
Becker and Woessmann, 2013; Franck and Iannaccone, 2014; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2008; Herzer
and Strulik, 2017; Ruiter and van Tubergen, 2009]. Our Religiosity cultural factor (derived in
chapter three) is a more holistic and multidimensional metric. In fact, our metric is similar to that
used in [Paldam and Gundlach, 2013], but they also focused on instrumental variable analysis
instead of time series analysis.
The economics literature on secularization has spawned a new theory called the ‘supply-side
hypothesis’. This is where the reduction of choice in the religious market place —possibly due an
established state church or some other governmental intervention —results in the demand for
religion not being met. It has been used to explain the unusually religious nature of the United
States [Crabtree, 2010], but it does not generalize well to other countries [Norris and Inglehart,
2004]. Other studies have found that institutional innovations and socialization environments
do affect secularization: such as government intervention in the educational system [Franck
and Iannaccone, 2014] and the religious views of parents [Finke and Iannaccone, 1993]. These
examples suggest possible causes for secularization that are not economic.
In chapter six, we show that many of our cultural values correlate with economic develop-
ment. One of these, “Importance of Personal Prohibitions” is correlated with individualism [Ruck
et al., 2018] and [Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011] showed that individualism predicts long run
economic growth, possibly due to its effect on innovation. This effect is robust to the inclusion
of institutional variables and colonial history (both thought to be important for economic devel-
opment [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012]). Individualism is also associated with low corruption
[Hofstede et al., 2010] and corruption is known to retard economic growth [Treisman, 2000].
The rise of individualism is also correlated with self-expression cultural values [Inglehart and
Oyserman, 2004] —one the two dimensions of the Inglehart-Welzel cultural map. Self Expression
has been strongly associated with modernization and human development [Inglehart and Welzel,
2005]. It is part of a recent pattern of cultural value change which also involves the emergence
autonomy.
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2.7 Human Development Sequence Revisited
A prominent model linking cultural values to the emergence of democracy and economic devel-
opment is the ‘Human Development Sequence’ (HDS) [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005], which is
posited as an updated version of modernization theory. It claims that the improved material
circumstances provided by economic development led to the rise of ‘self-expression’ cultural values
because having material security means people can take survival for granted. Self-expression
cultural values are associated with a rise in individualism and autonomy, which creates a popular
drive to institutionalize choice; i.e. have democratic institutions [Welzel et al., 2003]. However,
there is controversy surrounding this causal explanation. Others have claimed that democratic
institutions must emerge first, otherwise self-expression values cannot be adopted [Spaiser et al.,
2014].
The HDS states that the rise of self-expression values is associated with the later stages
of economic development, namely when the economy is transitioning from industrial to post-
industrial. However, the initial stage of economic development, the transition from agrarian to
industrial society, is also also associated with cultural value change: moving from traditional to
secular-rational cultural values. In chapter seven we show that changes in secular values precede
those in economic development, contrary to the standard model of the HDS which assumes the
opposite [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. We should mention that our measure of Secularization is a
narrow representation of the Human Development Sequence’s secular-rational value dimension,
as it is also composed of questions related to respect for authority and autonomy [Inglehart and
Baker, 2000].
Using data from the WEVS, [Foa et al., 2016] showed that ‘support for democracy’ in western
countries has suffered an inter-generational decline. In chapter four, we detected a synchronous
global generational decline in institutional confidence and interest in politics. Taken together,
this confluence of cultural factors might be conceptualized as a decline in support for national
institutions. This finding is surprising because it runs contrary to democratic capital theory
[Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2015] which predicts that familiarity with democratic insti-
tutions strengthens support for them. Western countries, with the longest unbroken record of











In this chapter we used unsupervised methods to find a reduced set of cultural factors fromthe World Values Survey and European Values Survey data (WEVS). Having reviewedprominent efforts at using survey data to measure cultural values in the literature review,
we see how our cultural factors analysis compares. We discuss the technical challenges associated
with unsupervised learning of cultural value factors, such as missing data mitigation, matrix
decomposition, factor interpretation and national aggregation. Our reduced set of cultural factors
are the descriptive cultural value units we utilize in the remaining chapters, where we look at
cultural value dynamics and their interaction with human development variables.
3.1 WEVS Data
We derive our cultural factors using the open-source World Value Survey (WVS) and European
Values Survey (EVS) datasets. They quantify the cultural values of representative samples from
over 100 countries located on every inhabited continent. The EVS was first posited in the late
1970’s by Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moor for capturing European opinion on politics, family,
religion and society. Since then, four completed waves have covered 47 European countries
— as well as the USA and Canada [EVS, 2011]. The WVS — headquartered in Stockholm,
Sweden — was instigated by political scientist Ronald Inglehart and uses similar sampling and
administrative techniques as the EVS. During its six waves since 1981, the WVS has gradually
increased its global scope from just 12 countries (who were largely western), to almost 100 from
the full socioeconomic and political spectrum. Such is the international character of the WVS, it
is cited in thousands of scientific publications in 20 different languages [WVS, 2017].
To achieve this broad coverage, the WVS planners have taken a decentralized approach to
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data collection. A team of social scientists in each country are responsible for their own data
collection, but must adhere to strict centrally planned rules. Samples must contain at least 1000
people to minimize sampling error [Norris and Inglehart, 2004]. Full probability sampling is
recommended, but stratified sampling is permissible to ensure a demographically representative
sample. Should the researchers choose a stratified sampling approach, they must use many
demographic categories so as each nested category contains around 10 individuals. Face to face
interviews must be used, this mitigates non-response bias and allows illiterate people to be
surveyed; although phone interviews are permitted for remote locations [WVS, 2017].
The WVS is centrally translated into English, Spanish, Arabic and Russian. If none of these
languages are spoken by 15% or more of the population, then the national surveyor is responsible
for translation into the local languages. Should this additional translation be required, the
process must involve two translators and a mediator to avoid the pitfalls of old techniques like
’back translation’. If the meaning of a particular question gets lost in translation, then it can
be removed from the survey but no more than 12 questions can be omitted for any reason. Any
violations of these guidelines must be reported to WVS association and they reserve the right to
exclude the results from the country in question. [WVS, 2017].
Systematic behavioural validation for WEVS questions has not been carried out because the
WEVS is seeking to measure cultural values rather than individual values or actual behavior
Welzel and Inglehart [2016]. At the group level, it is possible that collective attitudes will not
match behavior in obvious ways. For instance, politically engaged people actually vote less
[Inglehart, 1977; Norris, 2011] and the most tolerant countries are among the least diverse
[Alesina et al., 2003]. For these reasons, validation of the World Value Survey comes from clear
linkages to group-level external variables such as economic development [Norris and Inglehart,
2004], democracy [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005] and civic attitudes [Norris, 2011]. In one exception,
Deborah Kistler and her colleagues showed that Germans with higher emancipative and secular
values exhibited greater prosociality in experimental games [Kistler et al., 2015].
In fact, using survey data to separate individual-level personality traits from group-level
cultural values is not trivial. Firstly, if people from different cultures do not respond to a question
using the same standard, then cross-cultural comparisons will be affected by the ‘reference
group effect’, which necessitates objective behavioural measures [Heine et al., 2002]. The World
Values Survey ensures standardized question interpretation through careful question design
and translation [WVS, 2017], hence they detect stable cross-cultural differences [Inglehart and
Baker, 2000; WVS, 2017] that are linked with external variables [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005;
Norris, 2011; Norris and Inglehart, 2004]. Secondly, the responses of individuals to surveys will
be necessarily filtered through the culture in which they are socialized [Inglehart and Welzel,
2005; Schwartz, 2006]. Therefore to detect the ‘true’ opinion of an individual, you must correct
for what that person thinks other people think [Goffin and Christiansen, 2003; Prelec, 2004] —
effectively correcting for culture.
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Wave Years # countries # participants # questions
WVS-1 1981-1984 12 19378 320
EVS-1 1981-1984 16 10307 108
WVS-2 1990-1994 18 24588 342
EVS-2 1990-1994 29 38213 384
WVS-3 1995-1999 56 76075 363
EVS-3 1999-2001 33 41125 241
WVS-4 2000-2004 41 60045 337
WVS-5 2005-2009 58 83975 304
EVS-4 2008-2010 47 66281 311
WVS-6 2010-2014 60 85070 298
Table 3.1: Important summary attributes of the six WVS and four EVS waves completed since
1981
Period Years # Countries # Participants
1 1990-1994 44 63551
2 1995-1999 66 116710
3 2000-2004 42 61748
4 2005-2009 81 148302
5 2010-2014 60 86272
Table 3.2: Important summary attributes when the WEVS participants are binned into five time
periods since 1990 at five year intervals (data from the 1980s are excluded)
3.2 Time Resolution and Scope
There are six waves of the WVS and four of the EVS. Given they contain many of the same
questions, we consider both surveys together as the composite WEVS (table 3.1: wave summary
information). The frequency of the WVS and EVS is every five years, so we pool data using this
time interval. Results from EVS waves 3 and 4 transcend the five year boundary meaning the
country’s sample is split, so the entire sample is placed in the five year period containing the
majority of the sample. There is no data for the period 1985-1989, leaving us with data for 6
periods — 1980 to 1984, 1990 to 1994, 1995 to 1999, 2000 to 2004, 2005 to 2009 and 2010 to 2014.
We want to include as many time periods as possible to expand the temporal scope of our study,
but by doing this we also reduce the total number of questions common to all time periods. We
balance this trade-off using Figure 3.1 which shows that increasing the temporal range starting
in 1990 only means a small reduction in the number of common questions. However,starting in
1981 means a sharp reduction in the number of common questions (67 to 48), with only a 6%
increase in total sample size.
The final WEVS dataset we take forward covers the time periods from 1990 to 2014, has
67 questions and 476,583 respondents. Respondents are from 109 unique countries which on
average participated in 2.69 of the five time periods (see table 3.2).
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Figure 3.1: The decreasing number of common questions and increasing number of total partici-
pants from the addition of older waves of the WEVS into the total dataset.
3.3 Missing data mitigation
Dealing with missing data is an essential part of data analysis. It avoids biases and preserves
precision. There are two fundamental approaches: omission and imputation. Omission involves
removing entire observations which contain any missing values. Imputation replaces missing
values with plausible real ones. Omission means information is lost and, if the data is not missing
at random, can result in unexpected biases. Therefore, if possible, data should be imputed.
If the causes of missingness are known then choosing a missing data approach is easy. When
missingness is genuinely random (’missing completely at random’), omission or basic imputation
can be used without biasing the results. Unfortunately, missingness in the social sciences is
rarely completely random. Often the best case scenario is ’missing at random’ where, despite
the structure of the missingness, the structure depends on observed factors. Hence missingness
can be considered random if these dependent factors are controlled for. However, if missingness
structure depends on unobserved factors — or even on itself — avoiding biases will require prior
knowledge of the missingness mechanism.
There are clues regarding the missingness in the WEVS because we know how the data
is collected — some questions may be untranslated for instance. However, as is often the case
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in social science, we do not know all the reasons for missing data, which makes testing for
the structure of the missingness practically impossible. Though as mentioned before, if we
know that the missingness is dependent on some known variables, then it can be treated as
effectively random. Therefore the more variables we include, the greater the probability the
missingness can be considered random [Gelman and Hill, 2007]. Another way of mitigating
unknown missingness structure is through repeated imputation and sensitivity analysis. This
proceeds by first acknowledging that the correct model is not knowable. Then, by creating many
imputed datasets using a range of techniques, if the analysis of all these imputed datasets give
the same result, we can conclude the missingness structure is not important.
We create three data sets using complete case analysis (CC), stochastic mode imputation
(MI) and hot decking (HD). CC involves the omission of all individuals that did not respond to
all 67 WEVS questions. This leaves us with 109,072 complete cases, this is 23% of the original
participants. The other two are imputation techniques.
Our first approach is similar to ’stochastic mean imputation’ which replaces the missing
values within a single variable with random draws from a distribution defined using the observed
sample. However, WEVS responses are on discrete scales, so we use ‘stochastic modal imputation’.
This means we impute based on the frequency of responses in the observed sample. Finally, by
using stochastic imputation and not a deterministic regime, we preserve the observed variance.
Though one shortcoming is that, because imputation is done marginally, the covariance between
variables is depressed [Gelman and Hill, 2007].
The size of the WEVS is sufficiently large so that computationally expensive imputation
techniques such as K-nearest-neighbor (KNN) are not practical. However, our second imputation
method, ’hot decking’ (HD), is similar and computationally cheaper. In KNN, all pairwise distances
between observations must be calculated. HD forgos this expensive process by categorizing
observations into domains based on similarity. It then imputes participants missing value using
the observed value of a randomly selected participant from the same domain [Kowarik and Templ,
2016]. An advantage of HD compared to CC is that it takes into account covariance between
variables. HD is implemented using the VIM package in R [Templ et al., 2017].
The three datasets produced by complete case analysis (CC), stochastic mode imputation (MI)
and hot decking (HD) are taken forward to the subsequent stages of analysis. The same cultural
factors emerge in all cases, so we conclude a lack of sensitivity to our choice of data imputation
technique.
3.4 Finding the Cultural Factors
We have 67 WEVS questions representing a cultural value space, but we assume that these survey
responses can be expressed in fewer dimensions. Here we introduce two ways of reducing the
dimensionality of the WEVS data from different philosophical perspectives. Principal Component
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Analysis (PCA) finds the reduced set of orthogonal axes which best explain the variance in the
data and Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) assumes the survey responses are an emergent
property of some smaller number of underlying factors.
3.4.1 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
PCA maps the high dimensional data onto a new and reduced set of orthogonal components which
more efficiently explain the variance. The first component (PC1) is the direction which explains
the largest proportion of the variance. The second component (PC2) is the direction, orthogonal
to PC1, which explains most of the remaining variance. Then each subsequent component (PCn)
explains the largest proportion of the remaining variance, whilst being orthogonal to all previous
components. We end up with a series of D components (D being the dimensionality of the original
data) which explain a decreasing proportion of the total variance [Templ et al., 2017].
PCA uses Eigenvalue decomposition to express the high dimensional WEVS data as a smaller
set of orthogonal Eigenvectors called components. The Eigenvalues represent the variance
explained by each component and by scaling the Eigenvectors using the square root of its
Eigenvalue, we calculate the component loadings. These loadings are the correlation coefficients
of the original survey questions with the respective components [Templ et al., 2017].
3.4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)
EFA, unlike PCA, is a model based approach. EFA considers survey responses Xd as a weighted





where, Fm are the underlying factors, αd,m are the weights and σd are the errors [Fabrigar et al.,
1999]. Maximum likelihood estimates are found using the ‘psych’ package in R [Revelle, 2016].
The WEVS questions are all on Likert scales and a histogram for each can be found in the
Appendix for this chapter. From inspection, the majority of the questions have distributions
close to normal. However, there are a few that have skewed distributions such as "Is family
important in your life?" However, EFA is a linear model and, therefore, is robust to non-normality
due to the large size of our sample [Ali and Sharma, 1996]. Another reason why EFA might be
inappropriate, is that the Likert scales have different lengths. We mitigate this by normalising
the response variance of each question to equal one. A similar methodology was used in another
factor analyses of WEVS data [Inglehart and Baker, 2000].
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3.4.3 EFA vs PCA
In practice, EFA and PCA are similar in that they attempt to approximate the correlation matrix
of the data with rank D using a reduced one with rank M (where M << D):
(3.2) R =GG′+U2
where R is the correlation matrix of D dimensional WEVS data, G is the M dimensional fac-
tor/component loading matrix and U2 is the error matrix. The key technical difference is that PCA
accounts for all the variance in the survey questions, whereas EFA accounts for only the common
variance. The EFA solution will be similar to the PCA solution in cases where the variables are
numerous or highly correlated because this will increase the common variance [Templ et al.,
2017]. We estimated the average common variance using multiple correlation and found it to be
23%. Hence we do not expect PCA and EFA solutions to converge.
Philosophically, EFA offers a view of survey responses being an emergent property of some
underlying hidden constructs. This assumption is in keeping with the view that the WEVS
questions are the observable manifestation of a discrete set of cultural values. Therefore, we
proceed with EFA, rather than PCA.
However, there is one potential pitfall. The discrete and bounded Likert scales in the WEVS
violate EFA’s normality assumption. This means Pearson correlations are an unnatural measure
of question similarity and polychoric correlations are recommended instead [Baglin, 2014].
Furthermore, the length of Likert scales vary in the WEVS, but EFA requires all response
vectors to have the same variance [Timmerman and Lorenzo-Seva, 2011]. We mitigate the
second problem by normalizing all response vectors so variance equals one and mean equals zero.
Although simulation studies show that polychoric correlations do perform better than Pearson
correlations with low sample sizes [Holgado-Tello et al., 2010], this gap closes as sample sizes
increase [de Winter et al., 2009; Muthén and Kaplan, 1985], hence standard EFA is appropriate
for use on our sample of 476,583 respondents.
3.4.4 Interpretation of Factors
We view the latent constructs derived using EFA as discrete ‘cultural values’ which we call
‘cultural factors’. However, we need a way of interpreting and labelling them. As we have
already touched on, the factor loadings are the correlation coefficients between the known survey
questions and the cultural factors: the larger the absolute factor loading, the closer the survey
question and cultural factor are related. This offers a way of interpreting the cultural factors in
light of known survey questions. Mathematically speaking, we want the factor loading matrix to
have a ‘simple structure’. This means that each cultural factor will be highly correlated with a
small number of unique survey questions.
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3.4.5 Number of Retained Factors
EFA requires that we specify the number of factors it estimates, which means we need some
criteria for choosing. Here we review the two most common factor retention criteria and explain
why we decided to use an alternative.
Henry Kaiser’s (K1) method is perhaps the most common. This is where we retain all factors
with associated Eigenvalues greater than one. This threshold is significant because it represents
the average amount of variance explained by an original WEVS question [Ledesma and Valero-
Mora, 2007]. The second common method is Raymond Cattel’s ‘Scree Test’ (ST). This is a graphical
method where the variance explained by successive factors is plotted and an elbow is identified.
This elbow represents a point after which factors do not explain significantly more variance
[Ledesma and Valero-Mora, 2007]. For the WEVS data, figure 3.2 shows that K1 suggests
retaining 17 factors and ST suggests retaining around 7.
However, we used neither of these approaches. The cutoff suggested by K1 is criticized for
being rigid and arbitrary and simulation studies have shown that it severely overestimates the
correct number of factors to retain [Ledesma and Valero-Mora, 2007]. The number of factors
ST recommends is considered inherently subjective and imprecise. We see in figure 3.2 that K1
suggests nearly two times as many factors as the other methods. Finally, both K1 and ST are
variance based approaches, which makes them more appropriate for use with PCA, which is also
variance driven. Given that EFA assumes the WEVS data is the observed manifestation of some
latent set of cultural values, we want to retain only the factors that can be interpreted in terms
of the WEVS questions.
As mentioned previously, a simple structured factor loading matrix is critical for interpreting
factors. This is why we used ‘Very Simple Structure’ (VSS), a method that retains the number of
factors leading to the most simple factor loading matrix. It does this by approximating the full
factor loading correlation matrix (Σ) with a version of reduced complexity (SST ):
Σ= SST +Σres
where complexity c is the number of highly correlated WEVS questions used to represent each
factor in the factor loading matrix S. We then retain the number of factors which minimizes the
residual matrix Σres [Revelle and Rocklin, 1979], thus maximizing V SS.
V SS = 1—Σres
Σ
VSS is maximized for nine factors, whether we set c = 1 or c = 2 (see figure 3.2). The nine
factors retained by VSS is lower than that suggested by K1 and higher than that suggested by
ST. As we will see in subsequent chapters, these nine cultural factors also correlate with external
variables of human development, which suggests they are valid cultural value units. VSS is
implemented using the ‘psych’ package in R [Revelle, 2016]
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Figure 3.2: Left hand side: the Eigenvalues of successive factors from EFA, with the proposed
number of factors to retain as suggested by the Scree test (green triangle), Kaisers K1 (blue
square) and VSS (black circle). The Eigenvalues are expressed on a log10 scale for clarity. Right
hand side: VSS score for factor retention showing, for complexity 1 and complexity 2, that nine is
the number of factors which maximizes VSS (black circle)
3.4.6 Interpreting the Nine Factors
Our nine cultural factors were retained based on their interpretability in light of the WEVS
questions. Recall this is done by maximising the simple structure of the factor loading matrix,
which ensures each factor is highly correlated with a small set of unique WEVS questions. The
left hand side of figure 3.3 confirms the presence of simple structure for each factor. The right
hand side of figure 3.3 shows the majority of absolute loadings are less than 0.3 with a minority
above 0.4, but none in between. Therefore, we define the threshold as 0.4, above which a factor
loading is considered substantively significant and below which it can be ignored. This means
each factor has between two and nine contributing survey questions which we use to assign a
subjective interpretation. Given the assigned labels are inherently subjective, it is necessary to
present a justification for our choices.
The interpretations of factors one, two, five, six and seven are self-evident and do not require
justification — the labels are Religiosity, Institutional Confidence, Interest in Politics, Wellbeing
and Political Engagement respectively. The questions correlated with factor four reflect whether
cheating in society is justified when unobserved by others. As this type of cheating incurs no direct
cost to the cheater we label it Prosociality, or in other words the tendency not to free ride [Chudek
and Henrich, 2011]. Factor eight reflects the justifiability of a number of individual behaviors
which are sometimes morally prohibited — homosexuality, divorce, abortion, prostitution, suicide
and euthanasia. We have called factor eight Importance of Personal Prohibitions.
Factors three and nine concern the willingness to have a neighbor with a given stigmatized
characteristic. The correlates of factor nine reflect openness to out-groups (other races and
immigrants), so it is straightforwardly defined as Xenophilia. Factor three’s substantive loadings
combine stigmas from seemingly unrelated domains — homosexuals, drug addicts, heavy drinkers
29
CHAPTER 3. NINE CULTURAL FACTORS



















































Figure 3.3: Left hand side: the absolute factor loadings of each factor ordered by magnitude,
showing the cut-off of 0.4 above which the WEVS items associated with the loadings are used for
interpretation. Right hand side: a normalized histogram of all pooled absolute factor loadings
above 0.1, emphasizing the absence of mass between 0.3 and 0.4.
and people diagnosed with AIDS. The stigmas associated with Xenophilia relate to extrinsic
attributes like color of skin or accent, whereas the ones correlated with factor three are intrinsic
properties perceived to be the result of individual choice — in spite of evidence that homosexuality
is not entirely culturally determined [Hamer et al., 1993]. We, therefore, call factor three Intrinsic
Tolerance.
The substantive factor loadings for each factor can be found in their respective tables 3.3-3.11.
Factor Label (Abv.) F1—Religiosity (REL) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Important in life: Religion 0.8
How important is God in your life 0.76
Religious person 0.65
How often do you attend religious services 0.61
Confidence: Churches 0.61
Important child qualities: religious faith 0.54
Table 3.3: Factor 1 is interpreted as Religiosity using the listed substantive factor loadings
(substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater than 0.4)
30
3.4. FINDING THE CULTURAL FACTORS
Factor Label (Abv.) F2—Institutional Confidence (IC) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Confidence: Parliament 0.73
Confidence: The Civil Services 0.66
Confidence: The Government 0.57
Confidence: The Police 0.56
Confidence: The Political Parties 0.55
Confidence: Labour Unions 0.49
Confidence: The Press 0.49
Confidence: Major Companies 0.46
Confidence: Armed Forces 0.43
Table 3.4: Factor 2 is interpreted as Institutional Confidence using the listed substantive factor
loadings (substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater
than 0.4)
Factor Label (Abv.) F3 —Intrinsic Tolerance (IT) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Neighbours: Drug addicts 0.67
Neighbours: Homosexuals 0.59
Neighbours: Heavy drinkers 0.57
Neighbours: People who have AIDS 0.53
Table 3.5: Factor 3 is interpreted as Intrinsic Tolerance using the listed substantive factor loadings
(substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater than 0.4)
Factor Label (Abv.) F4—Prosociality (PRO) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Justifiable: cheating on taxes 0.67
Justifiable: someone accepting a bribe 0.61
Justifiable: avoiding a fare on public transport 0.6
Justifiable: claiming government benefits 0.56
Table 3.6: Factor 4 is interpreted as Prosociality using the listed substantive factor loadings
(substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater than 0.4)
Factor Label (Abv.) F5—Interest in Politics (IP) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Important in life: Politics 0.85
Interest in politics 0.57
Table 3.7: Factor 5 is interpreted as Interest in Politics using the listed substantive factor loadings
(substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater than 0.4)
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Factor Label (Abv.) F6—Wellbeing (WB) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Satisfaction with your life
Feeling of happiness
How much freedom of choice and control
State of health (subjective)
Table 3.8: Factor 6 is interpreted as Wellbeing using the listed substantive factor loadings
(substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater than 0.4)
Factor Label (Abv.) F7—Political Engagement (PE) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Political action: joining in boycotts 0.68
Political action: attending lawful 0.66 demonstrations
Political action: signing a petition 0.63
Table 3.9: Factor 7 is interpreted as Political Engagement using the listed substantive factor
loadings (substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater
than 0.4)
Factor Label (Abv.) F8—Importance of Personal Prohibitions (PP) |corr.|






Table 3.10: Factor 8 is interpreted as Importance of Personal Prohibitions using the listed
substantive factor loadings (substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute
values greater than 0.4)
Factor Label (Abv.) F9—Xenophilia (XEN) |corr.|
Fac. Load. Neighbours: People of a different race 0.69
Neighbours: Immigrants/foreign workers 0.63
Table 3.11: Factor 9 is interpreted as Xenophilia using the listed substantive factor loadings
(substantive loadings are all the WEVS questions that have absolute values greater than 0.4)
3.5 Individual vs Country Level
One of the ambitions of this thesis is to examine cultural value dynamics and to do this cultural
values must be compared across time periods. The WEVS is not a longitudinal study in which the
same individuals are surveyed through time, but takes representative cross-sectional samples
within each participating country. Therefore, in order to quantify cultural value dynamics we
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need to make use of these country-level repeated measures. It is prudent, therefore, to consider
the consequences of moving the analysis from the individual to the country level.
Although cultural values are manifest in human brains, they are really a group level phe-
nomenon and must be considered separately to individual values (or personality traits). The
average cultural value within a population seems to have a strong cultural component that
is linked to historic factors and economic development [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Whereas
the variation within the population — which might be labelled individual level values — is
determined by personality [Schwartz, 2006; Tuschman, 2013].
3.6 Comparisons with External Data
Our cultural factors established a nine dimensional cultural value space. It is more detailed than
the Inglehart-Welzel (I-W) map with two, the Schwartz map with three and the Hofstede map
with six. We have already noted some similarities among the other three cultural value maps
[Schwartz, 2006]. For example, Schwartz and Hofstede’s Individualism vs Collectivism dimensions
are equivalent to the I-W’s Survival-Self-Expression dimension [Inglehart and Oyserman, 2004].
Our nine cultural factors have more in common with the dimensions of the I-W map be-
cause both are derived from the WEVS dataset. However, some key differences exist. The I-W
dimensions — traditional vs secular/rational (T-SR) and survival vs self-expression (S-SE) — are
defined using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). This is a supervised method used to evaluate
a pre-proposed factor-variable structure. Their analysis also only included ten WEVS questions
that the authors considered important [Inglehart and Baker, 2000]. We, on the other hand,
included as many WEVS questions as possible and used the unsupervised factor analysis EFA.
Another critical difference is that the I-W map is a parsimonious description with orthogonal
axes, whereas we relaxed this constraint favoring as many interpretable factors as possible.
We assessed the relationship between the two I-W dimensions and our nine cultural factors
using linear regression (see table 3.12). Our nine factors give a more fine-grained view of cultural
values, so it is unsurprising the regression results show the I-W dimensions only partially explain
each of the factors. Furthermore, some of our cultural factors represent variation not covered by
the I-W dimensions. The I-W dimensions explain less than 10% of the variance in Institutional
Confidence (IC), Prosociality (PRO) and Interest in Politics (IP).
The Human Development Sequence (HDS) is the development model which includes the
cultural value dimensions of the I-W map. It proposes that cultural values move from Traditional
to Secular-Rational during industrialization. From the perspective of our nine cultural factors,
this means a decrease in both Religiosity and the Importance of Personal Prohibitions. Also,
all else being equal, Traditional societies tend to have higher Wellbeing; something noted by
others [Easterlin et al., 2010]. The second phase of HDS involves the move from Survival values
to Self-Expression during the post-industrial period. In our factors, we would see increases in
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T-SR S-SE R2
REL -0.84 (0.04)* -0.21 (0.04)* 0.87
IC -0.21 (0.11) 0.06 (0.11) 0.02
IT -0.05 (0.07) 0.77 (0.07)* 0.55
PRO -0.22 (0.11) 0.25 (0.11) 0.06
IP -0.17 (0.11) 0.13 (0.11) 0.01
WB -0.47 (0.06)* 0.90 (0.06)* 0.75
PE 0.37 (0.06)* 0.64 (0.06)* 0.69
PP -0.54 (0.04)* -0.62 (0.04)* 0.89
XEN 0.10 (0.08) 0.63 (0.08)* 0.44
Table 3.12: Linear regression results illustrating the predictive power of the two I-W dimensions
(T −SR = Traditional vs Secular-rational and S−SE = Survival vs Self-expression) on each of
our cultural factors. Each entry has the following format: coefficient (standard error), * if p <
0.003 (5% Bonferroni corrected statistical significance level)
Wellbeing, Political Engagement, Intrinsic Tolerance, Xenophilia and a further decrease in the
Importance of Personal Prohibitions.
3.7 Conclusion
We have established nine cultural factors which explain the entire WEVS dataset. They represent
a more fine grained description of cultural values compared to the more famous I-W map, whilst
also capturing additional variance. Our analysis was independent of the missing data mitigation
method because the same nine cultural factors were recovered regardless of whether hot-deck,
complete case or mode imputation were employed to impute data. We chose Exploratory Factor
Analysis to factor the WEVS data because there was good reason to see the survey responses
as an emergent property of a hidden set of cultural values; whereas Principal Component
Analysis simply aims to efficiently explain the total variance. Our EFA regime aims at factor
interpretability by maximizing the ‘simple structure’ of the factor loading matrix. Using the small
unique sets of correlated WEVS questions, we are able to interpret our nine factors as Religiosity,
Institutional Confidence, Intrinsic Tolerance, Prosociality, Interest in Politics, Wellbeing, Political
Engagement, Importance of Personal Prohibitions and Xenophilia.
This is the first cultural value space derived from the combined WEVS dataset using unsu-
pervised methods. It is a more fine-grained representation than the prominent I-W map and, by
analyzing the complete data set, we capture previously unexplained variance in the form of three
cultural factors — Prosociality, Institutional Confidence and Interest in Politics.
The nine cultural factors derived in in this chapter represent the conceptual space in which
we study cultural value dynamics and their interaction with human development variables. In
chapter four we look at how the nine cultural factors exhibit a diversity of dynamics and chapter
five uses the nine cultural factors as a basis for forming four cultural value clusters of nations.
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In chapter seven we focus on Secularization and the Importance of Personal Prohibitions in the
context of economic development and chapter eight summarizes the nine cultural factors as three













The WEVS consists of country-level cross-sectional samples collected since 1990. For 85of the countries, we have repeated measures which means we can quantify their culturalvalue dynamics. In this chapter, we quantify rates of change within the nine cultural
factors derived in the previous chapter. We then separate out two modes of cultural value change:
generational and opinion. Generational cultural value change is due to stable differences between
successive birth cohorts, whereas opinion change affects all birth cohorts equally during a given
time period.
We also characterize the two modes of cultural value change. We do this using their rates
of change, short term variability and global average trends. The presence of structure in these
cultural trajectories provides convincing evidence that the measured temporal variation is non-
random. Then, using regressions, we investigate the extent to which generational and opinion
change explain: first the recent cross sectional trends since 1990 and second, modern day cultural
value inequalities.
The WEVS has been released in five waves since 1990 which gives us, at most, a five point
time series for each country. Given the small number of data and relatively short time frame (25
years), it is possible the variation will be dominated by measurement error (discussed in more
detail later). That said, we have time series for 85 countries, so can pool data can detect general
trends and reduce the influence of random measurement error.
4.0.1 Measurement and Sampling Error
Measurement error is when the recorded value of a survey response differs from the true value.
Often, work employing the WEVS data assumes that measurement error is random, or in other
words, uncorrelated with the true values [Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005].
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Measurement error causes hidden data distortions when errors are not independent and occur
if survey items are processed differently by different participants, making them incomparable
[Bound et al., 2001].
The rigorous survey design requirements of the WEVS helps to elevate these concerns. The
modern translation techniques and use of local surveyors help to ensure the questions are
understood uniformly across cultures [WVS, 2017]. Measurement error that is close to random
means we can average across many individuals or survey questions (something Exploratory Factor
Analysis effectively does; see chapter three), this makes us confident our measure converges to
the true value.
To separate generational change from opinion change, we need to further subdivide the data by
birth cohort. Fortunately, the WEVS uses full probability sampling or, at worst, stratified sampling.
This means that, even at the level of the birth cohort, the sample will be demographically
representative. That said, we will get different sample sizes based on the frequency of any given
birth cohort and, therefore, different standard errors (S.E =σ/pN , where S.E is standard error,
σ is the population standard deviation and N is the sample size). We only consider sample
sizes greater than 100 to make sure the standard error is valid — according to the central limit
theorem. This cutoff also means the standard error remains less than 10% of the population
standard deviation σ.
4.1 Results
Utilizing the representative cross-sectional samples provided by the WEVS, we use repeated
measures at the country level to measure the rate of change in each of our nine cultural factors;
whilst mitigating for missing time series values caused by the sporadic participation of countries
in waves of the WEVS. Then we separate opinion O and generational G change from the cross-
sectional t series. We do this by subdividing the data into birth cohorts, which also requires
mitigating missing data caused by under-measured birth cohorts. We show that generational
trends and opinion change are not systematically dependent, meaning we can consider these two
modes of change separately.
We present evidence demonstrating the cultural values dynamics we have detected are non-
random, therefore are not due to random measurement error. We analyze absolute displacement
to show that opinion change is highly variable and subject to rapid short term fluctuations;
but that generational change is gradual and steady. We finally show, using regressions, that
volatile opinion change best explains the recent cultural value change measured using WEVS
cross-sectional samples since 1990. And that contemporary global patterns of cultural value
change are best explained by long-run generational change.
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4.1.1 Two Stage Hierarchical Bayesian Model
We use a two step process to estimate each country’s trajectory in the nine cultural factors. We
can only consider the 85 countries which have participated in two or more WEVS waves (21
countries participated in two waves, 40 in three waves, 13 in four waves and 10 in five waves). The
first stage is a Bayesian hierarchical model that imputes the missing values in the time series.
The hierarchical structure means data from all countries are pooled so that slope estimates are
regularized [McElreath, 2015]. Formally, the first stage is as follows:
(4.1)
X c,t ∼ Normal(αc,ψc) ψc > 0
αc ∼ Normal(αG ,φ) φ> 0
ψc ∼ Nornal(ψG ,χ) χ> 0
X c,t = X presc,t ∪ X missc,t
X presc,t ∼ Normal(X̄ c,t,SEc,t)
Model 4.1 applies to each of the nine cultural factors. The time series for each country X t,c
is drawn from a normal distribution with mean αc and variance ψc. Both αc and ψc are drawn
from global normal distributions with hyper parameters αG and φ then ψG and χ respectively.
The time series are constructed of both observed values X presc,t and missing values X
miss
c,t . Each
observed value X presc,t is drawn from a normal distribution with a mean that is the sample average
for the country c at time t X̄ c,t and a variance that is the standard error for that sample SEc,t.
The second stage is the linear regression, from which we take the slope βc as our measure
of change. The first stage ensures realistically imputed missing values so large short term
fluctuations will not lead to abnormally large estimates for βc. The linear regression used to
estimate βc is as follows:
(4.2) X c,t ∼ N(βc t+µc,σc) σc > 0
where βc is the trajectory of the given country, µc is the intercept and σc is the error.
4.1.2 Inferring Bayesian Models
For a Bayesian model to be analytically solvable it must have a conjugate prior, which means
that it must be from the same exponential family as the likelihood. This is rare, so generally
speaking, Bayesian models are instead numerically inferred. Our model is inferred using STAN
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[Carpenter et al., 2017] which uses Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to sample complex
probability distributions.
Most MCMC engines from the past — such as JAGS and BUGS — use Gibbs sampling
[Carpenter et al., 2017]. STAN, on other hand, uses an adaptive Hamiltonian MCMC method
called ’No-U-turn sampling’ (NUTS). Hamiltonian sampling eliminates the need for inefficient
random walk exploration used in Gibbs sampling, which means it converges on a numerical
solution in fewer samples. That said, Hamiltonian MCMC has internal parameters and its
sampling performance is sensitive to their settings; total number of steps L in particular. However
by adapting it with the NUTS sampling method, these tricky choices are circumvented under
most circumstances [Hoffman and Gelman, 2014]. The major shortcoming of Hamiltonian MCMC
is that, because it uses physical concepts like momentum to choose candidate samples, it requires
a continuous space so cannot easily handle discrete variables. Fortunately our model does not
contain discrete variables and so we are unaffected by this issue.
4.1.3 Cross-Sectional Trends in Nine Cultural Factors
As we have described, we have defined the slope of the above Bayesian linear regression as the
change each country has experienced within each of the nine cultural factors since 1990. We take
the mean across all countries to give us the global average change in each of the nine cultural
factors. The direction of change is ambiguous in all but three of the nine cultural factors. With
95% percent certainty, we can be sure global average Wellbeing (WB) is increasing, Political
Engagement (PE) is decreasing and the Importance of Personal Prohibitions (PP) is decreasing.
Although, even within these three there are many countries showing the opposite trend.
4.1.4 Subdivide Cross-Sectional Samples by Birth Cohort
As well as the cross-sectional sample trends presented above, we also want to analyze the separate
effects of opinion and generational change. To do this we split each of the cross-sectional samples
(in each time period) by birth cohort. For reasons already given, we only retain period-cohort
samples greater than 100. To help ensure as many samples as possible are greater than 100, we
pool birth cohorts by decade (1990’s, 1910’s, 1920’s etc). Table 4.1 is an example of a period-cohort
breakdown. Generational change G is obtained by treating successive generations g as the
temporal variable and averaging over time periods p. Opinion change O is the trend through time
periods p (similar to cross-sectional change t), but the samples are normalized by generation g.
4.1.4.1 Separability of Generational Trends and Period Effects
To discuss separate generational G and opinion O change, we need to check that they do not
depend on each other in any systematic way. Previous work suggests that generational trends in
cultural values are preserved through time and that these trends only translate due to causes
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Figure 4.1: Global average change in the WEVS cross-sectional samples since 1990, in each
each of the nine factors (where R=Religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic Tol-
erance, PRO=Prosociality, IP=Interest in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement,
PP=Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN=Xenophilia). Circles are the mean value over all
countries and bars are the errors defined as the 95 percent interval from a bootstrap sample of
means.
g|p 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
1900
1910 0.46 (0.063) 0.63 (0.056)
1920 0.51 (0.04) 0.6 (0.04)
1930 0.39 (0.049) 0.49 (0.039) 0.45 (0.07) 0.37 (0.069)
1940 0.33 (0.045) 0.43 (0.038) 0.27 (0.06) 0.2 (0.046)
1950 0.21 (0.04) 0.37 (0.031) 0.13 (0.05) 0.1 (0.042)
1960 0.21 (0.044) 0.4 (0.032) 0.11 (0.06) -0.07 (0.047)
1970 0.14 (0.045) 0.12 (0.061) 0.02 (0.054)
1980 0.02 (0.077) -0.18 (0.055)
1990 -0.19 (0.086)
Table 4.1: The generation-period breakdown of Religiosity (REL) for the USA. The rows are
generations and the columns are time periods. Each entry is the sample mean with the standard
error in brackets. A missing time period occurs due to non-participation in a WEVS wave. A
missing generation occurs when it is underrepresented during a given time period (a sample of
less than 100).
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Figure 4.2: Example generational trends in Religiosity (REL) measured in different time periods.
The four countries are Argentina, Nigeria, USA and United Kingdom.
acting on the entire population [Inglehart, 2008]; this is our definition of opinion change. This
view also appears to be true regarding Religiosity (see Figure 4.2).
To test if the separability of generational and opinion change is generally true, we use linear
regression. Specifically, we measure the additional explanatory power of including an interaction
term between generation and time-period p · g. We compare the following two equations:
(4.3) X g,p = γ0 +γ1 p+γ2 g+γ3 p · g+ε
(4.4) Yg,p = δ0 +δ1 p+δ2 g+ζ
where, g = generation, p = time period, ε and ζ = random error. If there is no dependence between
generation and opinion change then γ3≈ 0 and equation 4.3 will have equal explanatory power
when compared to equation 4.4.
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In practice adding more parameters to a regression will always give greater explanatory power
(something called ’overfitting’). Therefore, the explanatory power of any model must be offset
against its number of parameters and so we assess each model using the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC):
AIC =−2log(L)+2k
where L is the maximum likelihood solution for the model and k is the number of parameters. We
calculate the AIC for 4.3 and 4.4, we then subtract the former from the later to give an indicator
of the additional explanatory power offered by the interaction term p · g:
∆AIC = AIC(X g,p)− AIC(Yg,p)
This means that ∆AIC is the additional information gained by assuming there is a systematic
dependency between generation and opinion change. Also, because it is only an indicator, there is
no absolute way of deciding if the interaction term is important, however there is a convention
we can use as a rule-of-thumb. If ∆AIC is less than zero we conclude the interaction term is
totally insignificant because Yg,p provides more information. A ∆AIC between 0 and 2 provides
very weak evidence that p · g is important. A ∆AIC between 2 and 10 gives increasing support
for p · g. A ∆AIC greater than 10 means there is a strong interaction between generation and
opinion [Burnham and Anderson, 2004].
We calculate a ∆AIC for each country and we generally see very little support for p · g in
all nine cultural factors (see figure 4.3). The vast majority of countries show no, or very weak,
evidence for an interaction between opinion and generation (∆AIC < 2), while nearly all provide
no strong evidence for an interaction term (∆AIC > 10). Therefore, we can consider generation
and opinion trends independently.
4.1.4.2 Missing Data Mitigation
We saw in chapter three that very few countries participated in all five WEVS waves, which
presents itself as missing time-periods p. Furthermore, when we breakdown these samples by
generation g, we see missing generations at particular time periods. This is because certain
generations will be too old or young to compose a significant proportion of the population at that
time.
Our measure of generational change averages birth cohorts over all time periods. Figure
4.2 illustrates that opinion changes can be large (see the translation of the trends between
time periods), so we need to meaningfully impute missing generations to avoid biasing the time
period average. Tables 4.2 illustrate the location of missing values and the ones which need to be
imputed.
The early signs in our study (see figure 4.2) and previous work [Inglehart, 2008] suggest
that generational change will be more steady than opinion change. We take advantage of this
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Figure 4.3: The proportion of countries in each cultural factor with no systemic interaction
between opinion and generational change. The y axis is the proportion of countries which have
a ∆AIC less than the value on the x axis (where ∆AIC is an indicator of the importance of the
interaction between opinion and generational change). For each of the nine cultural factors which
are abbreviated as follows: REL Religiosity; IC Institutional Confidence; IT Intrinsic Tolerance;
PRO Prosociality; IP Interest in Politics; WB Wellbeing; PE Political Engagement; PP Importance
of Personal Prohibitions and XEN Xenophilia.
predictability and impute missing generations using a linear model (we further discuss the
relative steadiness of generational and opinion change in later sections). We are only interested
in imputing missing generations which appear in at least one time period (illustrated in table
4.2), thus reducing the amount of extrapolation necessary. The following is the linear model used
for imputation:
Zp,g =µp + Ap gp +εp
where Z+ p, g is the period-generation (p-g) matrix for each country, g is generation decade, p is
time period and ε is the error.
4.1.5 Generational and Opinion Change
By averaging across time period in the newly imputed period-generation (p-g) matrix, we create
the generational time series for 109 countries. Then by averaging across the generation dimension
of the p-g matrix we create the complementary opinion change time series, but only for the 85
countries measured in two or more waves of the WEVS.
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g|p 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 2010-2015
1890
1900
1910 0.46 (0.063) 0.63 (0.056) Impute Impute
1920 0.51 (0.04) 0.6 (0.04) Impute Impute
1930 0.39 (0.049) 0.49 (0.039) 0.45 (0.07) 0.37 (0.069)
1940 0.33 (0.045) 0.43 (0.038) 0.27 (0.06) 0.2 (0.046)
1950 0.21 (0.04) 0.37 (0.031) 0.13 (0.05) 0.1 (0.042)
1960 0.21 (0.044) 0.4 (0.032) 0.11 (0.06) -0.07 (0.047)
1970 Impute 0.14 (0.045) 0.12 (0.061) 0.02 (0.054)
1980 Impute Impute 0.02 (0.077) -0.18 (0.055)
1990 Impute Impute Impute -0.19 (0.086)






1940 0.94 (0.044) 0.96 (0.026) Impute Impute
1950 0.96 (0.028) 0.95 (0.017) 1.01 (0.021) Impute
1960 0.92 (0.022) 0.95 (0.013) 1.05 (0.011) 0.99 (0.025)
1970 0.98 (0.036) 0.96 (0.012) 1.02 (0.009) 0.93 (0.018)
1980 Impute Impute 1.03 (0.014) 0.92 (0.01)
1990 Impute Impute Impute 0.88 (0.018)
Table 4.2: Period-generation (p-g) matrices for Religiosity in the USA (top row) and Nigeria
(bottom row). The rows are generations and the columns are time periods. Each entry is the
sample mean with the standard error in brackets. A missing time period occurs when a country
does not participate in a WEVS wave at that time and a missing generation occurs when it is
underrepresented during a time period (a sample of less than 100). The entries labelled ’impute’
are the values imputed using our linear model.
We measure the generation trend Gc, f and opinion trend Oc, f for each country c in the
nine cultural factors f . We employ the same two-stage Bayesian framework used for the cross-
sectional changes (see figure 4.1). To ensure missing generations are extrapolated reasonably, we
use Bayesian hierarchical imputation (equation 4.1) and then quantify change fusing a linear
regression (equation 4.2). The only differences to the cross-sectional case being that temporal
dimension t will be substituted with generation g in the case of generational change and time
period p in the case of opinion change. Figure 4.4 shows the global generational and opinion
trends in each cultural factor by averaging over all countries.
We see that generational change (right hand side of figure 4.4) exhibits a homogeneous
global pattern. We see increases in Xenophilia, Intrinsic Tolerance, Wellbeing and Political
Engagement and also decreases in Religiosity, Institutional Confidence, Prosociality, Interest in
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Figure 4.4: Left hand side: the globally averaged opinion change ∆O in each cultural factor (85
countries). Right hand side: is the equivalent plot for globally averaged generational change ∆G
(109 countries). All errors are the 95% intervals of bootstrapped sample of means. Rates of changes
are expressed as a proportion of the contemporary total variance. Cultural factor abbreviations:
R=religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO=Prosociality, IP=Interest
in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement, PP=Importance of Personal Prohibitions,
XEN=Xenophilia.
Politics, Religiosity and the Importance of Personal Prohibitions.
In contrast opinion change, like the cross-sectional trends, show globally heterogeneous
change. We only see global average trends towards higher Prosociality, Religiosity and Wellbeing
and lower Political Engagement. This suggests a differing mechanism driving generational
and opinion change because trends in Religiosity, Prosociality and Political Engagement run in
opposite directions.
4.1.6 Are the Measured Changes Non-Random?
We have detected non-zero changes in cross-sectional samples (figure 4.1), opinion (left hand
side of figure 4.4) and generation (right hand side of figure 4.4). The fact we observe globally
directional changes suggests that these dynamics represent real signal and not just measurement
error. To add more weight to this assertion we present the pairwise correlations between the nine
cultural factors for both opinion and generational changes.
If the measured change in cultural values is random then we expect no correlation among the
nine cultural factors. However, even in the case where dynamics are random perturbations, we
would expect to measure some correlations by chance. To avoid the detection of false positives
we set a high bar for their detection: each must meet statistical significance at the conservative
Bonferroni corrected level (p < 0.0014). At this baseline even the detection of a single correlation
would be evidence of non-random structure at 5% level.
The correlation matrix for opinion change shows six correlated pairs of cultural factors which
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REL IC IT PRO IP WB PE PP XEN
REL 0.04 0.09 0.3 -0.21 0.38 -0.4 0.54 0.06
IC -0.01 -0.02 0.24 0.06 0.15 0 -0.27
IT -0.04 0.1 0.04 -0.05 -0.07 0.07
PRO -0.12 0.22 -0.17 0.52 -0.04
IP -0.02 0.56 -0.27 0.02




Table 4.3: Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the opinion changes in the nine
cultural factors. The bold values are statistically significant at the Bonferroni corrected level (p
< 0.0014). Cultural factor abbreviations: R=Religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic
Tolerance, PRO=Prosociality, IP=Interest in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement,
PP=Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN=Xenophilia.
meet statistical significance (adjusted using the conservative Bonferroni correction. Table 4.3
show positive correlations between Religiosity and Wellbeing, Religiosity and the Importance
of Personal Prohibitions, Political Engagement and Interest in Politics, Prosociality and the
Importance of Personal Prohibitions. It also shows negative correlations between Religiosity and
Political Engagement, the Importance of Personal Prohibitions and Political Engagement.
The complimentary correlation matrix for generational change shows even more evidence
of non-random structure. Table 4.4 shows strong generational trend correlations between many
factors. Though there are some interesting differences when compared to the opinion change
matrix. For instance, generational changes in Political Engagement and Interest in Politics are
uncorrelated, but their opinion changes are correlated. Generational trends in Wellbeing also
show no significant correlation with any other cultural factor. Not only does this give evidence
that the measured dynamics are non-random, but also suggests that opinion and generational
change have different causes.
4.1.7 Speed and Variability of Cultural Value Change
The absolute speed of cultural change is an important measure to see whether it is opinion or
generational change which shows greater displacement over short periods. This information is
not captured by figure 4.4 because countries show both positive and negative changes which
offset each other — this is particularly true for opinion change.
We also want to account for the possibility that changes occur at a faster rate than the full
range of the time series. Again, this is particularly the case for opinion change which we suspect
will vary at a higher rate than the 25 year range of the WEVS survey (possibly in response to
exogenous economic shocks [Easterlin et al., 2010; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Therefore, we
define a second absolute speed similar to the first but measured at every 5 year interval. We are
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REL IC IT PRO IP WB PE PP XEN
REL 0.27 -0.63 0.61 0.08 -0.07 -0.62 0.82 -0.52
IC -0.35 0.25 0.21 -0.19 -0.3 0.42 -0.36
IT -0.45 -0.09 -0.02 0.5 -0.73 0.7
PRO 0.25 -0.23 -0.47 0.72 -0.31
IP -0.1 0.34 0.11 -0.01




Table 4.4: Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients between the generational change in the nine
cultural factors. The bold values are statistically significant at the Bonferroni corrected level (p
< 0.0014). Cultural factor abbreviations: R=Religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic
Tolerance, PRO=Prosociality, IP=Interest in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement,
PP=Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN=Xenophilia.
limited to a time resolution of 10 years for generational changes, but we half it so we can present
it as a 5 year interval to facilitate comparisons between opinion and cross-sectional change. This
interpolation is reasonable because, as we will show, generational change is steady even at much
higher time resolutions.
The time series for both opinion and generational change contain many missing values. In
the opinion change case, we can only measure 5 year differences if the country participated in
two consecutive WEVS waves. However there is the risk that excluding countries which do not
meet the participation criteria may bias our result. To address this, we have a version of the data
with missing values imputed using the hierarchical Bayesian model (model 4.1). We present the
results using both the imputed (Oimp and G imp) and non-imputed datasets (O and G) and the
right hand side of figure 4.5 shows the results are insensitive.
The left hand side of figure 4.5 shows the average displacement for opinion change is larger
than for generational change. Even this an underestimation because the differences in displace-
ment over the shorter 5 year period are even greater (right hand side of figure 4.5). It appears
that generational change is steady and persistent with 5 year fluctuations on roughly the same
order as its long-term average; whereas opinion change is large and highly variable.
The largest expected opinion displacement over 25 years is for Prosociality (16% per decade)
and the lowest is for Religiosity (5% per decade). The differences between cultural factors are
accentuated when we look at change over the 5 year period. The right hand side of figure 4.5 shows
large bursts of change over 5 years — around 40% — for Institutional Confidence, Prosociality,
Interest in Politics and Intrinsic Tolerance. This is much higher than that seen for Religiosity,
Wellbeing, Political Engagement and the Importance of Personal Prohibitions, where the bursts
are closer to 20%.
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Figure 4.5: Left hand side: the global mean absolute displacement for generational change (red)
and opinion change (black) — opinion change is averaged change over 25 years and generational
change is averaged over 100 years. The right hand side: the equivalent plot except with global
mean absolute displacement measured over 5 year time periods for opinion change and 10
year period for generational change. Circles represent data with imputed missing values and
squares with omitted missing values. All changes are expressed as a percentage of the total
contemporary observed variance in each cultural factor. Cultural factor abbreviations are as
follows: R=Religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO=Prosociality,
IP=Interest in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement, PP=Importance of Personal
Prohibitions, XEN=Xenophilia.
4.1.8 Long term and short term change
We have shown that generational changes are gradual and steady, whereas opinion changes are
rapid and volatile. Therefore, we might expect opinion change to be the main driver of cultural
value change over the short term and, as opinion change averages out, generational change to be
the driver over the long run.
To test this proposition we run two sets of regressions using generational change and opinion
change as predictors. The first set of regressions test if either generational or opinion change
predict the last 25 years of cultural value change measured using the cross-sectional WEVS
samples (see figure 4.1). In the second set of regressions we test whether generational or opinion
change predict the modern day distribution of cultural values — measured as the average cultural
values from the last 25 years.
Table 4.5 presents the results for regressions 1-9 which determine the effect of opinion change
∆O and generational change ∆G on the last 25 years of cultural value change in each of the
nine cultural factors. For all cultural factors, these account for nearly 100% of the variance. This
means, unsurprisingly, that recent cultural value change is entirely explained by changes in
opinion and the replacement of older generations with new ones. All the effects are statistically
significant, but opinion change has a near one-to-one correspondence, compared to the weaker
effect of generation ranging from 0.36 to 0.73. This suggests that opinion change is the dominant
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R1 R2 R3 R4 R5
Dep Var ∆ REL ∆ IC ∆ IT ∆ PRO ∆ IP
∆G 0.64 (0.06)* 0.55 (0.13)* 0.36 (0.11)* 0.72 (0.11)* 0.58 (0.08)*
∆O 1.01 (0.03)* 0.99 (0.02)* 0.99 (0.02)* 1.03 (0.03)* 0.98 (0.02)*
R2 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.95 0.96
R6 R7 R8 R9
Dep Var ∆ WB ∆ PE ∆ PP ∆ XEN
∆G 0.73 (0.07)* 0.59 (0.06)* 0.48 (0.08)* 0.6 (0.1)*
∆O 1.02 (0.03)* 0.97 (0.02)* 1.03 (0.03)* 1.04 (0.02)*
R2 0.95 0.98 0.95 0.97
Table 4.5: Regression results showing the effect of opinion change ∆O and generational change ∆G
on the last 25 years of cultural value change. This is for all cultural factors which are abbreviated
as follows: R=Religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO=Prosociality,
IP=Interest in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement, PP=Importance of Personal
Prohibitions, XEN=Xenophilia. R2 is the proportion of the variance explained and (*) means
statistical significance has been met at the Bonferroni corrected level (p=0.003).
mode of cultural value change over periods in the order of 25 years.
Table 4.6 presents regressions 10-18 which show generational change ∆G is a better predictor
of the modern-day distribution of cultural values when compared to opinion change ∆O. ∆G
obtains statistical significance for Religiosity, Intrinsic Tolerance, Wellbeing, Political Engagement
and Importance of Personal Prohibitions. Although, we also see ∆O reach statistical significance
for Institutional Confidence and Xenophilia, but with much smaller effect sizes. This tells us
that modern day cultural value inequalities have been shaped by the last 100 years of persistent
generational cultural value change. That said, this is not true for all cultural factors; Prosociality,
Interest in Politics, Institutional Confidence and Xenophilia have distributions not explained by
generational change and, in the case of Institutional Confidence and Xenophilia, are partially
explained by opinion change.
We saw that opinion and generational change entirely explain the last 25 years of cultural
value change (see table 4.5). However, they only partially explain modern day cultural value
inequalities (R2 ranging from 0.09 to 0.58; see table 4.6). Variance explained exceeds 25% only in
cases where there is an important contribution made by generation changes, providing further
evidence that it is generational change that is the primary mode of change when explaining the
modern day cultural value distribution. Our generational trends only stretch back 100 years,
so it seems reasonable to speculate that the unexplained variance might relate to generational
changes which occurred in previous time epochs.
As we have shown, opinion changes occur at much higher frequencies than 25 years, so
we may detect their influence on the distribution of cultural values over shorter time periods.
We run additional tests to see if the global cultural value distribution is affected by opinion
change over just the preceding 5 years. To do this we rerun regressions 1-9 four times: one
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R10 R11 R12 R13 R14
Dep Var REL IC IT PRO IP
∆G 6.17 (1)* 2.9 (1.21) 6.56 (1.2)* 1.8 (0.66) -2.17 (0.82)
∆O -1.09 (0.48) 0.57 (0.19)* -0.19 (0.19) 0.19 (0.15) 0.26 (0.21)
R2 0.34 0.15 0.29 0.09 0.1
R15 R16 R17 R18
Dep Var WB PE PP XEN
∆G -6 (0.73)* 4.36 (0.84)* 6.9 (0.69)* 2.2 (1.17)
∆O -0.13 (0.31) 0.31 (0.26) 0.6 (0.24) 0.85 (0.25)*
R2 0.48 0.27 0.58 0.18
Table 4.6: Regression results showing the effect of opinion change ∆O and generational
change ∆G on the modern day distribution of cultural values. This is for all cultural factors
which are abbreviated as follows: R=Religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic Tol-
erance, PRO=Prosociality, IP=Interest in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement,
PP=Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN=Xenophilia. R2 is the proportion of the variance
explained and (*) means statistical significance has been met at the Bonferroni corrected level
(p=0.003).
for each transition between time periods, where the dependent variable is the static cultural
value distribution at the end of the transition (for example REL1995 , REL2000, REL2005 and
REL2010) and the independent variable is the opinion change that occurred in the 5 years prior
to that period (∆O1995, ∆O2000, ∆O2005, ∆O2010). We continue to include generational change in
the regression and we expect its contribution to remain stable because generational change is
slow and persistent; an assumption that is confirmed in table 4.7.
Table 4.7 shows that spikes in opinion change after 5 years can have a small but detectable
effect on the global distribution of cultural values. We see this in 3/4 of the periods for the
Importance of Personal Prohibitions and Institutional Confidence; 2/4 for Prosociality, Interest in
Politics and Xenophilia and 1/4 for Intrinsic Tolerance, and Political Engagement.
Taken as a whole, these regression results confirm our belief that long-run generational
change is important for explaining modern day cultural value inequalities, but that cultural value
changes on the order of 25 years are largely the product of opinion change. That said, opinion
changes can have transient effects on the global distribution of cultural values of the order of 5
years.
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R101995 R111995 R121995 R131995 R141995
Dep Var REL1995 IC1995 IT1995 PRO1995 IP1995
∆G 5.63 (0.99)* 2.34 (1.18) 7.45 (1.35)* 1.99 (0.66) -2.39 (0.82)
∆O1995 -0.42 (0.18) 0.12 (0.11) 0.08 (0.11) 0.04 (0.1) 0.23 (0.09)
R2 0.32 0.06 0.29 0.1 0.16
R151995 R161995 R171995 R181995
Dep Var WB1995 PE1995 PP1995 XEN1995
∆G -6.88 (0.76)* 3.89 (0.85)* 6.34 (0.74)* 2.19 (1.12)
∆O1995 0.44 (0.19) 0.31 (0.13) 0.44 (0.13)* 0.08 (0.11)
R2 0.53 0.27 0.59 0.06
R102000 R112000 R122000 R132000 R142000
Dep Var REL2000 IC2000 IT2000 PRO2000 IP2000
∆G 5.89 (1.03)* 2.55 (1.19) 7.1 (1.32)* 2.31 (0.64)* -2.06 (0.82)
∆O2000 0.47 (0.27) 0.48 (0.1)* 0.35 (0.06)* 0.26 (0.11) 0.18 (0.12)
R2 0.32 0.26 0.38 0.18 0.1
R152000 R162000 R172000 R182000
Dep Var WB2000 PE2000 PP2000 XEN2000
∆G -6.42 (0.77)* 4.27 (0.85)* 7.51 (0.73)* 2.43 (1.11)
∆O2000 0.25 (0.14) 0.19 (0.16) 0.19 (0.16) 0.5 (0.1)*
R2 0.46 0.24 0.57 0.29
R102005 R112005 R122005 R132005 R142005
Dep Var REL2005 IC2005 IT2005 PRO2005 IP2005
∆G 6.95 (1)* 3.54 (1.33) 6.47 (1.27)* 2.41 (0.69)* -1.58 (0.85)
∆O2005 -0.44 (0.3) 0.43 (0.1)* 0.07 (0.07) 0.38 (0.08)* 0.43 (0.1)*
R2 0.37 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.23
R152005 R162005 R172005 R182005
Dep Var WB2005 PE2005 PP2005 XEN2005
∆G -4.96 (0.76)* 4.61 (0.87)* 7.88 (0.74)* 3.56 (1.26)
∆O2005 0.1 (0.13) 0.45 (0.14)* 0.61 (0.16)* 0.48 (0.11)*
R2 0.35 0.33 0.61 0.27
R102010 R112010 R122010 R132010 R142010
Dep Var REL2010 IC2010 IT2010 PRO2010 IP2010
∆G 6.73 (1)* 3.22 (1.46) 6.52 (1.22)* 1.35 (0.73) -1.58 (0.9)
∆O2010 0.19 (0.27) 0.38 (0.11)* 0.19 (0.12) 0.43 (0.07)* 0.32 (0.08)*
R2 0.36 0.15 0.27 0.31 0.17
R152010 R162010 R172010 R182010
Dep Var WB2010 PE2010 PP2010 XEN2010
∆G -4.62 (0.7)* 5.03 (0.91)* 8 (0.81)* 4.12 (1.4)
∆O2010 0.24 (0.12) 0.23 (0.16) 0.58 (0.16)* 0.25 (0.12)
R2 0.4 0.31 0.56 0.14
Table 4.7: We rerun regression 10-18 to see the effect of opinion change (of the order of 5 years)
∆Oyear and generational change ∆G on the global distribution of cultural values. We do this
for each of the four time-period transitions (1995, 2000, 2005, 2010). This is for all cultural
factors which are abbreviated as follows: R=Religiosity, IC=Institutional Confidence, IT=Intrinsic
Tolerance, PRO=Prosociality, IP=Interest in Politics, WB=Wellbeing, PE=Political Engagement,
PP=Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN=Xenophilia. R2 is the proportion of the variance
explained and (∗) means statistical significance has been met at the Bonferroni corrected level
(p=0.003).
4.2 Discussion
We have representative cross-sectional samples for 109 countries, 85 of these have been measured
repeatedly during the last 25 years. We use Bayesian regression, with a preliminary missing data
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imputation stage, to measures changes in the nine cultural factors we derived in chapter three.
We then separate generational change (which occurs as old birth cohorts are replaced with new
ones) and opinion change (where the entire population changes their mind at particular time)
from the aforementioned cross-sectional data. Finally, we document the differing characteristics
of these two modes of cultural value change and their effects on both recent cultural value change
and the modern day distribution of cultural values.
We imputed missing values using a Bayesian hierarchical model which, by pooling data across
countries, means imputations are constrained to take reasonable values [McElreath, 2015]. This
is important when there are only a few data points and large change occurs. This shrinkage
should moderate our expectations (after all, in certain cultural factors, we saw changes of 40% of
the total observed range in just 5 years). The imputation stage ensures that these fluctuations do
not lead an unrealistic regression slope. In other words, it prevents over-fitting.
The WEVS cross-sectional samples since 1990 reveal no average global cultural value dynamic.
We see unambiguous average increases in Wellbeing and decreases in Political Engagement and
Importance of Personal Prohibitions, but there are a still a number countries showing change in
the opposite direction. The three possible modes that drive cultural value change are generational
(the replacement of older generations by new ones), life-cycle (changing with age) and opinion
(the entire population changes during a particular time period). Identifying their independent
effects is analytically impossible [De Vries, 2005; Down and Wilson, 2013], hence we examine
only generational and opinion change because previous long-term studies of cultural values show
that life-cycle effects are relatively small [Inglehart, 2008].
Generational change is slow and persistent, whereas opinion change is rapid and highly
variable; this may stem from their respective causes. Generational trends represent ’baseline’
cultural values, formed through processes of socialization during formative years [Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005]. Whereas opinion change occurs at a particular time and affects the entire popula-
tion - potentially caused by high frequency economic changes like inflation and unemployment
[Easterlin et al., 2010; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. We show statistically that generational and
opinion changes are independent of each other. Due to the fact that opinion change affects the
entire population equally [Inglehart, 2008], differences in cultural values between successive
generations are preserved.
Opinion change, like cross-sectional change, is globally heterogeneous. So, unsurprisingly, we
show the last 25 years of cultural value change (measured using the cross-sectional samples) is
overwhelmingly determined by opinion change, with only a limited effect due to generational
replacement. Democratic systems often operate within time windows of 25 years or narrower, so
governments will want to manage public opinion within similar-sized time frames. It is important
for them to understand that opinion change is highly variable and hard to predict. Moreover,
changes in opinion are unrelated to the more persistent generational trends, the effects of which
will dominate in the long run.
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Generational change, unlike opinion change, has exhibited a clear homogeneous global
average pattern during the last 100 years. To greater or lesser degrees, the world is increasing
in Intrinsic Tolerance, Xenophilia, Wellbeing and Political Engagement; and decreasing in
Religiosity, Institutional Confidence, Interest in Politics, Prosociality and the Importance of
Personal Prohibitions. This suggests that the drivers of generational change are universal and
can affect all countries simultaneously, whereas the idiosyncratic nature of opinion change
suggests more local causes.
In chapter three, we identified cultural value variation not accounted for in the Inglehart-
Welzel (I-W) cultural map [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Coincidentally it is these three cultural
factors — Institutional Confidence (IC), Interest in Politics (IP) and Prosociality (PRO) — that
exhibit the most interesting dynamic behavior. In all three cases, the last 100 years of generational
trends do not provide a statistically significant explanation for their modern day distributions
(these are 3 of the 4 of cultural factors where this is the case). Moreover, opinion change within
these cultural factors is particularly volatile (these are 3 out of 4 of the cultural factors where we
see 40% changes over 5 year periods). The dominance of opinion over generational change means
the respective trajectories of Prosociality, Institutional Confidence and Interest in Politics are
harder to predict.
4.3 Conclusions
Using a unique two stage Bayesian regression framework we use the representative cross-
sectional samples provided by the WEVS to measure cultural value change since 1990. We see
that the last 25 years is characterized by idiosyncratic change with few clear global average
trends. We identify and measure two distinct modes of cultural value change: generational and
opinion change. We find that generational change is gradual and steady, where opinion change is
rapid and variable.
We show that the last 25 years of cultural value change is predominantly explained by opinion
change, but that modern day cultural value inequalities are determined by long-run generational
changes. Although, in the three new cultural factors (Institutional Confidence, Interest in Politics











Countries that are linguistically, religiously or geographically similar, tend to have similareconomic development [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005], corruption [Treisman, 2000], lifeexpectancy [Deaton, 2013] and, significantly for us, cultural values [Inglehart and Welzel,
2005]. Unfortunately, cultural value clusters are generally a-priori defined using the linguistic,
religious or geographic consistencies we mentioned. We use an unsupervised clustering algorithm
(k-means) to see if these cultural-historic clusters can be identified with minimal assumptions.
We then describe the nature of these clusters within each of the nine cultural factors — for
example, we might expect clusters to more separable in certain cultural factors. Next, we see
how cultural-history influences the two independent modes of cultural value change derived in
chapter four: opinion and generational change. We also bring in external data to characterize the
clusters in terms of economic development.
5.1 Cultural Classifications in Anthropology and Ethical
Considerations
Using quantitative methods to cluster countries according to cultural values is important in
human development studies. Using quantitative methods and data makes the debate more
objective by shifting the argument away from descriptive approaches. Arguments about the
human condition are fraught because our cognitive biases evolved for use in the very same social
realm that we are seeking to study [Kahneman, 2011]. Quantification moves the argument into
the abstract domain, meaning the resultant topics of debate — such as modeling assumptions
and data collection techniques — are less emotionally charged. Moreover, using unsupervised
learning methods minimizes the modeling assumptions we have to make in the first place. Once
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clusters have been detected, they can be the basis of a number of different research questions. In
this chapter, we will ask to what extent our clusters are explained by shared cultural-history and
which cultural mechanisms might explain them [Matthews et al., 2016; Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2016].
We made reference to a number of prominent qualitative cultural value clusterings in the
literature review [Basanez, 2016; Huntington, 1996; Inglehart and Baker, 2000], but there is
also a history of classifying cultures in anthropology. Most notably, Ruth Benedict’s ’Patterns of
Culture’ [Benedict, 1937] where she classified cultures on a value dimension ranging from the
wild abandon of ‘Dyonisians’ to the strict rules of the ‘Apolonians’. Benedict’s methodologies no
doubt influenced Margaret Mead’s work in Samoa [Mead, 1928]. More recently, building on work
by Pertti Pelto [Pelto, 1968], Michelle Gelfand has classified countries according to loose or tight
adherence to cultural norms [Gelfand et al., 2011].
There are ethical considerations surrounding the classification of cultures that need to be
taken seriously. Victorian-era theories about hard-wired differences between different racial
groups [Galton, 1869; Spencer, 1857] led to pseudoscientific disciplines like eugenics and phrenol-
ogy that were based on false premises. The human species is actually unusually genetically
homogeneous [Ebersberger et al., 2002] and there is no teleology leading societies to become ever
more complex [Currie et al., 2010; Flannery and Marcus, 2012].
The cost of ignoring between-cultural differences, is the possibility that unscientific as-
sumptions regarding group differences go unchallenged. Risking the proliferation of pernicious
stereotypes [McCrae and Terracciano, 2005]. Therefore, quantitative cross-cultural comparisons
are a vital tool for understanding human development as objectively as possible in the social
sciences.
5.2 Methods
There are a number of unsupervised clustering techniques we could employ. They can be cat-
egorized under two headings: flat and hierarchical clustering. Flat clustering methods can be
deterministic (like k-means) or probabilistic (like soft k-means). Hierarchical methods can be
bottom up (like agglomerative hierarchical clustering) or top down (like divisive hierarchical
clustering). Dimensionality reduction tools like Principal Component Analysis or Exploratory
Factor Analysis are also used for clustering. However, we limit our discussion to the two most
common techniques: k-means and agglomerative hierarchical clustering.
K-means clustering is a flat clustering method. K-means aims to find cluster centers that
minimize the euclidean distance between the observations (countries in our case) and their











where RSSk is the total deviation of the assigned observations ωk from the centroid of cluster µk,
x is the vector of all observations and RSS is the total deviation between all observations and
their respective cluster centers.
The k-means clustering algorithm uses the following iterative procedure: first, cluster centers
are set to randomly selected observations from the data (seeds), then each observation is assigned
to its nearest cluster center, the cluster centers are then adjusted to the mean of the observations
assigned to it, then the observations are reassigned to their nearest cluster based on these
new centers. This process is repeated until the cluster centers have converged. In certain cases
this may require an impractical amount of time, so a compromised result is often used once a
maximum iteration limit as expired or when an acceptable threshold for RSS or ∆RSS has been
reached.
K-means is computationally cheap compared to hierarchical clustering; it boasts linear time
complexity (O(IK NM)), where I is the number of iterations, K is the number of clusters, N is
number of observations and M is the number of vector distances that must be calculated. This
makes k-means a better candidate for very large datasets
One shortcoming of K-means is that is not deterministic — in that the algorithm does not
guarantee we arrive at the global optimum. Under our regime, we increase our chances of finding
the global optimum by running the k-means algorithm using many different random seeds and
taking the best result from the ensemble of results. Sometimes a preliminary method is used to
intelligently select the initial seeds, but this would still not ensure we obtain the global minimum
RSS.
Perhaps the most striking shortcoming of k-means is that we need to choose the number of
clusters K a-priori. There is no foolproof way of choosing this parameter. We know that RSS will
decrease monotonically with the number of clusters (asymptomatically RSS = 0, when k = N;
where N is the number of observations.) Therefore, similar to the Scree plots we used in chapter
three, used to decide the number of factors to retain in Exploratory Factor Analysis, we can look
for an elbow in the RSS vs number of clusters (K) plot which indicates the point where additional
improvements in RSS gained by adding extra clusters is diminished [Manning et al., 2008].
Hierarchical clustering is an iterative bottom-up clustering method. It begins with each
observation making up its own cluster (K = N), then with each iteration the two clusters which
are considered ‘nearest’ are merged into one. This is repeated until just a single cluster remains.
This forms a hierarchy of similarity, where the number of clusters (K) depends on the chosen
clustering depth. Hierarchical clustering is flexible in that it can be used with a wide variety of
data, just so long as a distance metric can be defined. On the down side, the algorithm is more
computationally expensive because it has to compute pairwise comparisons of all clusters in each
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iteration. This leads to a computational cubic time complexity O(n3) which makes it unsuitable
for large datasets.
The outcome of hierarchical clustering hinges on the definition of ‘nearest’. There are a
number of ways the distance between clusters is measured and each gives a different result.
Single linkage defines the distance between two clusters using the nearest observations within
each. This tends to create long thin clusters because a cluster containing many observations has a
greater probability of any one of its observations being near to any other cluster. Complete linkage
uses the farthest point in each cluster. This forms clusters of more equal diameter because it
favors merging clusters with the smallest diameter (generally those with fewest points). However,
sensitivity to outliers is a problem with complete linkage. The maximum value in a sample scales
with the size of that sample, this means large clusters are more likely to absorb other clusters
if there are outliers. Using some scale-invariant measurement of maximum value (like 95th
percentile) would solve this problem.
There are a few other definitions of ‘nearest’ cluster that are less common. Average linkage
takes the average pairwise distance between all members of each cluster; Ward linkage tries to
to minimize the variance within each cluster — analogous to k-means clustering — and centroid
linkage merges the two clusters which have the nearest centroids [Manning et al., 2008].
5.3 Results
Our ambition is to cluster the 109 countries which participated in the WEVS using the nine
cultural factors derived in chapter three. Each country’s position in the nine cultural factor space
is determined by its mean value measured over the last 25 years. Taking the 25 year average
minimizes the influence of rapid and variable opinion changes (see chapter four).
We chose to use k-means instead of hierarchical clustering for two main reasons. The first
being that k-means takes into account the global variance with every iteration of the algorithm,
whereas hierarchical clustering can only make local merge choices based on the state during
that particular iteration. Secondly, we are not interested in knowing the depth structure of the
clusters, so flat clustering is fine for our purposes. Plus, the similarity structure between countries
is really a network, and any attempt to describe it in a lower dimensional space like a hierarchy
is necessarily imposing some constraint which could be arbitrary. There are network analysis
methods, such as community identification, which might be a better way to discover clusters with
depth [Newman and Girvan, 2004].
As mentioned before, when using k-means it is hard to be sure we have reached the globally
optimum solution. To improve our chances, we run k-means 1000 times with different randomized
seeds and use the cluster centers which provide the lowest residual RSS from the ensemble.
Figure 5.1 shows that 1000 random seeds is sufficient for the effective global minimum RSS to
be obtained; even when the parameter space becomes complex as K increases. It shows that the
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Figure 5.1: The number of random seeds used in k-means clustering to reach an effective global
minimum RSS (improvements below a threshold ∆RSS < 1 are considered insignificant). The
blue line is the median number of seeds needed to reach minimum RSS. The k-means algorithm
is run for 200 iterations in all trials. Each black circle represents a trial (50 trials for each cluster
number and number of seeds combination). The y axis is on a log scale for clarity.
median number seeds to reach the minimum is always under 100 (the blue line). It also shows
that only in rare cases does it take more than 100 seeds (see the black circles).
5.3.1 Number of Clusters (K)
Choosing the number of clusters K is an important, yet fairly subjective, part of k-means
clustering. One criterion is to choose the number of clusters which minimizes the total squared
residual (RSS). However, as we have discussed, the more clusters we add, the smaller RSS will
get. This is because we are adding nine parameters (one for each cultural factor) every time
we add a cluster; this is called over-fitting. As we saw in chapter four, we can use the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) to penalize additional parameters and find the optimum number of
clusters. Formally:
AICK = RSS+2mK
where m is the number of dimensions (nine cultural factors) and K in the number of clusters.
Figure 5.2 illustrates that the AIC is lowest when K =2, 3 and 4; this suggests the optimum
number of clusters falls in this range. The top map in figure 5.3 shows the geographical distri-
bution of countries when we assume two clusters (k = 2). The divide is roughly between rich
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Figure 5.2: AIC vs the number of clusters in the k-means algorithm (k). AIC evaluates the
goodness of fit of the k-means algorithm for a given cluster number k, but it penalizes additional
clusters to avoid overfitting. The AIC is lowest for k = 2, 3 and 4, highlighted by the red region.
countries, in northern latitudes above Southern Europe, and poor ones in southern latitudes. The
notable exceptions are the rich southern hemisphere countries like Australia and New Zealand.
Also, Argentina and Uruguay fall into the rich cluster unlike all other Latin American countries
(we will discuss the anomaly of Uruguay later). Certain Eastern European countries fall into the
poor cluster.
When we chose k = 3 (the bottom map in figure 5.3), we see the same divide between rich
western countries and the poorer (largely African-Islamic) countries in the southern latitudes.
However, an intermediate cluster emerges consisting largely of the former communist countries
in Eastern Europe. Interestingly, Latin America is divided among the three clusters: Uruguay and
Argentina remain with the western countries, Chile and Peru fall in with the former communist
counties and the others remain clustered with the poor southern latitude countries. It is difficult
to see why Latin American countries would be clustered in this way.
We decided that k = 4 was the correct number of clusters because it better reflects cultural-
history (see figure 5.4). The new fourth cluster consists of Catholic countries — those of Latin
America and prominent European Catholic countries like Ireland, Poland and Italy. For illus-
trative purposes, we try adding a fifth cluster, but this only serves to arbitrarily divide the
African-Islamic cluster; see figure 5.5. This split is not on cultural-historic grounds, so we con-
clude that the correct number of clusters is k = 4. That said, there are still interesting anomalies
even with four clusters, we will explore these later. We implemented k-means using the statistical
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Figure 5.3: Top map: the geographical distribution of countries when we assume there are two
clusters (k = 2). Bottom map: the distribution of countries when we assume there are three
clusters (k = 3). Countries which have no data are left white.
programming language R.
5.3.2 Cluster Membership
The 109 countries of the WEVS are assigned to the four clusters as follows:
1. Czech Rep., Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Australia, Finland, Great Britain, New Zealand,
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Figure 5.4: Geographical distribution of countries when we assume four clusters (k = 4). The
colored clusters are labeled as follows: Western (blue), Catholic (purple), Communist-Confucian
(red) and African-Islamic (green). Countries which have no data are left white.
Figure 5.5: Geographical distribution of countries when we assume there are five clusters (k = 5).
Countries which have no data are left white.
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Norway, Sweden, Uruguay, United States, Germany, Slovenia, Canada, Israel, Andorra,
France, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Luxembourg.
2. India, Nigeria, Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, El Salvador, Azerbaijan, Georgia,
Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania,
Uganda, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Malaysia, Mali, Rwanda, Thailand,
Zambia, Ethiopia, Qatar, Uzbekistan, Palestine, Libya, Yemen, Tunisia, Bahrain, Kuwait,
Cyprus (T), Kosovo
3. Belarus, China, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro,
Romania, Ukraine, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Lebanon
4. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Poland, South Africa, Colombia, Peru, Puerto Rico, Do-
minican Rep., Venezuela, Singapore, Trinidad and Tobago, Cyprus (G), Italy, Guatemala,
Ecuador, Greece, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, North Ireland
Using the cultural-historic character of the countries assigned to each cluster, we have
tentatively labeled them as follows: 1 = Western, 2 = African-Islamic, 3 = Communist-Confucian
and 4 = Catholic. Figure 5.6 is two pairwise plots which illustrate clear cultural value differentials
between the clusters. The ellipse diameters are the sample standard deviation of the members of
each cluster. As we can see, the clusters are statistically non-overlapping.
5.3.2.1 Establishing Clusters Using Posterior Samples
As we saw in chapter three, the majority of countries did not participate in all five of the WEVS
waves. The resulting missing values in the time series were imputed according to our Bayesian
hierarchical model (chapter four). This means that the average cultural factor scores during the
last 25 years are actually posterior distributions, not the fixed values we have used thus far (the
fixed values we use are the mean values of the posterior distributions).
It is important to check the significance of this uncertainty and its effect on the cluster
assignments. To do this, we run the same k-means clustering algorithm on each of the posterior
samples (giving us 2000 different cluster assignments). However, when we try to compare the
posterior samples we have the problem of ‘label switching’, which stems from the fact that cluster
labels are arbitrary. A country could be assigned to cluster A in one posterior sample and cluster
B in another, yet the other countries within that cluster may be largely the same. The important
information for deciding whether a pair of countries are similar is the frequency with which they
are clustered together.
Once we have calculated the pairwise probabilities of countries falling into the same cluster
(based on the 2000 k-means outcomes, one for each posterior sample), we are left with a network
of probabilities and a community detection problem [Newman and Girvan, 2004]. Ideally, we
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Figure 5.6: Illustration of the distributions of the four cultural value clusters using two pairwise
examples. Left hand side: Xenophilia (XEN) vs Importance of Personal Prohibitions (PP). Right
hand side: Religion (REL) vs Wellbeing (WB). The small circles each represent individual countries
(N=109). The ellipses represent each of the clusters, where the centers are the cluster centers
and the diameters are the within cluster standard deviation. The clusters are colored as follows:
blue = Western, green = African-Islamic, red = Communist-Confucian, purple = Catholic.
would like to know which countries are highly likely to fall into the same cluster, so we employ
a conservative cutoff point: if the probability of two countries clustering is less than 0.95, we
assume the countries are not related.
This result is four isolated components in the network. They correspond well with our original
four clusters:
1. Japan, Spain, Switzerland, Australia, Finland, Great Britain, New Zealand, Norway, Swe-
den, Uruguay, Germany, Canada, Andorra, France, Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Den-
mark, Iceland, Luxembourg.
2. Nigeria, Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, Georgia, Algeria, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Ghana, Malaysia, Mali,
Rwanda, Qatar, Palestine, Kuwait, Kosovo
3. Belarus, China, Russia, Slovakia, South Korea, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Serbia and Montenegro, Ukraine, Taiwan, Hong Kong
4. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Poland, Colombia, Peru, Puerto Rico, Dominican Rep.,
Trinidad and Tobago, Italy, Guatemala, Ireland, Portugal, North Ireland
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However, there were a number of countries that were singleton isolates. In other words,
they were not conclusively attached to any of the four network components. They were Czech
Rep., India, South Africa, El Salvador, United States, Venezuela, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia,
Croatia, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Iran, Israel, Kyrgyzstan, Singapore, Viet Nam, Burkina
Faso, Cyprus (G), Thailand, Zambia, Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Ecuador, Libya, Yemen,
Lebanon, Tunisia, Bahrain, Cyprus (T), Greece and Malta.
A number of these singleton countries were also those which fell into surprising clusters
during the standard k-means (such as Singapore and South Africa being in the Catholic cluster
for instance). Therefore, by taking into consideration the uncertainty surrounding contemporary
cultural values, we are able to explain why certain countries were not clustered according to their
cultural-history.
5.3.3 Clustering Within Cultural Factors
Though the k-means algorithm has identified four clusters, we may not expect the clusters to
be separable in all nine cultural factors. We define clusters as being distinct from one another if
the sum of the distributions is bimodal. For example, in a situation where all the clusters are
separated, we would expect the total summed distribution to have four peaks, and, in cases where
they are mixed, just one.
We know a mixture of two distributions is bimodal if |µ2 −µ1| > σ1 +σ2. In other words,
when the sample standard deviation region of the first distribution (with parameters mean =µ1
and SD = σ1) and the standard deviation region of the second distribution (with parameters
mean = µ2 and SD = σ2) do not overlap [Schilling et al., 2002]. Figure 5.7 shows the cluster
distributions in two illustrative cultural factors: one where there is complete mixing (right hand
side) and one where the clusters are largely separated (left hand side).
Figure 5.8 shows that Institutional Confidence (IC), Interest in Politics (IP) and Prosociality
(PRO) show no separation between the clusters. We see a bimodal distribution in the case of
Religiosity (REL), where Communist-Confucian mix with Western countries, and Catholic and
African-Islamic countries mix at different ends of the scale. We also see bimodal distributions for
Xenophilia (XEN) and Intrinsic Tolerance (IT), but this time Catholic countries mix with Western
ones and Communist-Confucian are at the intolerant end with African-Islamic countries. The
final bimodal cluster is Political Engagement (PE), where the West alone is highly politically
engaged, the other three are mixed at the politically disengaged end of the scale. Finally, there are
two factors which are tri-modal. The first is Wellbeing (WB), where the West and Catholic coun-
tries have the highest wellbeing, followed by African-Islamic and lastly Communist-Confucian
countries which have very low Wellbeing. The second tri-modal factor is the Importance of Per-
sonal Prohibitions (PP), where Western countries find them unimportant, Communist-Confucian
and Catholic countries are mixed and Islamic-African countries find them important.
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Figure 5.7: Illustration of cluster separability in two cultural factors. Left hand side: Prosociality
(PRO). Right hand side: Importance of Personal Prohibitions (PP). The colored lines represent
the distributions of countries within the following clusters: blue = Western, purple = Catholic,
red = Communist-Confucian and green = African-Islamic.
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Figure 5.8: The distribution within each cluster in each of the nine cultural factors. The circles
are the cluster mean and the bars are the sample standard deviation of the countries within
each cluster. Each cluster is colored as follows: blue = Western, green = African-Islamic, red =
Communist-Confucian and purple = Catholic. Cultural factor abbreviations are as follows: REL
= Religiosity, IC = Institutional Confidence, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO = Prosociality, IP =
Interest in Politics, WB = Wellbeing, PE = Political Engagement, PP = Importance of Personal




Aside from the separability of the clusters, we want to know the absolute variance within each
cluster because it gives an idea of the ‘tightness’ of the cluster. To do this, we utilize a measure
we call Heterogeneity H, which is the average absolute distance of each cluster member to its
center. Formally:
(5.3) Hk, f = E[|D i|]
where, D i is the distance between country i and its respective cluster center k in the cultural
factor f .
The top row of figure 5.9 shows that the heterogeneity of the clusters within each of the
cultural factors are usually comparable. We see the same similarity when measuring H across
all nine cultural factors — making use of the multi-dimensional version of Heterogeneity Hk =




f . By this measure, we see that Western,
Catholic and Communist-Confucian clusters have roughly equal heterogeneity (Hwest = 4.18±0.37,
Hcath = 4.36±0.18 and Hcom−con = 4.43±0.36, where the error of the bootstrapped samples
are in the 95th percentile). The exception is the African-Islamic cluster which is far looser
(Vaf r−isl = 5.88±0.3). This is driven by a large range of opinion in Institutional Confidence (IC),
Interest in Politics (IP),Tolerance of Intrinsic Differences (IT) and Xenophilia (XEN).
If we look at the combined cluster heterogeneity in each cultural factor (bottom row of
figure 5.9), there are some interesting differences. We see tight clusters for the Importance
of Personal Norms (HPP = 0.32±0.04) and Religiosity (HREL = 0.42±0.05), but loose clusters
for Institutional Confidence (HIC = 0.64± 0.09), Interest in Politics (HIP = 0.66± 0.07) and
Prosociality (HPRO = 0.75±0.08).
5.3.5 Value Change Within Clusters
In chapter four, we separated generational change (the socialized change occurring in successive
birth cohorts) and opinion change (transient change which affects the entire population at a
particular time). We did this by splitting the representative cross-sectional samples provided by
the WEVS by birth cohort. We compare the opinion and generational change within each cultural
value cluster.
Figure 5.10 shows the generational and opinion changes within each cluster in each of the
nine cultural factors. The bottom row of figure 5.10 shows that generational change is stronger
in Western compared to African-Islamic countries (6/9 of the cultural factors); also very often
Communist-Confucian and Catholic countries show intermediate generational change. Two of
the exceptions are Institutional Confidence and Interest in Politics, which incidentally are two of
the cultural factors where the clusters are not separable. Futhermore, African-Islamic countries
generally exhibit near zero generational change (8/9 of the cultural factors), the exception being
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Figure 5.9: Top row: the heterogeneity H for the four clusters in each cultural factor. Bottom row:
the combined heterogeneity H of all clusters in each cultural factor. The circle is the mean H and
the error bars are the 95th percentile of a bootstrap sample (N=200). The four cultural value
clusters are colored as follows: blue=Western, green=African-Islamic, red=Communist-Confucian
and purple = Catholic. Cultural factor abbreviations are as follows: REL = Religiosity, IC =
Institutional Confidence, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO = Prosociality, IP = Interest in Politics,
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Figure 5.10: Top row: the mean opinion change (∆O) for each cluster in each cultural factor.
Bottom row: the equivalent plot, but for generational change (∆G). The rates of change are calcu-
lated in chapter four using the two stage Bayesian linear regression. The error bars are the 95th
percentile of a bootstrap sample (N=200) and the circles are its median. The colors representing
each cluster are blue = Western, green = African-Islamic, red = Communist-Confucian and purple
= Catholic. Cultural factor abbreviations: REL = Religiosity, IC =Institutional Confidence, IT =
Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO = Prosociality, IP = Interest in Politics, WB = Wellbeing, PE = Political
Engagement, PP = Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN = Xenophilia.
Wellbeing where the expected change is the same as Catholic and Western countries. Wellbeing
is also unusual because Communist-Confucian countries show larger generational increases than
all other clusters; this is the only cultural factor where a non-Western cluster clearly exhibits the
largest change.
There is a lot of within-cluster variation for opinion change — evidenced by the large error bars
in the top row of figure 5.10 — suggesting that cultural-history does not predict changes in opinion.
The exception seems to be the Communist-Confucian cluster, where we see non-zero average
changes in Religiosity, Importance of Personal Prohibitions, Wellbeing, Interest in Politics and
Political Engagement. The other three clusters show fewer examples of clearly directional average
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change (west: changes in two factors, Catholic: one factor and African-Islamic: one factor). Given
that the beginning of the WEVS in 1990 corresponds with the fall of Communism, it is possible
that the countries from the Communist-Confucian cluster are independently experiencing similar
environmental shocks. The sudden decrease in Political Interest and Political Engagement has
been attributed to a post-honeymoon effect which often follows a successful revolution [Inglehart
and Catterberg, 2002]. The increase in Religiosity could be a bounce-back effect following the end
of communist-era religious repression. The increase in Wellbeing might also be a bounce-back,
but from the collective depression felt when an all-encompassing belief system (like communism)
collapses [Inglehart and Baker, 2000]. This would also explain the extremely low levels of
Wellbeing measured in the Communist-Confucian cluster during the last 25 years (see figure 5.8).
5.3.6 Cluster Economic Development
The second part of this thesis analyzes the relationship between cultural values and human
development. Here we briefly introduce GDP per capita, we do so to characterize the average
economic development of each of the cultural value clusters. We use GDP per capita (normalized
to 2005 US dollars) from the Word Bank (referred to simply as GDP from this point onwards). The
distribution of GDP is highly skewed, with many countries at the poor end of the scale [Deaton,
2013]. To account for this, we present log GDP, as well as linear GDP. When we treat GDP as a
linear variable, we see clearly that the Western cluster is far richer than the others (left hand
side of figure 5.11) and, if we ignore the errorbars, the second richest cluster is Catholic, followed
by Communist-Confucian and lastly African-Islamic. When we look at log GDP, this ordering
of wealth by cultural-history is even more conclusive — the errorbars overlap less on the right
hand side of figure 5.11). This means that that GDP (or at least log(GDP)) corresponds with
cultural-history. The Western cluster is the richest and the African-Islamic cluster the poorest,
with Catholic and Communist-Confucian countries in the middle.
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Figure 5.11: Left hand side: mean GDP per capita (GDP) of countries in each of the four cultural
value clusters. Right hand side: the equivalent plot but using log10(GDP). The error bars are
the 95th percentile for a bootstrap sample (N=200). Cluster name abbreviations: west=Western,
cath=Catholic, com-con=Communist-Confucian and afr-isl = African-Islamic.
5.3.7 Cultural, Geographic and Historical Features
Cluster membership correlates with economic development, but it also seems to correlate with
deep rooted cultural-historic features. Here we test whether membership of the four clusters can
be predicted by 16 cultural-historical variables. Our choices for linguistic and religious categories
were guided by data constraints and a desire to capture cultural diversity.
Linguistically it makes sense to divide countries by language family. However, the countries
that predominately speak Indo-European languages comprise 61% of the WEVS sample. There-
fore, to capture more linguistic information, we split the Indo-European language tree into six
subtrees.
The big state religions make more natural categories (Catholicism, Islam, Protestantism etc)
to which countries can be easily assigned. But some countries do not have a clear state religion
and have populations that subscribe to many different religions (China for example [Fukuyama,
2012]). For simplicity ‘The Religious Characteristics of States’ data that we used, categorizes
these non-state religions as ‘Animism’ [Brown and James, 2015]. This is based on the assumption
that high god religions [Norenzayan, 2013] evolve from less complex religions based on ancestor
worship and animism [Murdock, 1967].
The cultural-historic variables we used are of three types:
Religion — the predominant religion in the country during the year 1900. The religious
variables are Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, Islam, Buddhist and Animist. These six religions
were chosen because they represent the predominant religion in more than three of the 109
WEVS countries. We used religion from 1900 because our belief is that our four clusters reflect
deep history, so using modern day predominant religions would bias our results. The data is
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taken from the ‘Religious Characteristics of States’ dataset’(RCS). It collates data from a wide
range of sources, to measure the historical prevalence of religious sects in 220 states [Brown and
James, 2015].
Linguistic — the language family of the predominant language in the country. The linguistic
variables are Italic, Balto-Slavic, Germanic, Indo-Aryan, Turkic and Semitic. Again, these cate-
gories were chosen because they are the predominant language family in more than three of the
109 WEVS countries. Linguistic data were taken from the Ethnologue website [Lewis, 2009]. It
documents all known extant languages and the countries in which they are spoken. Unfortunately,
unlike religious denomination, we are forced to use modern-day language predomination because
the historic data are not available.
Colonial History — was the country ever a part of the British Empire, Spanish Empire,
Ottoman Empire or Former Communist. These data were drawn from the Encyclopedia Britannica
[Encyclopedia Britannica, 2018].
We want to see if membership of our cultural clusters overlap with any of these cultural-
historic variables. Seeing as all the variables concerned are binary, we compare them using the
Phi coefficient φ. Formally:
(5.4) φ= n1,1n0,0 −n1,0n0,1√
(n1,1 +n1,0)(n1,1 +n0,1)(n0,0 +n1,0)(n0,0 +n0,1)
where n0,0 is the number of observations which are zero in both binary vectors; n1,1 is the number
of observations where both equal one; n1,0 is the number where just the first vector equals one
and n0,1 is the number where just the second value equals one. It is equivalent to the Pearson
correlation coefficient applied to binary variables [Warner, 2013].
If we take φ= 0.4 to be a substantive threshold, we find that each cluster is characterized by
a religion and a language family.
The Western cluster is correlated with Germanic languages and Protestantism, the Catholic
cluster with Italic languages and the Catholic religion, the Communist-Confucian cluster with
Balto-Slavic languages and the Orthodox religion and the African-Islamic cluster with Semitic
languages and Islam. In addition, two of the clusters are correlated with colonial history: the
Catholic cluster with the Spanish Empire and the Communist-Confucian cluster with Former
Communist countries.
We also see clear geographic structure in figure 5.4. On the Afroeurasian landmass, Western
Europe falls into the Western cluster, East Europe and North Asia are Communist-Confucian,
South Asia and Africa are African-Islamic, Latin America is Catholic, along with Catholic
European countries on the boundaries of Western Europe. Some of these correlations may seem
obvious, but that is because we drew the cluster labels from an intuitive grasp of the cultural-
historic similarity between cluster members.
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Western Catholic Comm-Conf African-Islamic
Religious Protestant (0.59) Catholic (0.48) Orthodox (0.41) Islam (0.56)
Linguistic Germanic (0.48) Italic (0.47) Balto-Slavic (0.54) Semitic (0.41)
Colonial Spanish Empire (0.5) Communist (0.61)
Table 5.1: Substantively significant φ coefficients which measure the membership overlap between
cultural-historic categories and the four cultural clusters. The columns are the four cultural value
clusters and each row represents the three cultural-historic super-categories. Each cell contains
the variables from each cultural-historic super-category where φ> 0.4. The bracketed values are
the φ coefficients themselves (statistical significance: p << 0.001 for all noted φ.)
5.3.8 Cultural Anomalies
Despite the cultural value clusters aligning with linguistic, colonial, religious and geographic
variables, many countries are clustered in non-obvious ways. The anomalous countries are as
follows: the Western cluster contains Japan, Uruguay and Israel; the African-Islamic cluster
contains El Salvador, the Communist-Confucian cluster contains Lebanon and the Catholic cluster
contains Singapore and South Africa. Figure 5.12 illustrates the positions of these countries
relative to the four clusters (we only present six cultural factors because, as we saw in figure 5.8,
the clusters are not separable in Prosociality, Interest in Politics and Institutional Confidence).
Figure 5.13 shows that four out of seven of the anomalous countries — Israel , El Salvador,
Singapore and South Africa — are equally near a second cluster. These alternative clusters
sometimes match the countries geography and culture: South Africa and Singapore are both
also close to the African-Islamic cluster and El Salvador is close to the Catholic cluster. The
Israeli result is unusual because, based on its language and geography, it should be close to
the African-Islamic cluster, which in fact is the farthest removed. Israel is actually close to the
Catholic cluster, as well as the Western one.
Based on cultural-history, we expect to find Lebanon in the African-Islamic cluster, but it is
instead in the Communist-Confucian one. Closer inspection shows it is aligned with the African-
Islamic cluster in terms of Wellbeing and Political Engagement. However, it is less Religious
and places less Importance on Personal Prohibitions (PP); see figure 5.12. An unusual feature of
Lebanon, is its high tolerance of Intrinsic Differences, yet very low levels of Xenophilia; these are
two cultural factors which are generally positively correlated.
When we quantified the uncertainty about a country’s cluster membership (using k-means on
the the posterior distribution from the Bayesian hierarchical imputation model), many countries
cannot be placed with confidence. These countries include many of the anomalies we discuss:
such as Lebanon, Israel El Salvador, South Africa and Singapore. However, even taking into
account this uncertainty, both Japan and Uruguay still fall into the Western cluster.
Japan has a fairly unique cultural-historic profile, so its not clear where it should cluster.
Although, based on geography alone, it should be with the Communist-Confucian countries,
which happens to be the next nearest cluster. Figure 5.14 compares the 20th century generational
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Figure 5.12: Illustration of the anomalous countries in relation to the four cultural value clusters.
Three pairwise cluster plots where each axes represents one of the six cultural factors in which
the clusters are separable. The seven anomalous countries are plotted on each and are labeled
using the following abbreviations: JPN=Japan, URU=Uruguay, ISR=Israel, SAL=El Salvador,
LEB=Lebanon, SIN=Singapore and SAF=South Africa. The colored ellipses represent the clusters,
they are centered on the cluster mean and have diameters equal to the standard deviation. The
clusters are colored as follows: blue=Western, green=African-Islamic, red=Communist-Confucian
and purple=Catholic. Cultural factor abbreviations: REL = Religiosity, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance,
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Figure 5.13: The distance between the seven anomalous countries and each of the four cluster cen-
ters (Dcc). The error bars represent the 95th percentile of a bootstrap sample (N=200), the circles
are the medians. Cultural value clusters: blue=Western, green=African-Islamic, red=Communist-
Confucian and purple=Catholic. Anomalous country abbreviations: JPN=Japan, URU=Uruguay,
ISR=Israel, SAL=El Salvador, LEB=Lebanon, SIN=Singapore and SAF=South Africa.
changes in cultural values of Japan and China (a country of theoretically similar cultural-history).
It shows that Japan diverged from China in many of the cultural factors which characterize
the difference between Western and Communist-Confucian countries — Intrinsic Tolerance,
Xenophilia and the Importance of Personal Prohibitions.
Unlike Japan’s recent divergence from China, when we look at the generational changes
in Uruguay — compared to a typical Catholic country like Mexico — we see evidence of much
older divergence. Figure 5.15 shows non-intersecting lines, which indicate that the historical
time when Uruguay and Mexico shared cultural values is deeper in history than for China and
Japan. In the Importance of Personal Prohibitions (one of the cultural factors which defines the
difference between Catholic and Western countries) the trends are roughly parallel, suggesting
that Uruguayans and Mexicans might never have agreed on this issue. Although, Uruguay does
show generational changes in Wellbeing and Political Engagement which are identical to those of
Mexico.
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Figure 5.14: Generational changes of Japan (blue lines) and China (red lines) during the 10
decades of the 20th century. Each regression line represents a sample from the posterior dis-
tribution, derived using the two-stage Bayesian linear regression (see chapter four). Cultural
factor abbreviations: REL = Religiosity, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance, WB = Wellbeing, PE = Political
Engagement, PP = Importance of Personal Prohibitions and XEN = Xenophilia.


























































Figure 5.15: Generational changes of Uruguay (blue lines) and Mexico (purple lines) during the 10
decades of the 20th century. Each line represents a sample from the posterior distribution, derived
using the two-stage Bayesian linear regression (see chapter four). Cultural factor abbreviations:
REL = Religiosity, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance, WB = Wellbeing, PE = Political Engagement, PP =




We have identified four cultural value clusters which correspond with geography, linguistics,
religion and colonial history. Although AIC analysis shows that a choice of two or three clusters
would also be valid, cluster membership in these cases does not neatly correspond with cultural-
historic variables. In the same way, adding a fifth cluster seemingly splits the African-Islamic
group arbitrarily, although closer inspection may uncover deep rooted cultural differences. Four
clusters is fewer than most scholars have entertained [Huntington, 1996; Inglehart and Baker,
2000], but is similar to Miguel Basanez’s model of three global macro-cultures: cultures of joy,
honor and achievement [Basanez, 2016].
Cultures of joy correspond with our Catholic cluster, cultures of achievement is roughly in
line with our Western cluster (although Basanez includes the Confucian culture in this category),
cultures of honor align with our African-Islamic cluster (although Basanez includes Christian
Orthodox countries). The key difference between our clusters and those of Basanez is our fourth
cluster: Communist-Confucian. It contains mainly Christian Orthodox and Confucian countries,
which Basanez included in cultures of honor and achievement respectively. This cluster may have
been overlooked because the colonial history which unites them is Communism which, compared
to other colonial histories, is a fairly recent event.
The most consistent cultural value differential is between the Western and African-Islamic
clusters. They are different in six out of nine of the cultural factors (the remaining three cultural
factors are Prosociality, Institutional Confidence and Interest in Politics, and they exhibit no
separability between clusters). Western countries are less religious (REL), more tolerant (IT
and XEN), find personal prohibitions less important (PP), more politically engaged (PE) and
happier (WB). In addition, Western countries have seen the most generational change in the
last 100 years which, as we saw in chapter four, goes a long way in explaining the cultural value
inequalities we see today. The cultural value differences between Western and African-Islamic
clusters are mirrored by levels of economic development (see figure 5.11).
Catholic and Communist-Confucian countries inhabit both an economic and cultural value
middle ground, so we might view them as developing countries. Yet Catholic and Communist-
Confucian countries have different cultural value profiles, possibly presenting evidence of two
possible development pathways. Catholic countries are high in Xenophilia, Intrinsic Tolerance
and Wellbeing; whereas Communist-Confucian countries are low on all these variables, but
considerably less religious. We should be cautious with this developmental pathway hypothesis
because their generational change profiles are fairly similar (bottom row of figure 5.10), so the
differing profiles may just reflect different starting points in recent history.
The fact that we have ‘cultural zones’ defined by economic development is not new; neither is
the idea that these same cultural zones are determined by cultural-historic variables [Inglehart
and Baker, 2000]. We provide support for the second point by showing that cluster membership
is substantively correlated with linguistic family, religion and colonial history. These cultural
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relationships correspond with a geographic structure which makes them hard to distinguish in
statistical analysis.
That said, Luke Matthews [Matthews et al., 2016] showed that cultural proximity is a superior
explanation for economic and political innovations than geographical proximity. Although, the
countries involved in this study were limited to those who speak an Indo-European language.
This is because Mathews’ used phylogenetic methods, so was limited to using languages from a
single phylogenetic tree because a ‘super-phylogenetic’ tree does not exist (that is a single tree
connecting all the languages on Earth). This means phylogenetic analysis is not an option for our
global sample. Enrico Spolaore suggests a possible work around by using genetic distance (for
which global similarity matrices are available) as a proxy for cultural differences [Spolaore and
Wacziarg, 2016].
We confirm previous work showing that cultural value clusters are not separable in the
Prosociality cultural factor [Minkov et al., 2013]. However, we also discovered that cultural value
clusters are not separable in Institutional Confidence and Interest in Politics. These three factors
are the new variance that is absent from the standard Inglehart-Welzel (I-W) cultural map (see
chapter three). Figure 5.9 shows that the clusters are loose in these dimensions, particularly for
African-Islamic countries. This means that cultural-history does not explain the distribution of
countries in Institutional Confidence, Prosociality or Interest in Politics.
Although cultural-history and geography go a long way in explaining cluster membership,
we identified some interesting anomalous countries. There are three countries classified as
Western which, cultural-history dictates, should be in different clusters. Japan adopted Western
cultural values possibly because it adopted Western institutions. Following the Meiji restoration
in 1868, Japan embarked on rapid modernization. It imported many Western institutions, such as
education, science and technology, communication systems and banking [Encyclopedia Britannica,
2018], which could also have led to Western style cultural values.
In the case of Israel it was not just institutions that were transplanted, but the population
itself. Before Israel’s founding in 1948 (and since), there have been massive immigrations of Jews
from the diaspora, the majority of which came from Europe [Sicherman et al., 2018]. This was
accompanied by occasional expulsions of Arabs, who had previously made up the majority of the
population [Sicherman et al., 2018]. Given the heritable nature of cultural values and norms,
we might expect their cultural values to persist and be more reflective of European rather than
African-Islamic culture. That said, immigrants to a new culture will tend towards the cultural
values of the existing population [Norris and Inglehart, 2012], which could explain why Israeli
exhibit levels of religiosity and tolerance tending towards that of African-Islamic countries.
Uruguay’s classification as a Western country may be seen as a combination of population
and institutional transplantation. It certainly has adopted many western style institutions —
such as the rights of women to divorce and vote, the abolition of the death penalty and legalized
abortion [Goni, 2016]. Figure 5.15 indicates that the divergence between Uruguay and other
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Catholic countries occurred more than 100 years ago which means it might stretch back to the
colonial period. The Uruguayan population is 88% white European [CIA, 2018], suggesting that
these settlers may have brought with them European institutions and cultural values. Although
this alone cannot be the explanation because other Latin American countries, such as Chile and
Argentina, also have very high white European populations.
Lebanon, for a Middle Eastern country, has a long history of economic and social liberalism
— particularity in its capital Beirut [Totten, 2013]. Prior to 1975, Lebanon was one of only two
countries in the Middle East and North Africa (along with Israel) which was considered free in
terms of civil liberties and political rights. Despite the civil war between 1975 to 1990, Lebanon is
still less Religious (REL) and less concerned with Personal Prohibitions (PP) than other African-
Islamic countries. It is also far more tolerant of behaviors like homosexuality, drug abuse etc (IT),
but it is very intolerant of foreigners and immigrants (XEN). This unusual divergence could be
due to outside interference by a multitude of other countries (particularly Syria) during its civil
war, resulting in a breakdown of trust [Totten, 2013].
We use purely statistical criteria to select for the number of clusters, but because AIC
recommended somewhere between two and four clusters, we subjectively chose four clusters
because they reflected interesting cultural-historic commonalities. Statistics is a process of
summarizing complexity with the goal of identifying general patterns; outliers are a feature of
this type of analysis. It is right, therefore, that our cluster labels reflect commonalities shared
by the majority of a cluster’s countries. That said, we offer only speculative explanations for the
outliers; such as Japan’s presence in the Western cluster.
Identifying these four clusters was an important step in finding an explanation for the
grouping of countries according to stable cultural features like language and religion. Cultural
values of Secular-Rationalism and Cosmopolitanism originated in Western Europe during the
Enlightenment and have been diffusing to other countries ever since along geographic and
cultural pathways, hence countries closer to Western Europe (geographically and culturally) are
more likely to hold these values [Ruck et al., 2019].
5.5 Conclusion
We used an unsupervised clustering algorithm — k-means clustering — to identify groups of
countries with similar cultural values. Contrary to the majority of previous work, which generally
assumes somewhere on the order of ten clusters, we found that four clusters best reflect cultural-
historic variables like language, religion and colonial history. The four clusters are Western,
African-Islamic, Communist-Confucian and Catholic.
We show that African-Islamic countries have experienced almost no stable generational
value change in the 20th century and Western countries have experienced the most. This is
mirrored in their respective levels of economic development. We go on to show that Catholic and
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Communist-Confucian countries occupy an economic and cultural value middle-ground, yet their
cultural value profiles are different. The previous unquantified variance discovered in chapter











GENERATIONAL CULTURAL VALUES AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
In chapters two to four we built a description of recent cultural value dynamics. We dis-covered nine cultural factors which offer a reduced form explanation of the WEVS data.We then separated two modes of cultural value change from the WEVS cross-sectional
samples — opinion and generational change. Finally, we identified four clusters of culturally
similar countries that reflect cultural-historic variables. The focus for the next three chapters is
to place changing cultural values in the wider context of society and development.
We confirm that the modern day distribution of cultural values is highly correlated with
external variables of development, but go on to show that long-term generational changes are also
correlated. This suggests that development and cultural variables are related, but establishing
causal pathways is difficult. We attempt to rule out certain classes of causal models by testing
whether macro-level variables precede others using time-lagged regressions. We aim to provide
some clues for answering the big question, ‘do improvements in development cause cultural value
shifts, or vice versa?’
We analyze the temporal relationships between cultural values and two key developmental
variables: economic development and democratic institutions. One-hundred-year time series are
available for both of these development variables [Bolt et al., 2014; Marshall et al., 2017] and by
using generational trends as a proxy for historic change, we also have comparable time series for
cultural values. Treating birth cohorts as representative of an historical period is not new [Foa
et al., 2016; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005], however using them in formal time-lagged regressions
is.
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6.1 Development Data
The two aspects of human development we focus on are economic development and democratic
institutions.
Our novel methodological step, supported by the analysis in this chapter, is to extend cultural
value time series to the entire of the 20th century by acknowledging that cultural values are
formed during the first few decades of life [Henrich and Henrich, 2007; House et al., 2013;
Ruiz-Mallén et al., 2013; Sears and Funk, 1999]. Hence, we must select measures of human
development which are reliable across the last 100 years. For example, the income Gini index
(the standard measure of economic inequality) is unsuitable for our purposes because limits in
the survey data mean international data only stretches back to around 1980 [Milanovic, 2005].
In another case, the standard human development index is a high dimensional concept
incorporating data for education, life expectancy and economic development [Spaiser et al., 2014].
The interrelatedness of measures of socioeconomic development has been a feature of complex
human states for millennia [Turchin et al., 2018]. Therefore, given this robust co-occurrence of
development variables, we use GDP per capita as proxy for human development because it has a
well attested 100-year time series, [Acemoglu et al., 2018; Bolt et al., 2014; Gundlach and Paldam,
2009; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014], unlike the human development index.
Democracy is not part of the human development index and does not appear in the United
Nations millennium goals [United Nations, 2018]. However, it is an oft cited institutional indicator
of human development [Acemoglu et al., 2018; Spaiser et al., 2014] and also has well attested
long-run time series for multiple countries [Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Marshall et al., 2017; Miguel
et al., 2004; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014].
Here we present detailed descriptions of the data sets we exploit: the Madison Project data
for economic development and the Polity IV data for democratic institutions.
6.1.1 Economic Development
The Madison Project provides historical economic development data [Bolt et al., 2014] consisting
of GDP per capita estimates for over 150 countries. It is a commonly cited resource in the study
of historical economics and development [Acemoglu et al., 2008; Gundlach and Paldam, 2009;
Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014]. To enable comparison between countries with different population
sizes and prices, it normalizes GDP to per capita to international prices (in 1990 U.S dollars).
It makes estimates stretching back 2000 years (in the case of the Roman Empire for example),
but we are only interested in data from around 1870 onwards which means we do not need to
be concerned with excessive missing data. Nonetheless, missingness is present in countries for
which data is hard to come by — sub-Saharan African countries — and where countries did not
exist in the recent past — such as states which formed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In
some cases, historical GDP was estimated for states which no longer exist, but which correspond
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to modern states. For example, the Cape Colony has been equated with South Africa; Holland
with the Netherlands; North and Central Italy with Italy and Great Britain and England with
the United Kingdom. In addition, Eritrea and Ethiopia are considered to be equivalent.
The Madison Project acquires GDP estimates from a variety of sources. Recent estimates (since
roughly 1950) are taken from respectable international agencies that provide highly calibrated
data, such as the United Nations, World Bank and Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Before 1950, systematic calculations of GDP were not carried out but,
through expert analysis and interpretation of historical data, GDP per capita estimates can be
made. The Madison project uses economic historians to gather information about past economies
such as wages, trade and income. Using this information they can run standard GDP calculations.
Moreover, by obtaining historic data on population sizes and prices, they can also perform the
required normalizations for cross-country comparison [Bolt et al., 2014].
The resolution of generational cultural value trends is 10 years and we need our GDP data to
be comparable. Therefore, we take the average observed GDP per capita in each decade from 1870
to 2010. There are certain WEVS countries that were not present in the Madison data — Northern
Ireland, Malta, Luxembourg, Iceland, Andorra and Cyprus. All of these countries have small
populations and all are European countries, which happens to be the region most represented
in the WEVS data (44 European countries out of 109 total). Therefore we decided to omit these
countries from future analysis, leaving us 103 countries corresponding with generational cultural
value change.
The resolution of both the cross-sectional samples and opinion change is 5 years (ranging
from 1990-1995 to 2010-2015). So to make the Madison data comparable with these time series,
we take 5-year averages from 1975 to 2020. We only have cross-sectional/opinion trends for 85
countries because they must have participated in at least two WEVS waves. Unfortunately, six of
the seven of WEVS countries which do not appear in the Madison data (Northern Ireland, Malta,
Luxembourg, Iceland, Andorra and Cyprus) do actually appear in the cross-sectional/opinion
data. This leaves us GDP data for 79 countries that correspond with opinion and cross-sectional
changes.
We used GDP per capita as our measure of economic development because, unlike more
detailed measures like the Human Development Index (HDI) [Spaiser et al., 2014], the Madison
project offers unprecedented depth of time.
6.1.2 Democratic Institutions
We measure the quality of democratic institutions using data from the Polity IV project (compiled
by the ‘Centre for Systemic Peace’) [Marshall et al., 2017]. It is a commonly used a measure for
historic democracy [Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Miguel et al., 2004; Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014].
All 167 countries with a population of greater than 500,000 are included and it has a time range
stretching back to 1800. Polity IV is a live dataset where historical scores are revised in light of
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Table 6.1: The Polity IV project’s criteria used to asses the democratic DEM and authoritative
AUT nature of a country’s intuitions. Each row is an evaluation criteria and each entry shows the
points that can be accrued for meeting, or partially meeting, the criteria (only one score from each
entry can be accrued). Therefore DEM and AUT are both scored inclusively between 0 and 10.
The criteria abbreviations are as follows: XRCOMP is competitiveness of executive recruitment,
XROPEN is openness of executive recruitment, XCONST is constraints on chief executive, PAR-
REG is regulation of participation and PARCOMP is competitiveness of participation [Marshall
et al., 2017]
new evidence or suggestions from experts in the field. It is difficult to assess democracy quality in
the moment, so the most recent data are subject to change as new information comes in [Marshall
et al., 2017].
Polity IV presents two scores for each country. The first is the democratic score DEM which
is marked out of ten. Points are accrued when certain criteria are met (see table 6.1 for details).
Highly democratic institutions should have competitive political participation, constraints on
the chief executive and, competitive and open elections. The second score is the authoritarian
score ATH which is also marked out 10. The criteria for the ATH is the obverse of DEM (again,
see table 6.1 for details). The authority score is high when executives are secretly selected by
government insiders, where there are are no constraints on the authority of the chief executive
and where participation in the political process is restricted and noncompetitive.
The polity score POL is obtained by subtracting ATH from DEM, resulting in a value
between -10 and 10. Both the democratic and authoritarian scores are used because democratic
institutional features are not mutually exclusive to the autocratic ones. In other words, countries
can have a mixture of democratic and autocratic features. We normalize the score so all values
fall between 0 and 1 POLnorm = (POL+10)/20.
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Like we did with the historical GDP data, to facilitate comparison with the generational
cultural value data, we take 10-year averages of the polity score between the years 1870 and
2020. Likewise, to make the Polity IV data comparable to the cross-sectional/opinion change data
we took 5-year averages between the years 1975 and 2020. As we mentioned, countries with
small populations are not included. WEVS countries which are too small to be evaluated by Polity
IV are Andorra, Turkish Cyprus, Hong Kong, Iceland, Malta, Northern Ireland, Palestine and
Puerto Rico. This leaves us with 101 countries corresponding with the generational change data
and 81 corresponding with the cross-sectional/opinion change data.
There are many examples of state fragmentation during the last 20th century. The case
of the Soviet Union in 1990 being a striking recent example. This means there are a number
of modern states which are not assigned data before the date of the fragmentation. However
given that democratic institutions are effective at the state level, we think it is appropriate
to assign the historic democratic scores of the collapsed state to its children states. We made
the following adjustments: North Yemense scores are assigned to pre-1990 Yemen; Pakistan
scores to pre-1970 Bangladesh; Yugoslavia to pre-1990 Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, Bosnia,
Slovenia and Macedonia; Czechoslovakia to pre-1990 Czech Rebublic and Slovakia and Soviet
Union to pre-1990 Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Armenia. The Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania
and Estonia) were temporarily independent from the 1920’s until the 1950’s, and so the Soviet
Union scores were not used.
6.1.3 Cultural Value Links to Economic Development and Democratic
Institutions
Figure 6.1 shows that both democratic institutions DEM and economic development GDP are
highly correlated with our cultural factors (the exceptions being Institutional Confidence, Interest
in Politics and Prosociality). This confirms previous work showing strong links between cultural
values and the variables of human development [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005].
The more interesting question is whether changes in cultural values are linked to changes in
democratic institutions and economic development. Figure 6.2 shows us that generational changes
are strongly correlated with changes in human development. Whereas opinion changes only
show a weak correspondence. Changes in the cross-sectional samples are also poorly correlated
because, as we saw in chapter four, they largely reflect opinion change. It is instructive that
the cross-sectional samples correlate slightly better than opinion change because cross-sectional
samples are still slightly influenced by generational change. We conclude that sustained human
development is linked with the socialized baseline set of cultural values acquired during formative
years.
85
CHAPTER 6. GENERATIONAL CULTURAL VALUES AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT




























































Figure 6.1: Left hand side: the red bars represent the proportion of the variance in each of
the cultural factors explained by GDP per capita (comparing averages since 1990; number of
countries=106). Right hand side: the blue bars represent the proportion of the variance in each of
the cultural factors explained by democracy (comparing averages since 1990; number of coun-
tries=99). The opaque bars mean Bonferoni corrected 5% significance level (p < 0.006) has been
reached. Abbreviations: REL = Religiosity, IC =Institutional Confidence, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance,
PRO = Prosociality, IP = Interest in Politics, WB = Wellbeing, PE = Political Engagement, PP =
Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN = Xenophilia.
6.2 Multi-Level Time-Lagged Linear Regression (General Form)
We have made the case in this chapter that strong linkages exist between generational cultural
value change and human development indicators (economic development and democratic institu-
tions). Next we want to find out which way the causal arrow runs. We use a time-lagged linear
regression to help answer this question. Such models normally compute data with a single time
series for each variable. We, on the other hand, have many short time series, each representing a
WEVS country. We include all the data in a single multi-level model which includes a random
effect for each country γi, thus maximizing statistical power.
In cross-cultural studies, it is vital to control for the historical non-independence of countries;
this avoids ‘Galton’s problem’. Galton’s problem arises when we are not sure if a correlation
between two variables exists because of some interesting exogenous cause, or just because the
countries are culturally related [Mesoudi, 2011]. One way of controlling for cultural relatedness
is to include language phylogenies as a proxy [Mace and Jordan, 2011; Pagel et al., 2007].
Unfortunately, this means you are limited to studying countries from within a single language
tree and we have a global sample of countries from many language trees. Therefore, we need
some other way of controlling for cultural relatedness.
In chapter five, we found four clusters of countries which correspond to stable cultural features
like language, religion and colonial history (the four clusters are: African-Islamic, Western,
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Figure 6.2: Top row: the red bars represent the variance explained by the rate of change in GDP
per capita for the rate of change in each cultural factors. Bottom row: the blue bars represent
the equivalent plot, but instead the variance explained by the change in democratic institutions.
The first column uses the rate of generational change, the second row uses the change in the
cross-sectional samples and the third row uses opinion change. The opaque bars mean Bonferoni
corrected 5% significance level (p < 0.006) has been reached. Abbreviations: REL = Religiosity, IC
=Institutional Confidence, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO = Prosociality, IP = Interest in Politics,
WB = Wellbeing, PE = Political Engagement, PP = Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN =
Xenophilia.
Catholic and Communist-Confucian). Also the multi-level model we are using insists that cultural
similarity be described using discrete categories. For these reasons, we use membership of our
cultural-historic clusters to control for the cultural non-independence between countries. We do
this by adding a second random effect to the regression δh. The multi-level time-lagged regression
takes the general form:
(6.1) Yt =µ+αYt−T +βX t−T +γh|i +ε
where Y is the non-lagged target vector to be predicted by a series of lagged predictors X t−T and
a lagged version of itself Yt−T . The vector β is the effect vector for the predictor variables, and α
is the effect of the lagged version of Y . The variable µ is the universal intercept, and γi and δh
are adjustments for country i and cultural-historic cluster h respectively. T is the time lag.
For example, Y could be religiosity and X could consist of the two development variables —
economic development and democratic institutions. In this case, the vector β would contain two
parameters quantifying the effect of past economic development and democracy on religiosity
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T years in the future. δh checks that the variation in religiosity is not better explained by the
cultural relatedness of the countries and γi controls for the different cultural value histories of
individual countries.
The multi-level time-lagged linear regression is applied to generational change, as well as
opinion change and cross-sectional data. That said, we expect similar results when both cross-
sectional and opinion change data are used because opinion change dominates the variation in
the cross-sectional data (see chapter four).
The regressions are implemented using the ‘lmer’ package in R [Bates et al., 2015], which
uses maximum likelihood to estimate mixed-effect models. However, it does not calculate the
variance explained by the model (R2). So, following [Nakagawa and Schielzeth, 2013], we find R2










is the variance explained by the fixed effects, σ2h is the variance explained by the
cultural-historic random effect, σ2i is variance explained by the country-level random effect and
σ2ε is the model residual.
6.2.1 Robustness Checks
It is important to know when a particular generation becomes active in the adult population
because we are using this newest generation as a proxy for the entire population at a particular
time. It is hard to imagine that people born in the 1950’s meaningfully affect human development
in the 1960’s, but when do they begin to contribute? The neuroscientifc evidence is unclear
[Petanjek et al., 2011; Sowell et al., 1999], but the precise age is likely to vary within a population
and across countries. To ensue our results are robust to this uncertainty, we perform the multi-
level time-lagged linear regression (equation 6.1) three times. The first time we assume a
generation becomes active before the age of 10, in the second before the age of 20 and the third
before the age of 30. We do so in the hope our findings will be robust to this choice; the simulation
study in the next section tests this hope.
6.3 Simulation Study
Here we simulate two mechanisms that potentially explain the correlation between mass cultural
values and emergent development variables. We first suggested these in the literature review
and they are as follows:
1. Through processes of socialization, the cultural values of a generation will be proportional
to the level of human development in their formative years
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2. Human development emerges from the cultural values of the adult population, so the level
of human development at a particular time will be proportional to the average level of
socialized cultural values in the adult population
In the simulation we use the cultural value and human development variables that are the
subject of both the next chapter and our recent published paper [Ruck et al., 2019]: economic
development GDP and secularization SEC, where secularization is the inverse of the religiosity
cultural factor derived in chapter three.
We know both these variables have increased over a long period of time, so when we simulate
both causal mechanisms we know that the independent causal variable will be increasing with
time.
We assume that the independent causal variable (whether it be GDP or SEC) increases
according to a biased random walk and that the dependent variable (whether it is GDP or SEC)
changes proportionally. The simulation begins in 1750 which is approximately the onset of the
industrial revolution and we assume flat economic development and secularization before that
time. We must also decide at what age the formative years end and adulthood begins which, as we
discussed previously, is uncertain. For arguments sake, we set it at 20 years for these simulations,
but we will show later that we do not actually need to know this to recover the causal effect.
Once we have run the simulation, we end up with a time series for both GDP and SEC. We
then use a time lagged regression (similar to the general form equation 6.1) to see if the simulated
causal effect can be detected as the causal variable’s time series preceding the other variable’s
time series:
(6.2) GDPt ∼αGDPt−d +βsecSECt−d +ε
(6.3) SECt ∼αSECt−d +βgdpGDPt−d +ε
where equation 6.2 tests whether SEC precedes GDP and equation 6.3 tests whether SEC
precedes GDP. When economic development causes secularization, we expect βgdp to be sub-
stantively significant. When secularization causes economic development, we expect βsec to be
substantively significant.
In simulation one, where GDP causes SEC, we expect to find a positive effect of GDP on
SEC and a zero effect of SEC on GDP. In simulation two, where SEC causes GDP we expect to
detect the opposite: a positive effect of SEC on GDP and a zero effect of GDP on SEC.
6.3.1 Simulation One: Economic Development Causes Secularization
We assume that economic development increases exogenously according to a biased random walk
between 1750 and 2000 in 10-year increments:
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GDPt =GDPt−10 +normal(µ,σ)
where t is decade, µ is the bias on the random walk (µ= 10) and σ is its variation (σ= 10). Initial
GDP1750 is set to 1.
Economic development affects levels of secularization during a generations formative years.
A generation does not enter the adult population until they are 20. Therefore, the secularization
score of a generation just entering the adult population will be proportional to average value
during the previous two decades. So the SEC time series is generated using:
SECt = γGDPt−20 +GDPt−102
where GDPt−10 and GDPt−20 are the levels of economic development in the first and second
decades of a generations life; SECt is the secularization score in decade t and γ is the weight of
the linear dependency between SEC and GDP (set to γ= 0.6).
Once we have the two simulated time series, we use regressions 6.2 and 6.3 to see if we can
unambiguously recover the simulated causation. The left hand side of figure 6.3 shows that past
GDP predicts future SEC with a very small error, meaning we have recovered the causal effect
from economic development to secularization. However, the regression sometimes erroneously
detects a spurious relationship between past SEC and future GDP. The histogram on the right
hand side of figure 6.3 shows that when we run this causal simulation 200 times, we can detect
both positive and negative spurious effects, but that the expected value is close to zero. This
means we must be wary of false positives when analyzing the WEVS data.
































Figure 6.3: Detected effect sizes from simulation one, where economic development GDP
causes secularization SEC. Left hand side: the detected effect size (β) of past secularization
on economic development (GDPt ∼ SECt−d) and past economic development on secularization
(SECt ∼GDPt−d). The circles are the expected effect sizes and the error bars represent standard
errors. Center: histogram of measured true effects of past GDP on future SEC using 200 runs
of simulation one. Right hand side: a histogram showing the distribution of expected spurious
effect sizes of past SEC on future GDP using 200 runs of simulation one, where GDP causes
SEC. Time lag: d = 10
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6.3.2 Simulation Two: Secularization Causes Economic Development
For this simulation we assume that secularization SEC exogenously increases according to a
biased random walk between 1750 and 2000 in 10 year increments:
SECt = SECt−10 +normal(µ,σ)
where t is decade, µ is the bias on the random walk (µ= 10) and σ is its variation (σ= 10). Initial
SEC1750 is set to 1.
Economic development is an emergent property from the adult population and their social-
ized secularization levels. For the sake of simplicity we assume that economic development is
proportional to the mean secularization in the adult population. So we simulate the GDP time
series using:
GDPt = γmean[SECadult]
where GDPt is the economic development in decade t, SECadult is the secularization score of
each generation over the age of 20 and γ is the coefficient of proportionality (γ= 0.6).
As figure 6.4 shows, the regressions 6.2 and 6.3 successfully recover the causal effect of SEC
on GDP. Although, like in the first simulation, the regressions can sometimes detect a spurious
effect in the other direction. The histogram on the bottom row of figure 6.4, shows that significant
positive and negative effects can be spuriously detected, but that the expected effect size is around
zero (as per 200 runs of the simulation). Therefore, as with simulation one, we need to be weary
of false positives when analyzing the WEVS data.
When using birth cohort as a proxy for historical time period, we only have access to the
youngest generation from that population not the entire population from which human develop-
ment is emergent. We have laid out in this chapter why data from the youngest generation gives
us all the necessary information about the entire population. Here we can use the simulated data
to demonstrate why this is the case. The top row left hand side of figure 6.4 shows that the causal
effect is still detectable even when we only analyze data from the youngest generation.
We also do not know the age when a birth cohort first enters the adult world. Our simulation
assumes this happens as the cohort reaches their third decade (age 20-30), but this might not
be the case in reality. To test if the time-lagged regression can still detect the simulated causal
effect in the presence of this uncertainty, we run the regressions whilst pretending not to know
the true age of adulthood. We fit the regressions three times, first making the assumption that a
generation enters adulthood in the first decade (age 0-10), then the second decade (age 10-20)
and finally the third decade 20-30 (the age set in the simulation). The right hand plot in figure
6.4 shows that the causal effect remains detectable regardless of when we assume a generation
enters adulthood.
91
CHAPTER 6. GENERATIONAL CULTURAL VALUES AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT















































Figure 6.4: Detected effect sizes from simulation two where secularization SEC causes economic
development GDP. Top row left hand side: effect sizes of past economic development on secular-
ization (SECt ∼GDPt−d) and vice versa (GDPt ∼ SECt−d)). The red line shows the effect size
when SEC is measured as the average level secularization in the adult population, whereas the
black line shows the effect size when SEC is measured as the average of the only the youngest
generation in the adult population. Top row and right hand side: a similar plot showing the
effect sizes when we do not know the age at which a generation enters the adult population (the
simulation assumes that the true age is between 20 and 30 years). We run three time-lagged
regressions which assumes the following age of adulthoods: 0 to 10 (black line) 10 to 20 (red line)
and 20 to 30 (blue line). In both of the top row plots, the circles represent expected values, and
the bars are standard errors. Bottom row left hand side: the histogram of spurious effect sizes of
past economic development on secularization (SECt ∼GDPt−d); these are taken from 200 runs
of simulation two in which SEC causes GDP. Bottom row right hand side: histogram of true
effect sizes of past economic development on secularization (GDPt ∼ SECt−d); these are taken




We confirmed the finding that a country’s cultural values are predictive of key human development
variables like economic development and quality of democratic institutions. We go on to show
that the linkages are also strong when we compare long-run changes in human development
and generational changes in cultural values. We do not see the same strong links between
human development and opinion changes. It is the same story for the representative changes in
cross-sectional samples because the variance is dominated by opinion change. This shows that
generational trends — and not the cross-sectional samples — hold the key to understanding the
linkages between human development and cultural values.
Once we accept that long term cultural value change is driven by generation changes, we
can ask the question: do these cultural values cause changes in development or vice versa? We
introduce a multi-level time-lagged linear regression which can determine whether changes in
human development precede those in cultural values or vice versa. This allows us to rule out
certain classes of causal model. We run a simulation to confirm that our regression is able to











SECULARIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELPMENT
In the last chapter we showed that changes in human development are closely linked withgenerational changes in cultural values, but not with opinion changes. We also showed thatbirth cohorts are representative of historical time periods, thus expanding our cultural value
time horizon to around 100 years. In this chapter, we use our time series data and time-lagged
linear regression to see if changes in secularization precede those in economic development, or
whether the opposite is true. We do so while controlling for cultural non-Independence, autonomy
and the tolerance of prohibition violators.
The key results from this chapter are published in the peer reviewed journal Science Advances.
The paper presents the time-lagged linear regressions showing that secularization precedes eco-
nomic development, but that increased tolerance of personal prohibitions is a better explanation
of a country’s economic development.
7.1 Cultural Value Determiners of Economic Development
In the literature review we discussed the robust correlation between economic development and
secularization and the disagreement regarding its cause. The Importance of Personal Prohibitions
(PP) is a candidate explanation for this. It relates to personal morality such as the justifiability
of behaviors like homosexuality, abortion, divorce etc. Countries where PP is high tend to be
economically unequal and poor; possibly because these factors create low trust [Andersen and
Fetner, 2008] which is vital for connecting people in economically productive networks [Hidalgo,
2015].
We test secularization’s relationship with economic development in response to the large
and unsettled literature on this subject. Religious prosociality is a well attested explanation for
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large scale cooperation in early states [Norenzayan, 2013], but these states were characterized
by fragile economic growth and constant recessions [North et al., 2009]. This is why, as chapters
four and five show, countries that have experienced the most economic growth during the last
100 years also experienced the largest decrease in prosociality.
We define Secularization SEC as the inverse of our Religiosity cultural factor and Tolerance
of Prohibition Violators TOL as the inverse of the Importance of Personal Prohibitions cultural
factor. The reason we changed the signs of these variables was to ensure positive correlations
with economic development, thus making the regression results easy to read.
Our nine cultural factors did not include a measure of autonomy — whether a population
favors group conformity or individual achievement — but it has been implicated as a cause of
economic development [Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011]. Even though it could not be learned by
our Exploratory Factor Analysis in chapter three, we thought it was important to control for it.
We import a measure of autonomy used in past WEVS studies [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]:
the ‘autonomy index’. It is composed of questions relating to which beliefs parents think are
important to instill in their children: (1) religious faith; (2) obedience; (3) independence and (4)
determination/perseverance. The first question is conceptually and statistically related to our
Religiosity cultural factor (see chapter three). To avoid confounding it with Religiosity, we only
use questions two to four when we define Autonomy AUT. We compress the responses to these
three WEVS questions to a single Autonomy variable using Principal Component Analysis. The
component captures 42% of the variance and the component loadings are as follows: independence
0.68, determination 0.49 and obedience -0.75.
The three cultural value variables (SEC, TOL and AUT) are normalized so the standard
deviation equals one. This means we can interpret the regression results in terms of changes
per standard deviation. Economic development data is GDP per capita taken from the Madison
project (detailed in the last chapter). GDP per capita is divided by 10,000 to approximate the
scale of the cultural value data.
7.2 Regressions
Building on the general form regression outlined in the last chapter, we present the specific
regressions used to determine the temporal relationship between Economic Development GDP
and Secularization SEC. All regressions have a random effect for country (γi) and cultural-
historic cluster (γh), a universal intercept µ and error term ε. We first test whether Secularization
precedes Economic Development or vice versa. We then add Autonomy AUT and Tolerance of
Personal Prohibition Violators TOL to see if either offer a better explanation for GDP.
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7.2.1 Secularization and Economic Development
We evaluate the temporal relationship between Secularization SEC and Economic Development
GDP. We do so using generation changes — the mode of change with the strongest link to GDP
(see chapter six). We also run the analysis using the last 25 years of representative cross-sectional
samples and, finally, using opinion changes over the same period.
7.2.1.1 Generational Change
Here we present the two sets of regressions which test whether generational change in SEC
precede long term changes in GDP or vice versa. Equation 7.1 tests if SEC precedes GDP and
7.2 tests if GDP precedes SEC:
(7.1) GDPt,i,h =µ+αGDPt−g,i,h +βSECt−g,i,h +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past GDP on current GDP, β is the effect of past SEC on current GDP,
subscript g denotes the generational time lag (we run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30
years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster (representing cultural relatedness), µ is the
universal intercept and ε is the error.
(7.2) SECt,i,h =µ+αSECt−g,i,h +βGDPt−g,i,h +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past SEC on current SEC and β is the effect of past GDP on current
SEC. The subscript g is the generational time lag (we run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and
30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster (representing cultural relatedness), µ is
the universal intercept and ε is the error.
As discussed in chapter six, there is uncertainty about the age when a generation becomes
economically active, so we run each regression three times assuming this age is 0 to 10 years,
then 10 to 20 years and finally 20 to 30 years. Therefore, in total, we run each regression nine
times
7.2.1.2 Cross-Sectional and Opinion Change
The regressions for cross sectional samples and opinion change have the same structure because
both have time period as the temporal dimension (in five years increments since 1990). The two
regressions presented in this section are used to test whether cross-sectional/opinion changes in
SEC precede changes in GDP or vice versa. Equation 7.3 tests if SEC precedes GDP and 7.4
tests if GDP precedes SEC:
(7.3) GDPt,i,h =µ+αGDPt−p,i,h +βSECt−p,i,h +γh|i +ε
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where α is the effect of past GDP on current GDP, β is the effect of past SEC on current GDP,
subscript p denotes the time period time lag (we run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years),
i is country, h is cultural-historic cluster (representing cultural relatedness), µ is the universal
intercept and ε is the error.
(7.4) SECt,i,h =µ+αSECt−p,i,h +βGDPt−p,i,h +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past SEC on current SEC and β is the effect of past GDP on current
SEC. The subscript p is the time period time lag (we run three regressions for p = 5, 10 or 15
years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster (representing cultural relatedness), µ is the
universal intercept and ε is the error.
We run each regression three times. We expect the results using cross-sectional and opinion
change data to be roughly the same because opinion change largely explains recent change in
cross-sectional samples (see chapter four).
7.2.2 The Role of Autonomy and Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators
The regressions in this section are similar to those in the last, but we include variables for Toler-
ance of Personal Prohibition Violators TOL and Autonomy AUT. This allows us to test if either
TOL or AUT offer a better explanation for Economic Development GDP than Secularization
SEC. We can also see if there are interesting temporal relationships between the three cultural
value variables (SEC, TOL and AUT).
7.2.2.1 Generational change
We extend the set of generational change regressions from the previous section (equations 7.1 to
7.2) to include variables for TOL and AUT leading to four equations. We have dropped the i and
h subscripts for the SEC and GDP terms for clarity, given the long equations.
(7.5)
GDPt =µ+αGDPt−g +β1SECt−g +β2TOL t−g
+β3 AUTt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past GDP on current GDP and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past SEC, TOL and AUT on current GDP. The subscript g is the generational time lag (we
run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness), µ is the universal intercept and ε is the error.
(7.6)
SECt =µ+αSECt−g +β1GDPt−g +β2TOL t−g
+β3 AUTt−g +γh|i +ε
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where α is the effect of past SEC on current SEC and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, TOL and AUT on current SEC. The subscript g is the generational time lag (we
run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness), µ is the universal intercept and ε is the error.
(7.7)
TOL t =µ+αTOL t−g +β1SECt−g +β2GDPt−g
+β3 AUTt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past TOL on current TOL and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, SEC and AUT on current TOL. The subscript g is the generational time lag (we
run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness), µ is the universal intercept and ε is the error.
(7.8)
AUTt =µ+αAUTt−g +β1SECt−g +β2GDPt−g
+β3GDPt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past AUT on current AUT and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, SEC and TOL on current AUT. The subscript g is the generational time lag (we
run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness), µ is the universal intercept and ε is the error.
Again, we are uncertain when a generation becomes economically active and this is significant
due to the youngest generation being used as representative of an entire population from a
historical time period. We run each regression three times assuming the age when a generation
becomes economically active is 0 to 10 years, 10 to 20 years and 20 to 30 years. Therefore, in total,
we fit each regression nine times
7.2.2.2 Cross-Sectional and Opinion Change
Again, this series of regressions is just an extension of the cross-section/opinion change equations
7.3 and 7.4 from the previous section. These four equations can be applied to either cross-sectional
or opinion change data because they both use time period as the temporal dimension. Once again,
we drop the the subscripts for country i and cultural-historical cluster h from the fixed effect
terms — this is for clarity given the long equations.
(7.9)
GDPt =µ+αGDPt−p +β1SECt−p +β2TOL t−p
+β3 AUTt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past GDP on current GDP and the vector β contains the effect sizes
of past SEC, TOL and AUT on current GDP. The subscript p is the time period time lag (we
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run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness) and ε is the error.
(7.10)
SECt =µ+αSECt−p +β1GDPt−p +β2TOL t−p
+β3 AUTt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past SEC on current SEC and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, TOL and AUT on current SEC. The subscript p is the time period time lag (we
run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness) and ε is the error.
(7.11)
TOL t =µ+αTOL t−p +β1SECt−p +β2GDPt−p
+β3 AUTt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past TOL on current TOL and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, SEC and AUT on current TOL. The subscript p is the time period time lag (we
run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness) and ε is the error.
(7.12)
AUTt =µ+αAUTt−p +β1SECt−p +β2GDPt−p
+β3GDPt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past AUT on current AUT and the vector β contains the effect sizes
of past GDP, SEC and TOL on current AUT. The subscript p is the time period time lag (we
run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness) and ε is the error.
We expect the regression results using cross-sectional and opinion change data to be roughly
the same. This is because opinion change largely determines cultural value change in the last 25
years of cross-sectional data. In each case, we run the four regressions three times (where the
time period lag is p = 5, 10, and 15 years).
7.2.3 Collinearity
The nine cultural factors are highly intercorrelated (see chapter four), correlated with cultural-
historic cluster (see chapter five) and correlated with economic development (see chapter six). In
linear regression, highly correlated predictor variables can lead to a statistical problem called
collinearity which leads to less identifiability in the model and increased standard errors. Al-
though linear regression is fairly robust — the ordinary-least-square (OLS) parameter estimates
are still unbiased and give minimum variance — it is still a problem to be taken seriously. The
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where R2 is the proportion of the variance in the target variable Y explained by all K of
the predictors, R2xβ is the variance explained in predictor variable xβ by all the other predictor
variables, N is the size of the sample, sxβ is the standard error of the predictor variable in
question and sY is the standard error of the target variable [Berry and Feldman, 1985]. When
collinearity is present R2xβ will be high, making the denominator in the equation 7.13 small and
thus sβ large.
The most concerning aspect of collinearity is the increased sensitivity of the model parameter
estimates to input data. When predictor variables are correlated they explain the same variance.
This means the OLS estimator will attempt to use the small amount of independent variation to
distinguish between them [Studenmund, 2014] and this fringe variation might be highly specific
to the sample, leaving the analysis prone to overfitting.
We test for the presence of collinearity by calculating the Variance Inflation Factor V IF for
each parameter β:
V IF = 1
(1−R2xβ)
where R2xβ is the variance in variable xβ explained by all the other predictor variables. V IF
measures how much the uncertainty in predictor xβ has been increased by the presence of other
predictors. There is no rule for knowing when collinearity is problematic, but we can use the
following heuristic: if V IF > 2.5 then collinearity may be problematic, and if V IF > 5 then it is
likely that it is problematic [Studenmund, 2014].
As we mentioned, the big problem of collinearity is overfitting. We test the robustness of our
results by running the regressions many times using random samples of 50% of the WEVS data.
If collinearity does not effect the estimates, then the ensemble of estimates should center around
a clear expected value.
7.3 Results
When we fit the regressions, we see that generational shifts in Secularization SEC robustly
predict future levels of Economic Development GDP and not the other way around; although,
Tolerance of Personal Prohibitions TOL offers a better explanation. Conversely, running the same
regressions, but using the cross-sectional samples instead of generational changes to measure
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cultural values, we find that GDP actually weakly predicts SEC; but this relationship is driven
by transient opinion change.
7.3.1 Generational change
Here we present the regression results which test the temporal relationship between generational
changes in Secularization SEC and long run Economic Development GDP (see regressions 7.1
and 7.2). We also present the regression results which include Tolerance of Personal Norm
Violators TOL and Autonomy AUT (see regressions 7.5 to 7.8). We include the full set of
regression results in tables in the appendix for this chapter.
Regressions 7.1 and 7.2 clearly show that changes in SEC precede those in GDP and not
the other way around. In no case does GDP have a statistical or substantively significant effect
on future GDP and, in all cases, SEC has a statistical and substantively significant effect on
future GDP which increases with time (see figure 7.1). This result is robust to the age we believe
a generation reaches adulthood (it does not matter whether we assume it is 0 to 10, 10 to 20 or
20 to 30 years).
Supporting findings in chapter five, we see that cultural-historical cluster γh is a good
indicator of both future GDP and SEC in most cases. The exception being that it does not reach
statistical significance when predicting future GDP after 10 years, though this could be a false
negative because effect sizes after 10 years are generally small. We have used a conservative p
value correction (Bonferroni correction).
Regressions 7.5 to 7.8 show that, in fact, TOL offers a better explanation of future GDP
than SEC. Surprisingly, we also see that TOL predicts a future decrease in AUT. In all nine
regressions (where g = 10, 20 or 30 years and with the three age-of-adulthood robustness checks
for each), we see TOL significantly predicts GDP every time and the effect size increases with
time (see the top row of figure 7.2). Importantly, including TOL in the regression eliminates any
effect of SEC.
We unexpectedly discovered that an increase in TOL results in a decrease in AUT (a statis-
tically significant result in seven out of nine of the regressions). The bottom row of figure 7.2
illustrates this result and also that the effect size increases with time. Again the statistically
insignificant results occur after 10 years, which could be attributed to a false negative due to
small effect sizes after 10 years and our conservative p value correction.
There are two other relationships which show limited statistical significance: AUT predicts
future GDP in three out of nine of the regressions and SEC predicts future AUT in one out of
nine. Although the evidence for the GDP to AUT relationship appears stronger, we are more
inclined to believe the AUT to SEC relationship because it is increasing in size with time, like
the other significant effect sizes (see figure 7.2). Figure 7.3 shows that we see this pattern for

























Figure 7.1: Detected effect size of generational changes in Secularization SEC on future economic
development GDP, where g is the number of years after a generation has reached adulthood and
become economically active. The blue bar is the effect size if we assume a generation reaches
adulthood between 0-10 years, the red bar assumes 10-20 years and the green bar assumes 20-30
years. The bar height is the the effect size and the black error bars are the associated standard
errors. The faded bars mean 5% statistical significance was not met (Bonferroni corrected
p < 0.004).
The cultural-historic cluster explains a statistically significant proportion of the variance in
all cases where a cultural value variable is the dependent variable in the regression (SEC, AUT
or TOL). However, when GDP is the dependent variable, statistical significance is not met after
10 years; this result fits with the finding from the minimal regressions in equations 7.1 and 7.2
(those including only SEC and GDP as fixed effects).
7.3.2 Cross-Sectional and Opinion Change
Here we present regression results investigating the temporal relationships between Economic
Development GDP and Secularization SEC based on cross-sectional and opinion change data.
We saw in chapter four that the recent cultural value changes expressed in the cross-sectional
data are largely explained by opinion change. Therefore, we expected the regression results using
these two data sets to be nearly the same. This turns out to be the case; confirming further that
recent cultural value change is dominated by opinion change. For these reasons, we will only
present the deeper analysis for the cross-sectional results safe in the knowledge that the opinion
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Figure 7.2: The top row: the effect of past generational changes in Tolerance of Personal Norm
Violators TOL on future Economic Development GDP. Bottom Row: similar plot showing the
effect of past TOL on future Autonomy AUT. In both plots, g is the number of years after a
generation has reached adulthood and has become economically active. The blue bar is the effect
size if we assume a generation reaches adulthood between 0-10 years, the red bar assumes 10-20
years and the green bar assumes 20-30 years. The bar height is the the effect size and the black
error bars are the associated standard errors. The faded bars means 5% statistical significance


















































Figure 7.3: The top row: the effect of past generational changes in Secularization SEC on future
Autonomy AUT. Bottom Row: similar plot showing the effect of past Autonomy AUT on future
Economic Development GDP. In both plots, g is the number of years after a generation has
reached adulthood and has become economically active. The blue bar is the effect size if we
assume a generation reaches adulthood between 0-10 years, the red bar assumes 10-20 years and
the green bar assumes 20-30 years. The bar height is the the effect size and the black error bars
are the associated standard errors. The faded bars mean 5% statistical significance was not met
(Bonferroni corrected p < 0.004).
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SEC (p=5) SEC (p=10) SEC (p=15)
N 128 90 73
n 74 67 53
SEC 0.89 (0.02)** 0.86 (0.04)** 0.83 (0.06)**
GDP 0.07 (0.02)** 0.08 (0.02)** 0.08 (0.04)
i 0 0.1 0.12
h 0 0 0.13
R2 0.94 0.93 0.88
GDP (p=5) GDP (p=10) GDP (p=15)
N 281 223 145
n 105 95 82
SEC 0.02 (0.02) 0.05 (0.03) 0.07 (0.04)
GDP 1.04 (0.01)** 1.08 (0.01)** 1.18 (0.02)**
i 0 0.11 0.21**
h 0.03 0 0.04
R2 0.99 0.98 0.98
Table 7.1: The time-lagged linear regression results testing the temporal relationship between
cross sectional samples of Secularization SEC and Economic Development GDP. The top section
shows the effects of past GDP on future SEC after p = 5, 10 and 15 years. The bottom section
shows the effects of past SEC on future GDP after p = 5, 10 and 15 years. Abbreviations: N =
number of data points, n = number of unique countries, i = variance explained by country-level
random effect, h = variance explained by cultural-historic random effect and R2 = total variance
explained. Each entry contains an estimate and, in brackets the standard error. Bonferroni
corrected statistical significance: p < 0.01(∗∗); p < 0.05(∗).
change results are nearly equivalent. All of the regression results are presented in the tables in
the appendix for this chapter.
The effect sizes are much smaller when we use cross-sectional samples compared to gen-
erational changes. This is unsurprising given the weak linkages between changes in these
cross-sectional samples and economic development (see chapter six). That said, we did find
some statistically significant effects that demonstrated the opposite causal pathway seen for
generational change: changes in GDP predict those in SEC.
Regressions 7.3 and 7.4 show that SEC does not predict future GDP in any cases —neither
after p = 5, 10 or 15 years. Whereas GDP predicts future SEC after both 5 and 10 years (see
table 7.1). The effect size after 15 years is substantively equal to the one seen after 10 years, it
does not meet statistical significance because of the larger standard error. The reason standard
errors are generally high after 15 years is because the sample size N is small. The sample size is
small because the cross-sectional time series are only 25 years long at five year intervals. This
means we have a maximum of two data points per country, but for most countries it will be fewer
because the cross-sectional time series also have a lot of missing values (see chapter four).





















Figure 7.4: The effect of past Economic Development GDP on future levels of the three cultural
value variables F measured using the WEVS representative cross sectional samples. The three
cultural factors F are Autonomy AUT Secularization SEC and Tolerance of Personal Prohibition
Violators TOL. The blue bars show the effect size after p = 5 years, the red bars after p = 10
years and green bars after p = 15 years. The height of the bar is the effect size and the black
error bars are standard errors. The faded bars mean the 5% statistical significance level has not
been met at the Bonferroni corrected level (p<0.004).
Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators TOL. We continue the see changes in GDP preceding
those in cultural values, but it turns out that GDP better predicts future AUT, rather than SEC.
Figure 7.4 shows larger effect sizes on AUT that increase with time. Also that SEC still has a
small effect that increases with time (though statistical significance is only met in one case). It
appears that opinion changes in Autonomy track changes in GDP per capita fairly well.
The Cultural-Historic cluster shows no predictive power in any of the cross-sectional re-
gressions. This is not surprising. We saw in chapter five that opinion changes (the driver of
cross-sectional trends) are idiosyncratic and culturally similar countries do not experience corre-
lated change; unlike for generational change.
7.3.3 Collinearity
To test for the presence of problematic collinearity, we calculated the Variance Inflation factor V IF
for each of the four sets of regressions (see figure 7.5). The first two sets of regressions measure
cultural values as generational change. The first set includes only the variables for Secularization
SEC and Economic Development GDP — we have called this ‘generational minimal’ GM — and
the second set includes variables for the Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators TOL and
107
CHAPTER 7. SECULARIZATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELPMENT












Figure 7.5: The distribution of V IF scores for all parameters estimated using the four sets of
regressions: cross-sectional complete CC, cross-sectional minimal CM, generational complete
GC and generational minimal GM. Each black circle is the V IF score for a single parameter. In
the two complete models (CC and GC) there are four parameters in each of the four regressions
and in the two minimal models (CM and GM) there are two parameters in each of the two
regressions. In the two cross-sectional models (CC and CM) there are three regressions and
in the two generational models (GC and GM) there are nine. This means the total number of
parameters for each regression set are NCC = 48, NCM = 12, NGC = 144 and NGM = 48. The
dotted red line at V IF = 2.5 is the level at which collinearity may be a concern and the solid red
line at V IF = 5 is where collinearity is likely to be a concern.
Autonomy AUT — we have called this ‘generational complete’ GC. The third and fourth sets
of regressions measure cultural values using cross-sectional samples (which is equivalent to
using opinion change data). Like the generational changes regressions, the third set only includes
variables for SEC and GDP (‘cross-sectional minimal’ CM) and the fourth includes variables for
TOL and AUT (‘cross-sectional complete’ CC).
When GDP and SEC are the only two variables in the regression (GM and CM), the V IF
score never exceeds 2.5 meaning collinearity is not likely to be a problem. A few parameters for
the ‘cross-sectional complete’ set of regressions fall above 2.5, but none above the more troubling
threshold of 5. However, the ‘generational complete’ set has many parameters where V IF > 2.5
and even some where V IF > 5. The level of collinearity in ‘generational complete’ GC is a concern
and needs further investigation (see figure 7.5).
The main effects we detected in the ‘generational complete’ regressions were that changes in
TOL precede those in GDP and that changes in TOL negatively predict future AUT (see figure
7.2). We found weaker evidence that SEC predicts future AUT and AUT predicts future GDP
(see figure 7.3). We test the robustness of the four stated effect sizes by running the ‘generational
complete’ regressions using random re-samples of 50% of the original data. We do this 200 times
to create an ensemble parameter estimates and, if collinearity is not an issue, then the estimates
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should converge on a single value.
The ensembles of parameter estimates converge to a single value in three out of four cases
(see figure 7.6). These distributions are unimodal, have the same sign as the original estimates,
and are centered around values which increase with time. However, the distribution of effect
sizes for past TOL on future GDP is bimodal and thus seems sensitive to choice of data (see
figure 7.7). Despite this, the direction of the effect remains positive and the effect size increases
with time (as we have come to expect). Therefore, we just need to be wary that the true effect size
may be smaller than what we have detected using the entire dataset.










Figure 7.6: The distribution of the ensemble of effect sizes accrued by randomly re-sampling
50% of the generational change cultural value and economic development data. Each of the 200
circles is an estimate arrived at by fitting the time-lagged regression to a version of the resampled
data; where, β is the effect size of the lagged predictor on the target (target ∼ predictor).
The four relationships are: lagged Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators on Economic
Development (GDPt ∼ TOL t−g), lagged Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators on Autonomy
(AUTt ∼ TOL t−g), lagged Secularization on Autonomy (AUTt ∼ SECt−g) and lagged Autonomy
on Economic Development (GDPt ∼ AUTt−g). The black circles represent a lag of g = 10 years,
green circles of g = 20 years and red circles of g = 30 years. For this plot, we assume generations
reach adulthood in their 20’s.
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Figure 7.7: Histogram of effect sizes for past Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators on
Economic Development (βGDPt∼TOLt−g). The ensemble of effect sizes are accrued by fitting the
time-lagged linear regression to 200 data sets each representing a 50% random resample from
the original data. The black histogram is the ensemble of effect sizes after g = 10 years, the green
is after g = 20 years and the red is after g = 30 years. For this plot, we assume generations reach
adulthood in their 20’s.
7.4 Discussion
Using a time-lagged linear regression we showed that generational changes in secularization
precede those in economic development and not the other way around. This suggests that Max
Weber’s ‘protestant work-ethic’ view of secularization, rather than Emile Durkheim’s ‘functional-
ist’ model, better fits the WEVS data. Although, to believe that the Protestant Reformation is
the cause of secularization requires a belief that Protestants were less religious than Catholics,
which seems unlikely [Matthews et al., 2013]. That said, secularization could be caused by other
non-economic factors, such as state-takeover of the educational system [Franck and Iannaccone,
2014] or other processes of socialization [Ruiter and van Tubergen, 2009]
When we include variables offering competing explanations of economic development —
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Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators’ and Autonomy — we find that tolerance actually
offers a better explanation for future levels of economic development than secularization (though
the size of this effect is uncertain because the parameter estimates are sensitive to the data
sample). This supports the claim that it is actually disagreement about moral issues which best
explains the inequality of the wealth of nations [Inglehart and Norris, 2003], rather than a
divergence in support for democracy [Huntington, 1996].
Tolerance reflects tolerance of behaviors often morally prohibited on religious grounds such as
abortion, divorce and homosexuality (see chapter three). This is why secularization and tolerance
are so closely related. That said, they do diverge for Communist-Confucian countries (see chapter
five) which are secular but have low tolerance for abortion, divorce and homosexuality, and
have fairly bad economic performance. One possible explanation is that the association between
religiousness and moral tolerance only emerges in countries where levels of openness are already
high [Adamczyk and Pitt, 2009]. In sum, secularization only leads to economic development in as
much as it comes with greater tolerance for the rights of individuals.
We found that cultural values precede economic development when we measure cultural
values as generational change, but when we measure cultural values using the representative
WEVS cross-sectional samples, we actually see weak effects in the opposite direction. We are not
the first to run this kind of analysis with cross-sectional samples. Our results are similar to those
showing changes in economic development preceding those in secular-rational values [Inglehart
and Welzel, 2005] and those in individualism [Hofstede et al., 2010].
The reason for the discrepancy between generational and cross-sectional trends is that cross-
sectional samples are dominated by opinion change (as we showed in chapter four) and that
the drivers of opinion change are very different to those of generational change; the former is
idiosyncratic and only weakly related to changes in human development (see chapters three and
five). Most importantly though, opinion changes are transient and don’t reflect sustained change.
So when previous authors ran regressions that used the standard cross-sectional samples over
short periods of time, they are in fact measuring the effect of transient opinion changes.
We see that cultural-historic cluster has far more power to explain generational change
compared to opinion change. This supports findings in chapter five showing uncorrelated opinion
change within clusters. Cultural factors continue to explain statistically significant proportion of
the variance in economic development, supporting the claim that cultural values influence future
levels of economic development [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005].
7.5 Conclusion
Using our multi-level time-lagged linear regression we have shown that generational changes in
secularization precede those in economic development and not the other way around. However,
tolerance of moral norm violators offers a better explanation than secularization. This runs
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contrary to the findings of Ronald Inglehart and Gert Hofstede who both showed, using cross-
sectional samples, that changes in economic development precede those in cultural values. We
repeated this analysis using our own cross-sectional samples and found similar results. However,
we also show that variance in the cross-sectional samples over short time periods is dominated by
transient opinion change. This means analysis using cross-sectional samples is actually capturing










CULTURAL VALUES AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
We showed in the last chapter that long-term economic development is preceded bysecularization and increased tolerance of other moral viewpoints. In this chapter wetake a broader perspective and investigate the linkages between general cultural values
and human development. We use the same multi-level time-lagged linear regression and include
information from all nine cultural factors to investigate cultural value linkages with economic
development and the emergence of democratic institutions.
We showed in chapter three that Institutional Confidence and Interest in Politics (along with
Prosociality) represent cultural value variation that had not been quantified by the seminal
Inglehart-Welzel cultural map [Inglehart and Baker, 2000]. Therefore, our investigation of the
Human Development Sequence (described in the literature review) will, for the first time, include
variance representing support for institutions. This will hopefully shed light on the mysterious
decline in support for democracy and other institutions measured during the last 100 years.
Previous statistical analyses of the HDS have used the representative cross-sectional samples
provided by the WEVS [Abdollahian et al., 2012; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Spaiser et al., 2014].
We also fit our multi-level time-lagged regressions to the cross-sectional samples, but we know
the variance in these samples is driven by transient opinion change (chapters four) and that their
dynamics are poorly linked to those in human development (chapter six). Our main focus is on
linkages between generational change — which is the cause of cultural value change over long
periods of time — and long run human development variables. This is the first attempt to use
generational cultural value changes in a formal statistical model of the Human Development
Sequence.
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8.1 Data
We include human development variables for economic development GDP and democratic insti-
tutions DEM. Economic development data was taken from the Madison project which provides
historical time series for GDP per Capita (normalized to 1990 US dollars). Democratic institutions
were measured using data from the Polity IV project which provide historical assessments of
democratic systems. We provide detailed expositions of both these datasets in chapter six.
We want to include the information from all nine of our cultural factors in the analysis;
however we are likely to have collinearity problems because of the strong inter-correlation
between the cultural factors (see chapter four). For example, consider the mild collinearity
problems we had in the last chapter when we included just three cultural value variables
(Secularization, Tolerance of Personal Prohibition Violators and Autonomy). For this reason we
have to express the cultural factors in a reduced form.
8.1.1 Openness, Secular-Rational and Institutional Support
To minimize collinearity concerns, our cultural value variables will ideally be orthogonal. We use
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to compress our nine cultural factors into a reduced set
of orthogonal components. PCA is discussed in chapter three, but fundamentally it attempts to
explain some high dimensional variance in a more parsimoniously way.
We rejected the use of PCA in chapter three because our objective then was to uncover
factors underlying the WEVS that were, in some sense, real. This meant that we conceptually
focused on making the factors interpretable, and so we allowed inter-correlation among factors.
PCA is inappropriate for this task because it conceptually focuses on explaining variance using
orthogonal components. However, in this chapter, we want to compress our nine cultural factors
into a more parsimonious form, a task that PCA was designed for.
Once PCA has been performed, we have to decide how many components to retain. The usual
way is to use Kaiser’s method, where we retain all of the factors which have an eigenvalue of
greater than one [Ledesma and Valero-Mora, 2007] — this means that all retained components
explain more variance than the average cultural factor. Kaiser’s method tells us to retain three
components (see the left hand side of figure 8.1). We have labeled these three cultural value
components: Openness OPEN, Secular-Rational RAT and Institutional Support INST.
The right hand side of figure 8.1 shows the correlations between the original nine cultural
factors and the three cultural components. These were used to label the three cultural components.
Openness OPEN is positively correlated with Intrinsic Tolerance IT, Xenophilia X EN and
Wellbeing WB, and is negatively correlated with the Importance of Personal Prohibitions PP.
Secular-Rational RAT is positively correlated with Political Engagement PE and negatively
correlated with Religiosity REL, the Importance of Personal Prohibitions PP and Prosociality
PRO. Institutional Support INST is positively correlated with Institutional Confidence IC,
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Interest in Politics IP and Wellbeing WB.
































Figure 8.1: Breakdown of the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) used to compress our nine
cultural factors into three cultural components. Left hand side: the eigenvalues of the sorted
components, where the dotted line indicates the cut-off point for factor retention according to
Kaiser’s method (eigenvalue=1). Right hand side: the correlations between each of the nine cul-
tural factors and the three cultural components. Cultural factor abbreviations: REL = Religiosity,
IC =Institutional Confidence, IT = Intrinsic Tolerance, PRO = Prosociality, IP = Interest in Politics,
WB = Wellbeing, PE = Political Engagement, PP = Importance of Personal Prohibitions, XEN =
Xenophilia. Cultural component abbreviations: OPEN = Openness, RAT = Secular-Rational and
INST = Institutional Support.
Openness OPEN and Secular-Rational RAT are similar to the two dimensions of the
Inglehart-Welzel cultural map discussed earlier — ‘survival vs self-expression’ and ‘traditional
vs secular-rational’ cultural values [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Openness explains 72% of the
variation in the ‘survival vs self-expression’ dimension and Secular-Rational explains 83% of the
variance in the ‘traditional vs secular/rational’ dimension. Conversely and as we expected, Insti-
tutional Support INST represents new variation not captured by either of the Inglehart-Welzel
dimensions. See table 8.1 for a complete statement of the pairwise relationships between the





Table 8.1: Variance explained (R2) in the pairwise relationships between the three cultural
value components (RAT=Secular-Rational, OPEN=Openness and INST=Institutional Support)
and the two dimensions of the Inglehart-Welzel (I-W) cultural map (TRAD-RAT is traditional vs
secular-rational values and SURV-SEF is survival vs self-expression values). The correlations
are calculated using the 91 countries for which we have I-W dimension data.
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8.2 Regressions
Here we present the multi-level time-lagged linear regressions we used to explore the temporal
relationships between cultural values and human development (adapted from the general form
model documented in chapter six). Cultural values are defined as the three cultural components:
Secular-Rational values RAT, Openness OPEN and Institutional Support INST. Human devel-
opment is defined as economic development GDP and democratic institutions DEM. The first
set of regressions measure cultural values using generational change data and the second set use
cross-section/opinion change data.
All of the regressions contain a universal intercept µ, a random-effect for country γi, a
random-effect for cultural-historic cluster γh and an error term ε.
8.2.1 Generational Change
Here we present regressions 8.1 to 8.5, which explore the temporal relationship between gener-
ational changes in cultural value components (RAT, OPEN and INST) and long run human
development (GDP and DEM). The subscripts for country i and cultural-historic cluster h have
been dropped from the fixed effect terms for clarity given the length of the equations:
(8.1)
GDPt =µ+αGDPt−g +β1DEMt−g +β2RATt−g
+β3OPENt−g +β4INSTt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past GDP on current GDP and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past DEM, RAT, OPEN and INST on current GDP. The subscript g is the generational time
lag (we run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic
cluster (representing cultural relatedness) and ε is the error.
(8.2)
DEMt =µ+αDEMt−g +β1GDPt−g +β2RATt−g
+β3OPENt−g +β4INSTt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past DEM on current DEM and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, RAT, OPEN and INST on current DEM. The subscript g is the generational time
lag (we run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic
cluster and ε is the error.
(8.3)
RATt =µ+αRATt−g +β1DEMt−g +β2GDPt−g
+β3OPENt−g +β4INSTt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past RAT on current RAT and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, DEM, OPEN and INST on current RAT. The subscript g is the generational time
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lag (we run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic
cluster and ε is the error.
(8.4)
OPENt =µ+αOPENt−g +β1DEMt−g +β2GDPt−g
+β3RATt−g +β4INSTt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past OPEN on current OPEN and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, DEM, RAT and INST on current OPEN. The subscript g is the generational time
lag (we run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic
cluster and ε is the error.
(8.5)
INSTt =µ+αINSTt−g +β1DEMt−g +β2GDPt−g
+β3RATt−g +β4OPENt−g +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past INST on current INST and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, DEM, RAT and OPEN on current INST. The subscript g is the generational time
lag (we run three regressions for g = 10, 20 and 30 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic
cluster and ε is the error.
We also run the three age-of-adulthood robustness checks (see chapter six for details). For
each regression, we assume that a generation enters adulthood first between 0 and 10 years,
then between 10 and 20 years and finally between 20 and 30 years. This means the regressions
8.1 to 8.5 are each fitted nine times.
8.2.2 Cross-Sectional/Opinion Change
Here we present regressions 8.6 to 8.10. They investigate the temporal relationship between the
cultural value components (RAT, OPEN and INST) — represented using cross-sectional/opinion
change data — and recent changes in human development data (GDP and DEM). These regres-
sions are applicable to both cross-sectional and opinion change because both sets of data use time
period (since 1990) as their temporal dimension. The equations are quite long so, for clarity, the
subscripts for country i and cultural-historic cluster h have been dropped from the fixed effect
terms.
(8.6)
GDPt =µ+αGDPt−p +β1DEMt−p +β2RATt−p
+β3OPENt−p +β4INSTt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past GDP on current GDP and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past DEM, RAT, OPEN and INST on current GDP. The subscript p is the time period lag (we
run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
(representing cultural relatedness) and ε is the error.
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(8.7)
DEMt =µ+αDEMt−p +β1GDPt−p +β2RATt−p
+β3OPENt−p +β4INSTt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past DEM on current DEM and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, RAT, OPEN and INST on current DEM. The subscript p is the time period lag (we
run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
and ε is the error.
(8.8)
RATt =µ+αRATt−p +β1DEMt−p +β2GDPt−p
+β3OPENt−p +β4INSTt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past RAT on current RAT and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, DEM, OPEN and INST on current RAT. The subscript p is the time period lag (we
run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
and ε is the error.
(8.9)
OPENt =µ+αOPENt−p +β1DEMt−p +β2GDPt−p
+β3RATt−p +β4INSTt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past OPEN on current OPEN and the vector β contains the effect sizes
of past GDP, DEM, RAT and INST on current OPEN. The subscript p is the time period lag
(we run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
and ε is the error.
(8.10)
INSTt =µ+αINSTt−p +β1DEMt−p +β2GDPt−p
+β3RATt−p +β4OPENt−p +γh|i +ε
where α is the effect of past INST on current INST and the vector β contains the effect sizes of
past GDP, DEM, RAT and OPEN on current INST. The subscript p is the time period lag (we
run three regressions for p = 5, 10 and 15 years), i is country and h is cultural-historic cluster
and ε is the error.
We expect the regression results using cross-sectional and opinion change data to be roughly
the same because the variance in the cross-sectional samples is explained almost entirely by
opinion change data (see chapter four). We run each of the four regressions three times (where













Figure 8.2: The Variance Inflation Factors V IF for parameters in the three sets of regressions.
Cross-section — regressions 8.6 to 8.10 — are used to fit the representative cross-sectional data,
there are 5 regressions with 5 parameters that are run 3 times, meaning the total number of
parameters is 75. Opinion — regressions 8.6 to 8.10 are used to fit the opinion change data,
there are 5 regressions with 5 parameters that are run 3 times, meaning the total number of
parameters is 75. Generation — regressions (8.1 to 8.5) are used to fit the generational change
data; where there are 5 regressions with 5 parameters that are run 9 times, meaning the total
number of parameters is 225. Each black circle represents a single parameter. The dotted red
line at V IF = 2.5 is the threshold where collinearity might be a problem and the solid red line at
V IF = 5 is the threshold where collinearity is probably a problem.
8.2.3 Collinearity
We expect that by compressing our nine correlated cultural factors into three orthogonal cultural
components, we will avoid problems of collinearity. We verify this by calculating the Variance
Inflation Factor V IF for each set of regressions. In the last chapter we gave a detailed exposition
of collinearity and the V IF. The V IF gives us a indicator for whether collinearity is likely to be
a problem, but can not tell us for certain. As a rule of thumb, V IF > 2.5 represents a potential
problem and V IF > 5 a likely problem [Studenmund, 2014].
Figure 8.2 shows, as we thought, that compressing the nine cultural factors into three
orthogonal components has avoided the problems associated with collinearity: very few of the
parameters have V IF > 2.5 and none have V IF > 5.
8.3 Results
When we fit regressions 8.1 to 8.5, we see that generational changes in Secular-Rational RAT and
Openness OPEN cultural values robustly predict future changes in both economic development
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GDP and democratic institutions DEM. Moreover, the mysterious decrease in Institutional
Support INST is preceded by a rise in Secular-Rational Values RAT. Although, when we fit the
cross-sectional/opinion change regressions 8.6 to 8.10, we see that Institutional Support INST is
affected by short term fluctuations in human development: economic development GDP precedes
increases in Institutional Support INST, whereas improvements in democracy DEM precede
decreases in Institutional Support INST.
8.3.1 Generational Change
We fit each of the generational change regressions (8.1 to 8.5) nine times: with generational time
lags of g = 10, 20 and 30 years and, for each of these, a regression where we consider a generation
becoming active in the adult population between the ages of 0 to 10 years, 10 to 20 years and 20
to 30 years. Full regression results in tables in the appendix for this chapter.
Supporting findings from the last chapter, we found robust evidence that changes in cultural
values precede those in human development and not the other way around. Changes in RAT
precede those in GDP (statistical significance met in nine out of nine regressions) and also
precede those in DEM. In the latter case, statistical significance is only met in six out of nine
regressions. The three insignificant effects occur at g = 10 years, where the effect sizes are small
(see the bottom right of figure 8.3). These could be false negatives, given our use of a conservative
p value correction (Bonferroni correction). Likewise, changes in OPEN robustly predict future
changes in DEM (in all nine of the regressions) and also predict future changes in GDP (in eight
of nine regressions). These results are presented in figure 8.3.
The cultural components RAT and OPEN reflect cultural value variance used in past
analysis of the human development sequence [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. However, we include
a third cultural component: Institutional Support INST. Regressions 8.1 to 8.10 show that
past generational changes in RAT predict future generational change in INST. Statistical
significance is met in six out of nine cases where, again, the exceptions are after g = 10 years.
After 10 years the effect sizes are small so, given our conservative p value adjustment, these
could be false negatives.
Cultural-historic cluster h explains an average of 33% of the variance in RAT and 34% in
SEC, but explains 0% of the variance in INST, 8% in GDP and 2% in DEM. It appears as
though past cultural values offer a better explanation for human development than cultural
relatedness, but that the cultural values themselves diffuse more readily through culturally
similar countries. We saw in chapter five that cultural-historic clusters were not separable in the
cultural factors which compose INST (Institutional Confidence and Interest in Politics), so it is























































































Figure 8.3: The effect sizes of cultural values on future levels of human development. Top left:
the effect of Openness OPEN on future economic development GDP. Top right: the effect of
Secular-Rationality RAT on future economic development GDP. Bottom left: the effect of past
Openness OPEN on future democracy DEM. Bottom right: the effect of past Secular-Rationality
RAT on future democracy DEM. The effect sizes are measured with time lags of g = 10, g = 20
and g = 30 years; the blue bar assumes generations reach adulthood between the ages of 0 and
10 years, the red bar between 10 and 20 years and the green bar between 20 and 30 years. The
black error bars are standard errors and the faded bars mean that 5% statistical significance was
not met (Bonferroni corrected to p < 0.003).
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Figure 8.4: the effect of past Secular-Rationality RAT on future Institutional Support INST.
The effect sizes are measured with a time lag of g = 10, g = 20 and g = 30 years; the blue bar
assumes generations reach adulthood between the ages of 0 and 10 years, the red bar between
10 and 20 years and the green bar between 20 and 30 years. The black error bars are standard
errors and the faded bars mean that 5% statistical significance was not met (Bonferroni corrected
p < 0.003).
8.3.2 Cross-Sectional and Opinion Change
We fit regressions 8.6 to 8.10 to investigate the temporal relationship between short tern changes
in human development and cross-sectional/opinion changes in cultural values. We found in
chapter four that the variation in cross-sectional samples is dominated by opinion change.
Therefore, we expect the regression results using the two types of data to be the same; this
turns out to be the case. For this reason, we only present in-depth analysis of the cross-sectional
results with the knowledge that the opinion change analysis will be nearly identical. The detailed
regression results using both cross-sectional and opinion change data are in the appendix for this
chapter.
We found limited statistical structure between short term changes in human development and
cross-sectional changes in human development, which is similar to the results in the last chapter.
Although we did find that GDP predicted future Secularization — an important component of
RAT — but this effect disappears once DEM, OPEN and INST are included in the regression.
That said, we do see statistically significant effects for both GDP and DEM on future INST;
but interestingly GDP predicts an increase and DEM predicts a decrease (see figure 8.5).
A major shortcoming of the cross-sectional data is that the time series are stunted. The












































Figure 8.5: The effect of short term changes in human development on opinion changes in
Institutional Support INST. Left hand side: the effect size of past economic development GDP
on future Institutional Support INST Right hand side: the effect size of past democracy DEM
on future Institutional Support INST. The effect sizes are measured with a time lag of p = 5,
p = 10 and p = 15 years. The black error bars are standard errors and the faded colored bars
mean that 5% statistical significance was not met (Bonferroni corrected p < 0.003).
This means each country has a maximum of five data points over a 25 year period, so when the
regression employs a 15 years time lag, this leaves us with a maximum of two data points per
country. The reality is actually worse than this because these time series contain a lot of missing
data. This means we lose entire countries as we increase the time lag resulting in the following
residual sample sizes: 70 countries with a lag of 5 years, 65 with a lag of 10 years and 49 with a
lag of 15 years.
We want to make sure our results are robust to this significant reduction in representative
countries. So we rerun the regressions using only the 49 countries which survive when we increase
the time lag from p = 5 to p = 15. Figure 8.6 shows that results are similar: once again only
statistically significant effects were seen for GDP and DEM on future INST. Tables containing
these regression results are in the appendix for this chapter.
8.3.3 Revised Human Development Sequence
These findings give us a new perspective on the Human Development Sequence (HDS). Our
version of the HDS contains two modes of cultural value change: generational change which
dominates cultural value change over the long-term and opinion change which dominates over
the short term. We find that cultural value changes (Secular-Rational and Openness) are primary
in the HDS and lead to future changes in human development. This includes an apparent side-
effect of a subsequent reduction in Institutional Support. Although, as we see in chapter four,
Institutional Support is subject to large opinion changes which are a response to short term
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Figure 8.6: A robustness check for the effects of short term changes in human development on
opinion changes in Institutional Support INST. These plots only use the 49 countries which
present data for all time lags (p = 5, p = 10 and p = 15). Left hand side: the effect size of past
economic development GDP on future Institutional Support INST Right hand side: the effect
size of past democracy DEM on future Institutional Support INST. The effect sizes are measured
with a time lag of p = 5, p = 10 and p = 15 years. The black error bars are standard errors and
the faded colored bars mean that 5% statistical significance was not met (Bonferroni corrected p
< 0.003).
fluctuations in human development.
Figure 8.7 illustrates that increases in Secular-Rational and Openness cultural values predict
long term future changes in both economic development and the emergence of democratic
institutions. It also shows that the mysterious decline in Institutional Support is a symptom
of rising Secular-Rational values. Finally, transient opinion changes in Institutional Support
are preceded by changes in human development: economic development results in increased
Institutional Support, whereas improvements in democracy result in decreased Institutional
Support in the short term.
8.3.4 Stability to Component Cultural Factors
As we documented earlier, our three cultural value components are actually orthogonal composites
of our nine cultural factors. The nine cultural factors have better defined meanings relating
to a small set of correlated WEVS questions. Consequently, we want to make sure our revised
human development sequence is robust to the swapping of the cultural value components with
its correlated cultural factors (these correlations are illustrated in figure 8.1).
We suspect that the long term generational change parts of the revised HDS will survive, but
not the cross-sectional/opinion change parts. This is because the set of cultural factors which
correlate with a given component also show correlated generation change, but not correlated
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Figure 8.7: A schematic illustrating the linkages between the human development variables —
economic development and democracy — and cultural value variables — Secular-Rationality,
Openness and Institutional Support. The human development variables are represented by
rectangles and the cultural value variables by circles. The black arrows indicate a pathway be-
tween long term generational changes and human development variables. The dotted red arrows
indicate a pathway from short run changes in human development variables to opinion changes
in Institutional Support. A minus sign (-) indicates a negative relationship. The cultural value
variables are the three cultural components derived in this chapter, the economic development
data is taken from the Madison project [Bolt et al., 2014] and the democracy data is taken from
the Polity IV project [Marshall et al., 2017].
opinion change. For example, the Secular-Rational component is correlated with Religiosity REL,
the Importance of Personal Prohibitions PP and Political Engagement PE and chapter four
showed that generational changes among these cultural factors were correlated, yet their opinion
changes were not.
We run each set of regressions another two times, substituting the cultural components with
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Figure 8.8: Robustness test for the five significant effects of cultural component generational
change on long term human development and Institutional Support (GDPt ∼ RATt−g, GDPt ∼
OPENt−g, DEMt ∼ RATt−g, DEMt ∼ OPENt−g and INSTt ∼ RATt−g). We substitute each
cultural component with its most correlated cultural factor: RAT = SEC, OPEN = X EN and
INST = IP; where SEC is Secularization, X EN is Xenophilia and IP is Interest in Politics. The
effect sizes are measured g = 10, g = 20 and g = 30 years after the generation enters adulthood,
which occurs between the ages of 20 and 30 years. The black error bars are standard errors and
the faded colored bars mean 5% statistical significance was not met (Bonferroni corrected p <
0.003).
the two cultural factors most strongly correlated with it. In the first new regression we make
the following substitutions: RAT=Secularization (inverse of Religiosity), OPEN=Xenophilia and
INST=Interest in Politics . The second the following substitutions: RAT=Political Engagement,
OPEN=Intrinsic tolerance and INST=Institutional Confidence.
8.3.4.1 Generational Change
As we predicted, the HDS structure associated with long-term generational changes is robust to
the substitution of highly correlated cultural factors (see figure 8.8 and 8.9). When we substitute
in the most correlated cultural factors (RAT=religiosity, OPEN=Xenophilia and INST=Interest
in Politics) the five causal arrows in figure 8.7 remain intact. The one minor difference is that
Secularization SEC has a much weaker effect on future DEM than RAT does. This means
statical significance is not met in two out of three regressions, but this could be a false negative
due to our use of the conservative Bonferroni p value adjustment.
As figure 8.9 shows, when we substitute in the second most correlated cultural factors
(RAT=Political Engagement, OPEN=Intrinsic Tolerance and INST=Institutional Confidence)
the HDS structure is largely preserved again. The one small difference is that the effect of
126
8.3. RESULTS

















GDPt ∼ ITt− g
DEMt ∼PEt− g
DEMt ∼ ITt− g
ICt ∼PEt− g
Figure 8.9: Robustness test for the five significant effects of cultural component generational
change on long term human development and Institutional Support (GDPt ∼ RATt−g, GDPt ∼
OPENt−g, DEMt ∼ RATt−g, DEMt ∼ OPENt−g and INSTt ∼ RATt−g). We substitute each
cultural component with its second most correlated cultural factor: RAT = PE, OPEN = IT and
INST = IC; where PE is Political Engagement, IT is Intrinsic Tolerance and IC is Institutional
Confidence. The effect sizes are measured with time lags of g = 10, g = 20 and g = 30 years, with
age of adulthood occurring between the ages of 20 and 30 years. The black error bars are standard
errors and the faded colored bars mean 5% statistical significance was not met (Bonferroni
corrected p < 0.003).
Political Engagement PE on future Institutional Confidence IC is small and does not reach
statistical significance; unlike the cultural component effect of RAT on future INST. That said,
the effect is still in the same direction and increases with time, which leads us to think that the
absence of statistical significance is a false negative.
8.3.4.2 Cross-Sectional Samples
As expected, when we substitute cultural components using the cross-sectional samples, our
revised HDS is modified. The first set of substitutions (RAT=Secularization, OPEN=Xenophilia
and INST=Interest in Politics) show the expected positive effect of GDP on Interest in Politics
IP, but not the negative effect of DEM on Interest in Politics. Whereas, when we substitute
the second set of cultural factors (RAT=Political Engagement, OPEN=Intrinsic Tolerance and
INST=Institutional Confidence), we see no evidence for the expected effect of GDP on Insti-
tutional Confidence and only limited evidence for the expected effect of DEM on Institutional
Confidence. These effect sizes are illustrated in figure 8.10.
This suggests that short term changes in human development result in different trajectories
of opinion change for cultural factors that are inter-correlated. In other words, GDP and DEM
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Figure 8.10: Robustness tests of the two significant effects for short term changes in human
development and opinion change in Institutional Support (INSTt ∼ GDPt−p and INSTt ∼
DEMt−p). Left hand side: we substitute each cultural component with its most correlated cultural
factor — RAT = SEC, OPEN = X EN and INST = IP; where SEC is Secularization, X EN is
Xenophilia and IP is Interest in Politics. Right hand side: we substitute each cultural component
with its second most correlated cultural factor — RAT = PE, OPEN = IT and INST = IC;
where PE is Political Engagement, IT is Intrinsic Tolerance and IC is Institutional Confidence.
The effect sizes are measured with lags of p = 5, p = 10 and p = 15 years. The black error bars
are standard errors and the faded colored bars mean 5% statistical significance was not met
(Bonferroni corrected p < 0.003).
both affect the cultural component INST because GDP affects Interest in Politics and DEM
affects Institutional Confidence, whereas the generational change in inter-correlated sets of
cultural factors is synchronous and they affect human development in the same way. For example,
RAT affects GDP because Secularization and Political Engagement both affect GDP.
8.4 Discussion
The Human Development Sequence (HDS) was devised by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel
to explain the role of cultural value change in the broader context of economic development and
emergent democratic institutions [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. They propose a causal structure
in which economic development facilitates cultural value change, which in turn facilitates the
rise of democracy. Although this sequence of events has been questioned [Spaiser et al., 2014].
We contribute to this debate by using time-lagged linear regressions to investigate the order in
which human development and cultural value variables emerged. Unlike previous studies, we
separate the two modes of cultural value change (generational and opinion) because these two
modes interact with human development in different ways.
Long term generational cultural values are primary in the HDS. Secular-Rationality and
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Openness precede changes in both economic development and democracy. This is contrary to the
mainstream view that economic development is primary [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Unlike
previous versions of the HDS, we include a variable for Institutional Support, which has been
declining in a way similar to ‘support for democracy’ [Foa et al., 2016]. It turns out that the long
term decline in Institutional Support is usually preceded by an increase in Secular-Rationality.
This supports the view that an increasingly informed and skeptical public become critical of
their governing institutions [Norris and Inglehart, 2009]. Therefore, it looks like the decline of
Institutional Support may just be an inevitable consequence of human development.
Institutional Support is also subject to large opinion fluctuations (as we saw in chapter four).
These changes are predicted by short term changes in democracy and economic development.
An increase in democracy can result in a transient reduction in future Institutional Support.
Conversely, an increase in economic development predicts a rise in Institutional Support. Given
that institutional confidence is linked to perceived government performance [Newton and Norris,
2000], this suggests that people might see economic prosperity as a responsibility of government.
Enrico Spolaore uses the idea of ‘cultural barriers’ to explain why cultural-history has such a
big influence on economic development [Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016]. Elaborating, the means
of economic development (i.e. the knowledge, knowhow and technology associated with the
industrial revolution) will diffuse more readily between countries with similar cultures. However,
we found that past cultural values offer a better explanation for economic development than
cultural-history. That said, cultural-history still has a big influence on the global distribution of
cultural values themselves — cultural values being the primal variable in our revised HDS.
The cultural barriers model should therefore be applied to the spread of cultural values.
Possible barriers to the spread of cultural values include an incompatibility of stable cultural
features like language and religion [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016] or
information restrictions resulting from a non-free press and bad communication infrastructure
[Norris and Inglehart, 2009]. It is possible that some other variable explains the global distribu-
tion of cultural values. These include education [Murtin and Wacziarg, 2014]. However, a recent
study shows that increased tertiary education enrollment does not predict future cultural values
[Ruck et al., 2019].
Generational cultural value change occurs at a deeper level than opinion change. Each of our
cultural value components are highly correlated with a few of our nine cultural factors. When
we substitute a cultural component with one of its correlated cultural factors, the long-term
HDS structure associated with generational change remains the same. On the other hand, when
we make the same cultural factor substitutions for short term opinion changes, the linkages to
human development differ depending on which correlated cultural factor was substituted in. If
we imagine a cultural value hierarchy in which deep cultural values affect those at the superficial
level, then generational changes occur at a deep level, causing correlated changes among the
superficial cultural factors (as we saw in chapter four). This is unlike opinion changes which are
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actioned at the superficial level.
Economic development is driven by technological innovation [Arthur, 2014], which scales
in complexity and diversity when knowledge and know-how accumulates in large and densely
connected networks [Hidalgo, 2015; Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016]. Cultural values are an
important part of the social software that directs human collective behavior [Morris, 2015; Ruck
et al., 2018, 2019]. Cultural values of secular-rationality — a greater concern for worldly issues
— means the productive capacity each person (the size of a person byte [Hidalgo, 2015]) goes
up. Openness values — openness to cooperation with traditional norm violators and out-groups
(see figure 8.1)— will increase the size and density of cooperative networks, possibly driving the
expansion of cities [West, 2017].
Figure 8.1 shows that secular-rationality and cosmopolitanism are both correlated with low
importance of personal prohibitions, which is indicative of the primacy of individual rights in
western cultures [Schulz et al., 2018]. Therefore, these societies have preferences for racial,
gender and economic equality [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Nikolaev et al., 2017] that makes
democracy an attractive administrative arrangement. Furthermore, the economic power these
cultural values bring (see figure 8.3) means that urban innovators can challenge the extractive
rule of hereditary elites [Flannery and Marcus, 2012].
We ran a number of regressions in this chapter, which raises concerns about the validity of
statistical significance levels; some even propose that the conventional statistical significance
level of 5% is too liberal and a 0.5% level should be employed instead [Benjamin et al., 2018].
However, applied statisticians place too much emphasis on p values which, in reality, are just
a continuous measure of certainty regarding the direction of an effect. This makes it a useful
heuristic when comparing many effects, but any cutoff — be it 5% or 0.5% — is arbitrary. In
Bayesian Statistics p-values are not employed because parameters are described by distributions,
therefore credible intervals — the proportion of the probability mass that is positive (or negative)
— are used instead [McElreath, 2015].
That said, many of our regressions include similar variables and many are just robustness
checks, which means they are not independent tests. Nonetheless, we still use a conservative
Bonferroni correction (which assumes independent tests) to adjust our p value threshold.
When using birth cohort differences to measure generational changes, we get the added bonus
of extending our time series to 100 years. However, our opinion change time series, like the
cross-sectional samples, only cover the last 25 years. This makes comparisons of generational
and opinion changes uncertain. That said, it is clear from chapters four and five that opinion
changes are very different in character from generational changes. Moreover, evidence from west
European countries allows us to extend opinion change time series back 40 years and we still see
that opinion changes are highly variable [Inglehart, 2008]. These trends still do not match the
largely increasing trends in both economic development and democracy seen by the world over
the same time period. Therefore, its probable that opinion changes will still be badly correlated
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with long-term human development, even if we had access to longer time series.
Controlling for the non-independence of countries is essential to avoid Galton’s problem
[Mesoudi, 2011] and Simpson’s paradox [McElreath, 2015]. We have done this using a hierarchical
model that treats countries as members of discrete language categories, but this ignores the
fact that languages are actually continuously related according to a phylogenetic tree [Pagel
et al., 2007]. Data from Glottolog [Hammarström et al., 2018] and Ethnologue [Lewis, 2009]
could be used to construct a network of linguistic similarity among nations and, if this network
were sufficiently clustered, it would justify the use of discrete language categories to control for
cultural-history. Otherwise a full phylogenetic control must be developed [Matthews et al., 2016].
8.5 Conclusion
We used our time-lagged linear regression to evaluate the temporal relationships between human
development (economic development and democratic institutions) and cultural values (Secular-
Rational, Openness and Institutional Support). We used the results to recommend a revised
version of the human developmental sequence which distinguishes between generational and
opinion cultural value change. The revised HDS shows that Secular-Rationality and Openness
are primary and predict future levels of human development. Our HDS includes a new variable
— Institutional Support — whose decline is partly explained by the rise of Secular-Rationality.
Institutional Support also shows volatile opinion changes that are preceded by short term
fluctuations in human development. However, opinion changes occur superficially in the cultural
value hierarchy, whereas generational changes occur at deeper level. The result being that
cultural factors which compose Secular-Rational, Openness and Institutional Support will exhibit












In the previous six chapters, we summarized the WEVS data and arrived at a parsimoniousdescription of cultural values. We have quantified their long and short term dynamics andhave shown that cultural values are primary in the sequence of human development. To
promote economic development and democracy around the world, we must reduce the barriers
that prevent the spread of beneficial cultural values by facilitating a free press, free trade and
better communication infrastructure [Norris and Inglehart, 2009].
In chapters two to four, we used unsupervised statistical methods to summarize the World and
European Values Surveys (WEVS) data. We view the WEVS responses as the visible emergent
property of a set of underlying cultural values. In chapter three, we discovered nine interpretable
cultural factors that explained the WEVS data. In chapter four, we used a two stage Bayesian
linear regression to measure cultural value dynamics, identifying two modes of change. First,
steady and persistent generational change that determine cultural values over the long term.
Second, rapid and transient opinion change that dominates cultural value change in the short
term. We showed in chapter five that countries cluster into four cultural value clusters that
reflect both cultural-history (language, religion and colonial history) and economic development.
Chapters five to seven place dynamic cultural values within the broader framework of human
development (economic development and democracy). Chapter six introduces our multi-level
time-lagged linear regression which we used to determine whether changes in cultural values
preceded those in human development or vice versa. We expand our time horizon by treating
birth cohorts as representative of historic time periods because cultural values are formed during
the first decades of life [House et al., 2013; Sears and Funk, 1999]. In chapter seven, we show
that secularization precedes economic development, contradicting certain theories [Durkheim,
1912; Norenzayan, 2013], but also that respect for individual rights is a more likely driver of
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economic development. In chapter eight, we showed that changes in cultural values precede
those in human development, demonstrating the primacy of cultural values. We also showed the
concerning decline in support for national institutions may just be an inevitable consequence of
human development.
9.1 Cultural Value Dynamics and Human Development
Our nine cultural factors were Religiosity, Political Engagement, the Importance of Personal
Prohibitions, Xenophilia, Tolerance of Intrinsic Differences, Wellbeing, Prosociality, Institutional
Confidence and Interest in Politics. We used Principal Component Analysis to compress these nine
cultural factors into three orthogonal cultural components: Secular-Rationality (correlated with
Secularization and Political Engagement), Openness (correlated with Xenophilia and Intrinsic
Tolerance) and Institutional Support (correlated with Institutional Confidence and Interest In
Politics). Secular-Rationality and Openness correspond to the two dimensions of the seminal
Inglehart-Welzel cultural map [Inglehart and Baker, 2000; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005], but
Institutional Support represents new variance.
The generational and opinion modes of cultural value change have distinctive characters.
Opinion changes are rapid and transient [Inglehart, 2008], often as a response to fluctuations in
short term economic variables [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. For instance, changes in inflation
and unemployment track the mood in English language literature [Acerbi et al., 2013] and that
opinion change in Institutional Support is a response to fluctuations in human development
(see chapter eight). Opinion change dominates the variance in the WEVS’s representative cross-
sectional samples, so when previous work used these cross-sectional samples to show that changes
in economic development preceded those in cultural values [Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and
Welzel, 2005], they were in fact showing that short term changes in the economy cause transient
opinion changes in cultural values. A view supported by findings in chapter seven.
On the other hand, generational changes are gradual and persistent and explain the distribu-
tion of cultural values we see in the world today (see chapter four). Furthermore, unlike opinion
changes, they track changes in human development and cultural-history (see chapter six). The
strong and long-term linkages of generational change with human development suggest it is the
important mode of cultural value change required to understand sustained improvements in
economic development and democracy. We show that changes in cultural values precede improve-
ments in both economic development and democracy (see chapter eight), in addition to changes in
tertiary education enrollment [Ruck et al., 2018]. Chapter five showed that generational changes
in African-Islamic countries are small to non-existent and are largest in Western countries. The
cultural values of rich and poor countries are continuing to diverge [Norris and Inglehart, 2009].
Our Prosociality cultural factor is a measure of moral behavior; where ‘moral behavior’ means
following the established rules of your society without coercion — like paying for taxes and public
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transport when it is possible to avoid it. Prosociality is a particularly volatile cultural factor
because it is subject to large opinion changes (see chapter four). This might be because of the
complex way our innate moral behavior interacts with economic incentives [Bowles, 2016]. In
a democratic country, a government’s influence is often constrained to around a decade due to
time-limited periods in office, whereas generational change can be on the order of a century.
Therefore, governments necessarily respond to the transient opinion changes of the public as
opposed to the more slowly evolving generational changes. Therefore, it is possible the extreme
variability in Prosociality are responses to the different short-termist incentive structures laid
down by successive governments.
Wellbeing has a fairly typical global profile when compared to other cultural factors. We see
that Western countries have greater Wellbeing than African-Islamic countries (the separability
of these two cultural-historic clusters is a standard feature of most cultural factors). However,
Wellbeing is unusual because the last 100 years of generational change does not explain the
modern day distribution of countries. For instance, we see that Western counties have the highest
Wellbeing and Communist-Confucian countries have the lowest, yet Communist-Confucian
countries have seen the strongest generational increase in Wellbeing in the last 100 years (see
chapter five). This suggests that an even larger inequality of Wellbeing existed in the time before
the 20th century.
The Importance of Personal Prohibitions is the cultural factor which acts as the best ‘cul-
tural value barometer’ for external conditions. It reflects cultural-history (see chapter five), it
provides the best explanation for future levels of economic development (see chapter seven)
and is correlated with Openness and Secular-Rationality which are the primal cultural values
in the human development sequence (see chapter eight). The WEVS questions used to define
the Importance of Personal Prohibitions ask about the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion,
divorce and euthanasia. These questions represent a respect for individuals to make their own
choices. This supports previous work showing that ‘individualism’ is important for explaining
human development [Gorodnichenko and Roland, 2011; Hofstede et al., 2010; Inglehart and
Norris, 2003].
The Openness cultural component is highly correlated with Xenophilia and Intrinsic Tolerance.
Intrinsic Tolerance means a person is open to interactions with norm violating in-group members,
such as drug users, alcoholics and homosexuals and Xenophilia means being open to interactions
with out-group members, like immigrants and those of other races. Evidence from chapters three,
four, five and seven show that Openness to in-group norm violators is often accompanied by
Openness to out-group members, but this is not always the case. In an extreme example, the
population of Lebanon have very high Openness towards in-group norm violators (particularly
when compared to other countries in the region), yet they are deeply suspicious of out-group
members (see chapter five). This might be a result of the interference of foreign countries during
their civil war [Totten, 2013].
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In the standard version of the Human Development Sequence (HDS), economic development
leads to Openness because development brings material security and less of a focus on basic
survival, meaning there is no reason to suspect the ‘other’ [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. However,
we showed in chapter eight that Openness emerges before economic development, which brings
this standard version of the HDS into question. We also show that democratic institutions do not
predict economic development, contradicting the view that ‘inclusive institutions’ are the key to
understanding economic development [Acemoglu et al., 2001]. However, democracy is just one
type of institution and there are many others that could still affect economic development, such
as rule of law [Fukuyama, 2001] and property rights [Besley and Ghatak, 2010].
Chapters seven and eight show clearly that cultural values of Secular-Rationalism and
Openness are primal in the Human Development Sequence and that democracy and economic
development are terminal outcomes. Economic development is the product of technological
innovation and trade [Arthur, 2014], which becomes more numerous and complex as the size of
the economic network increases [Hidalgo et al., 2007; Muthukrishna and Henrich, 2016]. More
precisely, economic development scales super-linearly (N1.2) with population size [Bettencourt
et al., 2007]. Openness cultural values act to remove barriers to cooperation by including people
with different ethnic markers in economic networks.
The second cultural value, Secular-Rationalism, represents an increased concern with im-
proving the real world, rather than being concerned with salvation in the supernatural realm
[Pinker, 2018; Weber, 1930]. This is conducive to economic development because it increases the
society’s motivation and capacity for technological innovation [Hidalgo, 2015], an effect that is
multiplied by universal education [Ruck et al., 2019].
Democracy emerges in the wake of Secular-Rational, and in particular the Openness, cultural
values (chapter eight). Openness to people from different cultures necessitates a more egalitarian
world view [Morris, 2015], extending the boundaries of the in-group [Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006]
and the associated sense of fairness. Mass-participation democracy is the institutionalization
of the norms of fairness and equality [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. However, democracy is also
diffusive [Brinks and Coppedge, 2006] and readily spreads from recently democratized countries
to undemocratic neighbors who are culturally similar [Matthews et al., 2016]. If the recipient
country does not have the appropriate levels of Openness then democracy will be unstable. This
might explain why many countries in the 20th century have experienced democratic recession
following democratization [Marshall et al., 2017].
The standard HDS states that Secular-Rationality is a prerequisite for both economic devel-
opment and democracy [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005]. Our analysis supports this claim, but we
also showed that Secular-Rationality predicts the surprising decline in Institutional Support we
observed in chapter four (a generational decline similar to the one seen for ‘support for democracy’
[Foa et al., 2016]). This could be because Secular-Rational societies are more skeptical and critical
of their ruling hierarchies [Norris and Inglehart, 2009]. Therefore the decline in Institutional
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Support, though concerning, may just be a side-effect of human development.
9.2 Deep Generational vs. Superficial Opinion Change
Opinion changes occur at high frequency and are highly transient (chapter four). Evidence
suggests that these occur in response to some environmental changes, such as terrorist attacks
[Best et al., 2006], or economic crises [Bentley et al., 2014] (also see chapters seven and eight).
These shifts in cultural values are similar to survival strategy changes seen in other primates
[Dunbar et al., 2009; Hockings et al., 2015]. During times of crisis humans revert to more
conservative values that are more rigorously implemented [Gelfand et al., 2011], whereas, when
security is assured, cultural values like Secular-Rationalism and Openness support innovation
and economic development [Harrington and Gelfand, 2014; Ruck et al., 2018].
Generational cultural value change, on the other hand, is more gradual and directional (chap-
ter four). Differences between birth cohorts are a result of the different conditions of socialization
they experienced during formative years [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; Ryder, 1965]. Converging
evidence from neuroscience [Petanjek et al., 2011; Sowell et al., 1999] and developmental psychol-
ogy [House et al., 2013; Sutter and Kocher, 2007] suggest this age is between adolescence and 30
years, which is reflected in our simulation models (see chapter six).
Generational changes represent internalized cultural values that are acquired from many
sources, including parents, one-to-many sources (media and education) and peer groups [Mesoudi,
2011]. However, evidence suggests that individualistic cultural values (related to Secular-
Rationalism and Openness values [Inglehart and Oyserman, 2004]) are acquired from peers and
one-to-many sources, whereas collectivist values come from parents [Mesoudi et al., 2016]. We
have seen that richer nations have higher Openness and Secular-Rationalism than poorer ones
(chapters six to eight) because mass-media and formal education have existed for longer in these
rich countries [Norris and Inglehart, 2009]. Also large urban areas are more common in rich
countries, which has the effect of expanding the size of peer networks and accelerating cultural
change [Bettencourt et al., 2007]. Nonetheless, parental influence is important, particularly
in the early years [Grusec and Kuczynski, 1997], so new generations are still anchored to the
cultural values of previous ones, hence the gradual nature of generational change (chapter four).
In chapter eight we used Enrico Spolaore’s ‘cultural barriers’ model [Spolaore and Wacziarg,
2016] to explain the influence of deep culture on the spread of cultural values. Cultural values
spread more readily between similar cultures because differences in stable cultural features —
like language and religion — act as a barrier to the spread of information (something similar
is observed for political and economic shocks [Matthews et al., 2016]). Non-cultural barriers
also prevent the spread of cultural values, these include the absence of a free press, economic
isolationism and poor communication infrastructure [Norris and Inglehart, 2009]. The origin of
the cultural values conducive to human development is probably Western Europe and, given the
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centrality afforded to individual rights, they could be Enlightenment values [Pinker, 2018].
9.2.1 Frequentist vs Bayesian Statistics
Statistical models are the engine of data analysis and causal inference, but there are two
ways of approaching this modelling: Bayesian and Frequentist. Though in practice Bayesian
and Frequentist methods often converge, or at least yield the same result, they are different
philosophically. Our analysis in this thesis employs a combination Frequentist and Bayesian
methods and so here we discuss the differences between them and why we employed both.
From a purely practical standpoint, Frequentist statistics are more accessible for non-
statisticians. Frequentist statistics was the overwhelmingly dominant paradigm in the 20th
century because it was computationally inexpensive. Frequentist inference uses only the likeli-
hood, whereas Bayesian statistics must infer a posterior distribution by multiplying a likelihood
by a prior distribution. The posterior distribution is analytically intractable in all but a few
cases where the prior distribution is ‘conjugate’. This means inferring Bayesian models requires
a combination of efficient sampling engines, like Markov Chain Monte Carlo, and plentiful
computational power [Gelman et al., 2013], which has only become available in the last few
decades.
The headstart enjoyed by Frequentist statistics means that black-box software packages
like Stata and SPSS largely implement these approaches. Therefore, non-statisticians who use
statistics in their scientific work tend to be Frequentist. Though in this thesis we exploit Bayesian
statistics where possible, we are non-statisticians and so employ Frequentist approaches when
our statistical knowledge is not sufficient to correctly formulate a model.
As an aside, the status quo may be changing as new packages become available which bridge
this knowledge gap, making Bayesian methods available for non-statisticians, such as Richard
McElreath’s statistical package in R called ‘Statistical Rethinking’ [McElreath, 2015].
Calculating a Bayesian posterior distribution may be computationally expensive, but it
overcomes a series of conceptual and practical problems that are baked into Frequentist statistics.
Frequentist approaches perform inference using only the likelihood, which assumes that the
model parameters are fixed and that the data are variable. This means that a genuine probability
distribution over the unknown parameters cannot be defined. This limitation is overcome using
the conceptually convoluted confidence interval on parameter estimates. A 95% confidence
interval is the range of parameter values that will explain 95% of data sampled from the same
hypothetical infinite dataset as the observed data [Van der Plas, 2014]. The centrality of the
likelihood also makes parameters distinct from data, which makes missing data mitigation
complicated [Marshall et al., 2009].
On the other hand, a Bayesian posterior expresses a joint probability distribution over all
parameters conditional on data. This frames probability as uncertainty about parameters that can
be reduced by introducing new data. The Bayesian framework also makes data and parameters
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interchangeable (data are just known parameters), so if data are missing then we can simply
assign them as parameters and infer them using the model [Gelman et al., 2013]. Moreover,
Bayesian statistics allow you to flexibly formulate known prior information about the model in
the form of a prior distribution, whereas Frequentist statistics implicitly assume an infinite flat
prior [McElreath, 2015].
9.3 Conclusions
We used the World and European Values Surveys (WEVS) to investigate the dynamics of global
cultural values and their role in human development. We showed that cultural values are primal
in the human development sequence: Secular-Rationality and Openness are prerequisites for
economic development and democracy. Cultural-history affects the spread of Secular-Rationality
and Openness by putting up cultural barriers between countries because stable cultural features
like language and religion prevent information being transmitted between dissimilar societies
[Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2016]. But these barriers can be reduced should a country adopt a free
press, free trade and modern communication infrastructure [Norris and Inglehart, 2009].
We identified nine cultural factors which underlie the WEVS data and these can be summa-
rized as three orthogonal cultural components: Secular-Rationality, Openness and Institutional
Support. Secular-Rationality and Openness correspond with the two dimensions of the seminal
Inglehart-Welzel cultural map [Inglehart and Welzel, 2005], whereas Institutional Support repre-
sents a new cultural component. We see a surprising generational decline in Institution Support,
similar to the one seen in ‘support for democracy’ [Foa et al., 2016], that corresponds to a rise in
Secular-Rationality. Therefore, the decline in Institutional Support may just be a side-effect of
human development.
We separated two independent modes of cultural value change from the representative
cross-sectional samples provided by the WEVS: generational and opinion changes. Generational
changes are persistent, steady and reflect socialized cultural values acquired during formative
years. Opinion changes are rapid, transient and affect the entire population during a particular
time period. Generational changes show strong linkages with human development and explain
the long term changes in cultural values, economic development and democracy.
Opinion changes respond to fluctuations in development variables. Moreover, the variance in
the representative cross-sectional samples is dominated by opinion changes. Therefore, when
previous authors found that economic development caused changes in cultural values [Hofstede
et al., 2010; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005], they were actually detecting transient opinion changes
and not generational changes linked with long run human development.
There are some limitations to our analysis which present opportunities for future work.
We have entirely focused on comparing the average person from each country. Future work
might focus on the importance of variation within populations. There are reasons to believe
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that the causes of within-population variation are different to between-population variation.
Take the example of political orientation, where the within population distribution is Gaussian
[Tuschman, 2013]. This Gaussian has a larger variance in countries with political and economic
uncertainty [Tuschman, 2013] and those with rigid hierarchical social structures [Hofstede et al.,
2010]. Whereas the mean of the Gaussian depends on factors like economic development and
cultural-history [Inglehart and Baker, 2000].
From a methodological stand point, we were faced with missing data problems throughout.
In chapters five to seven, when we employed our multi-level time-lagged linear regression, we
decided to omit missing data. Omitting data can bias inference and, because the use of different
time lags results in different missingness structure, comparing the models is difficult. We ran
many checks to ensure that our findings were robust in a number of different scenarios, but this
was not parsimonious. A Bayesian framework offers the opportunity to build data imputation











This appendix contains histograms of responses for each the 64 World and European Value
Survey questions we utilized. All of the questions are on ordinal or Likert scales of varying
lengths and the frequencies at each level are expressed as a fraction of the 476,583 responders
(minus non-responses).
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The generational time series’ for Religiosity REL in each country. It shows that older people are
more religious than younger people (particularly in Western countries). The table continues on
the next two pages.
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Albania -0.15 0.01 0.15 0.18 0.28 0.38
Algeria -0.88 -0.81 -0.74 -0.71 -0.67 -0.59
Andorra 0.50 0.75 0.97 1.12 1.06
Argentina -0.36 -0.30 -0.14 -0.06 0.05 0.16 0.30 0.41
Armenia -0.27 -0.20 -0.17 -0.24 -0.23 -0.27
Australia 0.21 0.29 0.45 0.63 0.68 0.80 0.83
Austria -0.08 0.08 0.26 0.36 0.46 0.64 0.76
Azerbaijan -0.08 -0.05 -0.02 -0.04 -0.09 -0.16 -0.11
Bahrain -0.37 -0.40 -0.35 -0.37 -0.34
Bangladesh -1.04 -0.99 -0.92 -0.90
Belarus 0.17 0.27 0.36 0.51 0.55 0.60 0.74 0.82
Belgium 0.07 0.18 0.26 0.53 0.73 0.78 0.79 1.00
Bosnia 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12
Brazil -0.72 -0.62 -0.55 -0.54 -0.48 -0.41 -0.37
Bulgaria 0.48 0.58 0.71 0.74 0.75 0.82 0.89
Burkina Faso -0.85 -0.83 -0.77 -0.80
Canada -0.51 -0.37 -0.24 0.00 0.15 0.19 0.38 0.55
Chile -0.66 -0.51 -0.42 -0.28 -0.19 -0.06 0.07
China 1.22 1.21 1.22 1.20 1.26 1.24 1.25
Colombia -0.81 -0.73 -0.66 -0.68 -0.60 -0.51 -0.44
Croatia -0.14 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.21 0.24
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1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Cyprus (G) -0.72 -0.58 -0.38 -0.24 -0.13 -0.07
Cyprus (T) -0.18 -0.09
Czech Rep. 0.44 0.56 0.70 1.00 1.20 1.27 1.27 1.48
Denmark 0.55 0.73 0.80 0.98 1.03 1.16
Dominican Rep. -0.48 -0.49
Ecuador -0.81 -0.64 -0.64 -0.54 -0.45
Egypt -0.89 -0.87 -0.88 -0.85 -0.83 -0.82 -0.81
El Salvador -0.86 -0.81 -0.72 -0.72 -0.68
Estonia 0.47 0.68 0.84 0.85 0.92 1.00 1.16 1.28
Ethiopia -0.70 -0.58 -0.52
Finland 0.27 0.47 0.59 0.75 0.88 1.04
France 0.36 0.48 0.79 0.88 0.94 1.06 1.20
Georgia -0.35 -0.39 -0.46 -0.55 -0.58 -0.65 -0.67 -0.74
Germany 0.39 0.48 0.66 0.84 1.00 1.04 1.09 1.29 1.40
Ghana -0.97 -0.98 -1.01 -1.00 -1.02
Great Britain 0.08 0.19 0.31 0.48 0.64 0.81 0.88 0.94
Greece -0.43 -0.26 -0.19 0.00 0.08 0.20
Guatemala -0.91 -0.87 -0.82 -0.79
Hong Kong 0.77 0.80 0.88 0.86 0.88 0.93 0.95
Hungary -0.01 0.16 0.52 0.75 0.78 0.94 1.14
Iceland 0.10 0.30 0.45 0.58 0.81
India -0.32 -0.31 -0.30 -0.29 -0.25 -0.18 -0.19 -0.18
Indonesia -0.97 -0.94 -0.94 -0.91 -0.89
Iran -0.89 -0.80 -0.82 -0.74 -0.69 -0.67
Iraq -0.82 -0.80 -0.80 -0.79 -0.74 -0.73
Ireland -0.80 -0.61 -0.40 -0.20 -0.03 0.21 0.36
Israel 0.07 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.00 -0.03
Italy -0.41 -0.38 -0.13 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.22
Japan 0.76 0.90 1.03 1.10 1.26 1.36
Jordan -1.00 -0.96 -0.93 -0.91 -0.90 -0.87
Kazakhstan 0.12 0.18 0.21 0.18 0.23 0.23
Kosovo -0.55 -0.56 -0.55 -0.57 -0.59
Kuwait -0.76 -0.74 -0.65 -0.78
Kyrgyzstan -0.06 -0.14 -0.10 -0.12 -0.11
Latvia 0.34 0.43 0.50 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.76
Lebanon -0.15 -0.27 -0.22 -0.12 -0.13
Libya -0.83 -0.77 -0.76 -0.76 -0.72
Lithuania -0.20 -0.05 0.19 0.42 0.52 0.54 0.78
Luxembourg 0.34 0.44 0.59 0.63 0.73 0.83
Macedonia -0.07 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.01
Malaysia -0.69 -0.69 -0.66 -0.60 -0.62
Mali -0.93 -0.92 -0.89 -0.89 -0.85
Malta -0.92 -0.76 -0.65 -0.54 -0.42 -0.28
Mexico -0.68 -0.58 -0.49 -0.41 -0.40 -0.26 -0.18
Moldova -0.32 -0.14 -0.10 -0.13 0.02 0.05
Morocco -1.05 -0.99 -1.00 -0.94 -0.89
Netherlands 0.38 0.49 0.70 0.86 0.94 0.99 1.14
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1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
New Zealand 0.40 0.45 0.57 0.72 0.72 0.75
Nigeria -0.99 -0.99 -0.98 -0.97 -0.97 -0.96
North Ireland -0.23 -0.13 0.26 0.38 0.36
Norway 0.35 0.40 0.70 0.81 0.89 1.01 1.19
Pakistan -0.91 -0.90 -0.90 -0.86 -0.84 -0.84
Palestine -0.70 -0.73 -0.67 -0.60
Peru -0.66 -0.58 -0.52 -0.43 -0.34 -0.25
Philippines -0.85 -0.85 -0.84 -0.84 -0.82
Poland -0.68 -0.61 -0.44 -0.32 -0.35 -0.24 -0.12
Portugal -0.38 -0.31 -0.12 0.07 0.12 0.28 0.43
Puerto Rico -0.98 -0.93 -0.86 -0.81 -0.71 -0.64
Qatar -0.98 -0.97 -0.97 -0.98
Romania -0.68 -0.56 -0.49 -0.31 -0.24 -0.22 -0.06
Russia 0.22 0.30 0.37 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.62 0.73 0.83
Rwanda -0.53 -0.52 -0.51 -0.50 -0.47
Saudi Arabia -0.81 -0.82 -0.75 -0.78
Serbia and Montenegro 0.12 0.16 0.25 0.30 0.27 0.34 0.41
Singapore -0.32 -0.32 -0.25 -0.12 -0.12 -0.03
Slovakia -0.33 -0.17 0.16 0.32 0.33 0.54 0.67
Slovenia 0.24 0.29 0.50 0.66 0.71 0.71 0.90
South Africa -0.68 -0.68 -0.63 -0.61 -0.58 -0.56 -0.51 -0.50
South Korea 0.23 0.32 0.36 0.50 0.60 0.67
Spain -0.31 -0.11 -0.04 0.26 0.54 0.71 0.83 1.01
Sweden 0.65 0.72 0.94 1.08 1.07 1.15 1.30 1.41
Switzerland -0.03 0.08 0.19 0.38 0.52 0.60 0.72 0.84
Taiwan 0.30 0.45 0.45 0.61 0.78 0.85
Tanzania -0.96 -0.90 -0.92 -0.95 -0.93
Thailand -0.24 -0.20 -0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.02
Trinidad and Tobago -0.71 -0.74 -0.72 -0.63 -0.58
Tunisia -0.89 -0.79 -0.77 -0.66 -0.61 -0.54
Turkey -0.75 -0.68 -0.52 -0.45 -0.44 -0.33 -0.24
Uganda -0.86 -0.79 -0.82
Ukraine -0.01 0.06 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.27
United States -0.52 -0.49 -0.43 -0.31 -0.20 -0.16 -0.10 -0.02 0.05
Uruguay 0.00 0.12 0.22 0.41 0.47 0.56 0.73
Uzbekistan -0.17 -0.18 -0.18 -0.12 -0.04
Venezuela -0.67 -0.60 -0.57 -0.52 -0.50
Viet Nam 0.58 0.65 0.62 0.68 0.64 0.69
Yemen -0.90 -0.80 -0.87 -0.86
Zambia -0.79 -0.76 -0.72 -0.75
Zimbabwe -0.93 -0.87 -0.85 -0.85 -0.83













This appendix contains the complete set of regressions results from chapter seven, where we look
at the relationship between secularization and economic development. In all tables the column
headings are the dependent variables and the rows represent lagged predictor variables.
C.1 Generational Changes
C.1.1 Secularization and Economic Development Regressions
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship between long term economic develop-




SEC 0.99 (0.01)*** 0.11 (0.01)***




Table C.1: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error
in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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SEC 0.99 (0.01)*** 0.13 (0.02)***




Table C.2: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error




SEC 1 (0.01)*** 0.14 (0.02)***




Table C.3: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error




SEC 0.91 (0.02)*** 0.34 (0.03)***




Table C.4: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error






SEC 0.9 (0.02)*** 0.36 (0.03)***




Table C.5: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error




SEC 0.92 (0.02)*** 0.24 (0.04)***




Table C.6: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error




SEC 0.76 (0.02)*** 0.55 (0.04)***




Table C.7: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error
in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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SEC 0.76 (0.02)*** 0.43 (0.04)***




Table C.8: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error




SEC 0.78 (0.03)*** 0.31 (0.05)***




Table C.9: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation reaches adulthood which
happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect size with the standard error
in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
C.1.2 Secularization, Tolerance, Autonomy and Economic Development
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship between long term economic develop-
ment GDP and generational changes in Secularization SEC, Autonomy AUT and Tolerance of
Personal Prohibition Violators TOL.
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C.1. GENERATIONAL CHANGES
10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 441 420 420 501
n 102 102 102 97
AUT 0.95 (0.02)*** -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01)**
SEC 0.07 (0.03) 1.01 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
TOL -0.09 (0.03) -0.01 (0.02) 0.93 (0.02)*** 0.1 (0.02)***
GDP -0.03 (0.03) 0 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02)***
i 0.04 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.07***
h 0.1** 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.05
R2 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.93
Table C.10: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 476 453 453 498
n 102 102 102 102
AUT 0.95 (0.02)*** -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.03 (0.01)
SEC 0.06 (0.03) 1 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02)
TOL -0.07 (0.03) 0 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02)*** 0.12 (0.02)***
GDP -0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) 0.93 (0.02)***
i 0.05 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.08***
h 0.1* 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.06
R2 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.94
Table C.11: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 503 480 480 429
n 102 102 102 102
AUT 0.95 (0.02)*** -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.02)
SEC 0.06 (0.03) 1 (0.01)*** 0.03 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
TOL -0.1 (0.03)* 0 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02)*** 0.12 (0.03)***
GDP 0.01 (0.03) -0.02 (0.01) -0.03 (0.02) 0.88 (0.03)***
i 0.05 0.05*** 0.06*** 0.11***
h 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.12*** 0.04
R2 0.95 0.99 0.99 0.95
Table C.12: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 349 326 326 473
n 98 96 96 102
AUT 0.8 (0.03)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.03)
SEC 0.18 (0.06)** 0.97 (0.03)*** 0.01 (0.04) 0.06 (0.04)
TOL -0.3 (0.06)*** -0.04 (0.03) 0.8 (0.04)*** 0.3 (0.04)***
GDP -0.04 (0.06) 0 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) 0.76 (0.04)***
i 0.22*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.18***
h 0.31*** 0.2*** 0.33*** 0.17***
R2 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.92
Table C.13: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the




10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 377 356 356 415
n 101 101 101 102
AUT 0.81 (0.03)*** -0.03 (0.02) -0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.03)
SEC 0.15 (0.05) 0.95 (0.03)*** 0.02 (0.04) 0.09 (0.05)
TOL -0.26 (0.06)*** -0.04 (0.03) 0.79 (0.04)*** 0.32 (0.05)***
GDP -0.08 (0.05) 0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.03) 0.68 (0.04)***
i 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.21***
h 0.3*** 0.2*** 0.31*** 0.16*
R2 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.94
Table C.14: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 401 378 378 340
n 101 101 101 102
AUT 0.81 (0.03)*** -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.09 (0.03)*
SEC 0.15 (0.05) 0.95 (0.03)*** 0.02 (0.03) 0.01 (0.05)
TOL -0.27 (0.06)*** -0.01 (0.03) 0.82 (0.04)*** 0.24 (0.05)***
GDP -0.04 (0.05) -0.03 (0.03) -0.06 (0.03) 0.69 (0.05)***
i 0.21*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 0.21***
h 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.12
R2 0.93 0.99 0.98 0.92
Table C.15: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 251 230 230 390
n 86 84 84 102
AUT 0.71 (0.05)*** -0.06 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
SEC 0.17 (0.08) 0.9 (0.05)*** 0.04 (0.06) 0.14 (0.06)
TOL -0.39 (0.08)*** -0.06 (0.04) 0.62 (0.05)*** 0.42 (0.05)***
GDP -0.16 (0.08) 0.02 (0.05) 0.02 (0.05) 0.67 (0.05)***
i 0.32*** 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.29***
h 0.48*** 0.35*** 0.51*** 0.23***
R2 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.95
Table C.16: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 286 263 263 326
n 97 94 94 102
AUT 0.7 (0.04)*** -0.05 (0.02) -0.06 (0.03) 0.1 (0.04)
SEC 0.22 (0.08) 0.89 (0.04)*** 0.06 (0.05) 0.07 (0.06)
TOL -0.37 (0.07)*** -0.07 (0.04) 0.65 (0.05)*** 0.34 (0.06)***
GDP -0.15 (0.07) 0.03 (0.04) -0.04 (0.05) 0.64 (0.05)***
i 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.28***
h 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.5*** 0.13
R2 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.94
Table C.17: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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C.2. CROSS-SECTIONAL CHANGES
10 AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 303 282 282 251
n 100 99 99 95
AUT 0.69 (0.04)*** -0.04 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03) 0.13 (0.04)*
SEC 0.22 (0.08) 0.87 (0.04)*** 0.06 (0.05) 0.02 (0.07)
TOL -0.4 (0.08)*** -0.05 (0.04) 0.68 (0.05)*** 0.27 (0.07)***
GDP -0.06 (0.07) -0.01 (0.03) -0.08 (0.04) 0.6 (0.07)***
i 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.3***
h 0.45*** 0.35*** 0.48*** 0.17
R2 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.93
Table C.18: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, TOL, AUT and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
C.2 Cross-Sectional Changes
C.2.1 Secularization and Economic Development Regressions
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship between short term economic develop-




SEC 0.89 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.02)




Table C.19: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 5 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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SEC 0.86 (0.04)*** 0.05 (0.03)




Table C.20: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the





SEC 0.83 (0.06)*** 0.07 (0.04)




Table C.21: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 15 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
C.2.2 Secularization, Tolerance, Autonomy and Economic Development
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship between short term economic develop-
ment GDP and cross-sectional changes in Secularization SEC, Autonomy AUT and Tolerance of
Personal Prohibition Violators TOL.
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C.2. CROSS-SECTIONAL CHANGES
AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 128 128 128 281
n 74 74 74 105
AUT 0.72 (0.06)*** -0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02)
SEC 0.11 (0.07) 0.88 (0.04)*** 0.15 (0.06) 0.02 (0.02)
TOL -0.09 (0.09) 0.06 (0.04) 0.74 (0.07)*** -0.05 (0.03)
GDP 0.12 (0.04)* 0.05 (0.02) 0.1 (0.04) 1.03 (0.01)***
i 0 0 0.1 0
h 0.05 0 0.18 0.07
R2 0.77 0.94 0.89 0.99
Table C.22: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, AUT, TOL and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 5 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 90 90 90 223
n 67 67 67 95
AUT 0.67 (0.07)*** -0.07 (0.04) 0.01 (0.06) 0.01 (0.03)
SEC 0.13 (0.1) 0.92 (0.06)*** 0.05 (0.09) 0.07 (0.05)
TOL -0.22 (0.1) 0 (0.06) 0.54 (0.1)*** -0.1 (0.05)
GDP 0.13 (0.04)** 0.09 (0.02)** 0.08 (0.04) 1.09 (0.02)***
i 0.27 0.1 0.21 0.12
h 0.09 0 0.33 0.1
R2 0.84 0.93 0.85 0.98
Table C.23: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, AUT, TOL and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 10 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 73 73 73 145
n 53 53 53 82
AUT 0.5 (0.1)*** -0.09 (0.06) -0.19 (0.08) -0.02 (0.04)
SEC 0.05 (0.13) 0.84 (0.07)*** 0.17 (0.11) 0.12 (0.06)
TOL -0.1 (0.14) 0.1 (0.09) 0.51 (0.12)*** -0.1 (0.06)
GDP 0.22 (0.07)** 0.11 (0.04) 0.18 (0.06)* 1.2 (0.03)***
i 0.42 0.15 0.33 0.21***
h 0.21 0 0.35 0.07
R2 0.85 0.89 0.89 0.98
Table C.24: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
SEC, AUT, TOL and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 15 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
C.3 Opinion Changes
C.3.1 Secularization and Economic Development
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship between short term economic develop-




SEC 0.88 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.01)




Table C.25: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 5 years. Each entry is an effect size with the







SEC 0.88 (0.04)*** 0.05 (0.03)




Table C.26: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the





SEC 0.85 (0.06)*** 0.08 (0.04)




Table C.27: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC
and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 15 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
C.3.2 Secularization, Tolerance, Autonomy and Economic Development
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship between short term economic devel-
opment GDP and opinion changes in Secularization SEC, Autonomy AUT and Tolerance of
Personal Prohibition Violators TOL.
161
APPENDIX C. CHAPTER SEVEN
AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 127 127 127 280
n 74 74 74 105
AUT 0.72 (0.06)*** -0.01 (0.03) -0.03 (0.05) 0.01 (0.02)
SEC 0.1 (0.07) 0.88 (0.03)*** 0.17 (0.06) 0.02 (0.02)
TOL -0.09 (0.09) 0.02 (0.05) 0.65 (0.07)*** -0.03 (0.02)
GDP 0.13 (0.04)* 0.05 (0.02) 0.11 (0.04) 1.03 (0.01)***
i 0 0 0.16 0
h 0.05 0.02 0.2 0.05
R2 0.76 0.93 0.86 0.99
Table C.28: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC,
AUT, TOL and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 5 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 89 89 89 222
n 66 66 66 95
AUT 0.7 (0.07)*** -0.03 (0.04) 0.03 (0.07) 0.01 (0.03)
SEC 0.09 (0.1) 0.93 (0.05)*** 0.08 (0.09) 0.05 (0.04)
TOL -0.23 (0.1) -0.05 (0.05) 0.46 (0.1)*** -0.02 (0.05)
GDP 0.13 (0.04)* 0.07 (0.02)* 0.08 (0.04) 1.08 (0.02)***
i 0.28 0.09 0.22 0.11
h 0.12 0.07 0.35 0.02
R2 0.84 0.94 0.82 0.98
Table C.29: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC,
AUT, TOL and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 10 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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C.3. OPINION CHANGES
AUT SEC TOL GDP
N 73 73 73 144
n 53 53 53 82
AUT 0.46 (0.09)*** -0.04 (0.05) -0.15 (0.08) -0.01 (0.04)
SEC 0.02 (0.12) 0.86 (0.07)*** 0.21 (0.11) 0.09 (0.05)
TOL -0.07 (0.13) 0.01 (0.08) 0.44 (0.12)*** -0.02 (0.06)
GDP 0.2 (0.07)* 0.05 (0.04) 0.2 (0.06)** 1.18 (0.03)***
i 0.48** 0.14 0.38** 0.21**
h 0.23 0.13 0.32 0.04
R2 0.88 0.9 0.9 0.98
Table C.30: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between SEC,
AUT, TOL and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 15 years. Each entry is an effect size
with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);













This appendix contains the complete set of regressions results from chapter eight, where we
examine the temporal relationships between human development and cultural values. In all
tables the column headings are the dependent variables and the rows represent lagged predictor
variables.
D.1 Generational Changes
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship of long term changes in economic
development GDP and democracy DEM with generational changes in Secular-Rationality RAT,
Openness OPEN and Institutional Support INST.
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 437 437 437 514 529
n 98 98 98 95 98
RAT 0.93 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.02) 0.12 (0.02)*** 0.02 (0.01)
OPN 0.04 (0.02) 0.94 (0.02)*** 0 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02)* 0.06 (0.01)***
INS 0 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.93 (0.01)*** -0.03 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
GDP 0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.03) -0.04 (0.04) 0.87 (0.02)*** 0.01 (0.02)
DEM 0.02 (0.04) 0 (0.04) 0.05 (0.05) 0.09 (0.03) 0.73 (0.03)***
i 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.1*** 0
h 0.11*** 0.08 0 0.06 0
R2 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.74
Table D.1: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between RAT,
OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 484 484 484 507 520
n 98 98 98 98 98
RAT 0.94 (0.02)*** 0.03 (0.02) -0.05 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.01)
OPN 0.05 (0.02) 0.9 (0.02)*** -0.02 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02)* 0.06 (0.02)***
INS 0 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01)*** -0.02 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
GDP -0.04 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 0.05 (0.04) 0.88 (0.02)*** -0.01 (0.02)
DEM 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.04) 0.05 (0.05) 0.08 (0.03) 0.74 (0.03)***
i 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1*** 0
h 0.1*** 0.11*** 0 0.05 0.03
R2 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.94 0.75
Table D.2: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation
reaches adulthood which happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 526 526 526 453 465
n 98 98 98 98 98
RAT 0.92 (0.02)*** 0.04 (0.02) -0.04 (0.02) 0.13 (0.02)*** 0.03 (0.01)
OPN 0.05 (0.02) 0.88 (0.02)*** -0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02)***
INS 0 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.92 (0.01)*** 0 (0.01) 0 (0.01)
GDP 0 (0.03) -0.03 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03) 0.87 (0.03)*** -0.02 (0.02)
DEM 0 (0.04) 0.04 (0.03) 0.05 (0.05) 0.12 (0.03)** 0.75 (0.03)***
i 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.09*** 0
h 0.12*** 0.12*** 0 0.01 0.02
R2 0.96 0.95 0.91 0.93 0.75
Table D.3: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 10 years after a generation
reaches adulthood which happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 350 350 350 469 469
n 94 94 94 98 98
RAT 0.77 (0.03)*** 0.02 (0.03) -0.1 (0.03)*** 0.28 (0.03)*** 0.07 (0.02)***
OPN 0.04 (0.04) 0.73 (0.04)*** 0.01 (0.03) 0.16 (0.04)*** 0.13 (0.02)***
INS 0 (0.03) 0.01 (0.02) 0.84 (0.02)*** -0.08 (0.02)** 0.01 (0.02)
GDP 0.04 (0.05) -0.03 (0.04) 0 (0.06) 0.7 (0.04)*** 0.02 (0.04)
DEM -0.03 (0.06) -0.13 (0.05) 0.1 (0.06) 0.13 (0.05) 0.26 (0.05)***
i 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.12***
h 0.31*** 0.33*** 0 0.17*** 0
R2 0.93 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.62
Table D.4: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between RAT,
OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 390 390 390 425 423
n 98 98 98 98 98
RAT 0.75 (0.03)*** 0.08 (0.03)* -0.1 (0.03)*** 0.27 (0.03)*** 0.09 (0.02)***
OPN 0.09 (0.04) 0.66 (0.03)*** 0 (0.03) 0.14 (0.03)*** 0.14 (0.03)***
INS 0 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.82 (0.02)*** -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
GDP -0.02 (0.05) -0.08 (0.04) 0.03 (0.05) 0.65 (0.04)*** 0 (0.04)
DEM -0.01 (0.06) -0.14 (0.05) 0.11 (0.07) 0.12 (0.05) 0.21 (0.05)**
i 0.18*** 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.19*** 0.14***
h 0.3*** 0.38*** 0 0.11 0.03
R2 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.91 0.64
Table D.5: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation
reaches adulthood which happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 428 428 428 370 367
n 98 98 98 98 98
RAT 0.76 (0.03)*** 0.11 (0.03)*** -0.12 (0.03)*** 0.24 (0.03)*** 0.12 (0.03)***
OPN 0.1 (0.04) 0.62 (0.03)*** 0 (0.03) 0.11 (0.03)** 0.11 (0.03)**
INS -0.01 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.82 (0.02)*** 0 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02)
GDP -0.06 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04) 0.04 (0.05) 0.65 (0.05)*** -0.01 (0.04)
DEM 0.01 (0.05) 0.02 (0.04) 0.11 (0.06) 0.17 (0.06)* 0.28 (0.06)**
i 0.19*** 0.2*** 0.2*** 0.18*** 0.12
h 0.3*** 0.37*** 0 0.07 0.06
R2 0.94 0.96 0.91 0.9 0.62
Table D.6: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 20 years after a generation
reaches adulthood which happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 257 257 257 388 385
n 77 77 77 98 98
RAT 0.63 (0.04)*** 0.04 (0.04) -0.15 (0.03)*** 0.35 (0.03)*** 0.07 (0.02)*
OPN 0.03 (0.05) 0.53 (0.05)*** -0.03 (0.04) 0.2 (0.04)*** 0.21 (0.03)***
INS -0.01 (0.04) 0 (0.03) 0.74 (0.03)*** -0.07 (0.03) 0.03 (0.02)
GDP 0.03 (0.1) -0.02 (0.09) 0.1 (0.1) 0.7 (0.05)*** -0.02 (0.05)
DEM -0.01 (0.07) -0.14 (0.06) 0.18 (0.07) 0.14 (0.06) -0.05 (0.05)
i 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.19***
h 0.49*** 0.5*** 0 0.16 0
R2 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.68
Table D.7: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between RAT,
OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation reaches
adulthood which happens between the ages of 0 and 10 years. Each entry is an effect size with the
standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗);
p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 303 303 303 342 338
n 93 93 93 98 98
RAT 0.61 (0.04)*** 0.09 (0.03) -0.16 (0.04)*** 0.34 (0.03)*** 0.11 (0.03)***
OPN 0.09 (0.05) 0.48 (0.04)*** -0.05 (0.04) 0.16 (0.04)*** 0.22 (0.03)***
INS -0.02 (0.03) 0 (0.03) 0.69 (0.03)*** -0.01 (0.03) 0.04 (0.02)
GDP -0.03 (0.07) -0.07 (0.06) 0.13 (0.07) 0.6 (0.05)*** -0.07 (0.05)
DEM -0.08 (0.07) -0.19 (0.06)** 0.15 (0.07) 0.13 (0.06) -0.12 (0.06)
i 0.32*** 0.29*** 0.37*** 0.27*** 0.21***
h 0.48*** 0.56*** 0 0.08 0.02
R2 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.7
Table D.8: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation
reaches adulthood which happens between the ages of 10 and 20 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 334 334 334 286 283
n 97 97 97 98 97
RAT 0.6 (0.03)*** 0.13 (0.03)*** -0.13 (0.04)** 0.29 (0.03)*** 0.15 (0.03)***
OPN 0.1 (0.05) 0.48 (0.04)*** 0.02 (0.05) 0.19 (0.04)*** 0.13 (0.03)***
INS -0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03) 0.58 (0.03)*** -0.01 (0.03) 0.02 (0.02)
GDP -0.03 (0.05) -0.13 (0.05) -0.09 (0.06) 0.55 (0.06)*** -0.07 (0.05)
DEM 0 (0.07) -0.1 (0.06) 0.05 (0.08) 0.2 (0.07) 0.12 (0.07)
i 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.42*** 0.27*** 0.14
h 0.46*** 0.55*** 0.11 0 0.07
R2 0.95 0.96 0.93 0.92 0.61
Table D.9: Generational change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes 30 years after a generation
reaches adulthood which happens between the ages of 20 and 30 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
D.2 Opinion Changes
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship of short term changes in economic
development GDP and democracy DEM with opinion changes in Secular-Rationality RAT,
Openness OPEN and Institutional Support INST.
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 122 122 122 266 264
n 70 70 70 99 99
RAT 0.84 (0.05)*** 0.13 (0.07) -0.01 (0.08) 0.04 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
OPN 0.06 (0.06) 0.41 (0.08)*** 0.06 (0.09) 0.03 (0.02) 0 (0.01)
INS 0 (0.05) 0.04 (0.06) 0.75 (0.07)*** 0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)*
GDP 0.07 (0.04) -0.03 (0.06) 0.16 (0.07) 1.02 (0.01)*** 0 (0.01)
DEM 0.01 (0.18) 0.17 (0.21) -0.3 (0.24) 0.05 (0.05) 0.79 (0.03)***
i 0 0.26 0 0 0.05*
h 0 0.59*** 0.21 0 0.02
R2 0.82 0.81 0.69 0.99 0.88
Table D.10: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between RAT,
OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 5 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 87 87 87 210 207
n 64 64 64 90 89
RAT 0.63 (0.06)*** -0.15 (0.07) 0.05 (0.08) 0.08 (0.03) 0.01 (0.01)
OPN 0.07 (0.08) 0.28 (0.08) -0.07 (0.1) 0.05 (0.04) 0.01 (0.01)
INS 0.07 (0.07) 0.02 (0.06) 0.63 (0.08)*** 0.02 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01)
GDP 0.06 (0.05) 0.06 (0.05) 0.21 (0.06)** 1.05 (0.02)*** 0 (0.01)
DEM 0.22 (0.23) 0.14 (0.19) -0.66 (0.28) 0.01 (0.12) 0.08 (0.04)
i 0.2 0.36*** 0.37 0.12 0.2***
h 0 0.65** 0 0 0.13***
R2 0.77 0.93 0.77 0.98 0.97
Table D.11: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between RAT,
OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 10 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 71 71 71 139 137
n 51 51 51 79 77
RAT 0.62 (0.09)*** 0.06 (0.11) 0.01 (0.1) 0.07 (0.04) 0.01 (0.02)
OPN 0.19 (0.11) 0.45 (0.11)*** 0.28 (0.1) -0.01 (0.05) 0.03 (0.02)
INS 0.11 (0.09) -0.03 (0.08) 0.64 (0.07)*** 0.02 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02)
GDP 0.06 (0.08) 0.03 (0.07) 0.29 (0.07)*** 1.18 (0.03)*** 0 (0.02)
DEM 0.46 (0.38) 0.53 (0.31) -1.33 (0.3)*** 0.04 (0.14) 0.3 (0.06)***
i 0.32 0.37** 0.17 0.2** 0.17***
h 0 0.54 0.58** 0.07 0.07
R2 0.78 0.91 0.9 0.98 0.93
Table D.12: Opinion change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between RAT,
OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 15 years. Each entry is an effect
size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance: p < 0.1(∗);
p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
D.3 Cross-Sectional Changes
Regression results investigating the temporal relationship of short term changes in economic
development GDP and democracy DEM with cross-sectional changes in Secular-Rationality
RAT, Openness OPEN and Institutional Support INST.
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 123 123 123 267 265
n 70 70 70 99 100
RAT 0.85 (0.05)*** -0.06 (0.07) 0 (0.09) -0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01)
OPN -0.08 (0.06) 0.43 (0.08)*** 0.05 (0.09) 0.02 (0.02) 0 (0.01)
INS -0.01 (0.05) 0.01 (0.06) 0.73 (0.07)*** 0.01 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
GDP -0.08 (0.04) -0.01 (0.06) 0.16 (0.07) 1.03 (0.01)*** -0.01 (0.01)
DEM -0.05 (0.18) 0.13 (0.2) -0.2 (0.25) 0.06 (0.05) 0.63 (0.04)***
i 0 0.24 0 0 0.09***
h 0.04 0.58*** 0.25 0.01 0.07
R2 0.82 0.81 0.67 0.99 0.89
Table D.13: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 5 years. Each entry is
an effect size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance:
p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 88 88 88 211 207
n 65 65 65 90 89
RAT 0.57 (0.08)*** 0.16 (0.08) 0 (0.08) -0.04 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01)
OPN -0.13 (0.09) 0.33 (0.08) -0.07 (0.1) 0.02 (0.04) 0 (0.01)
INS -0.05 (0.07) -0.02 (0.06) 0.58 (0.09)*** 0.01 (0.03) -0.01 (0.01)
GDP -0.07 (0.05) 0.07 (0.05) 0.22 (0.07)** 1.07 (0.02)*** 0 (0.01)
DEM -0.32 (0.23) 0.1 (0.19) -0.42 (0.28) 0.04 (0.12) 0.09 (0.04)
i 0.23 0.33** 0.42 0.1 0.19***
h 0.12 0.63** 0 0.02 0.15***
R2 0.79 0.91 0.78 0.98 0.97
Table D.14: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 10 years. Each entry is
an effect size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance:
p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 71 71 71 140 137
n 51 51 51 79 77
RAT 0.54 (0.1)*** 0.04 (0.1) -0.04 (0.1) -0.02 (0.05) -0.01 (0.02)
OPN -0.2 (0.11) 0.43 (0.1)** 0.28 (0.1) -0.04 (0.05) 0.02 (0.02)
INS -0.06 (0.09) -0.08 (0.07) 0.66 (0.07)*** 0.03 (0.04) -0.01 (0.02)
GDP -0.1 (0.08) 0.06 (0.07) 0.27 (0.07)*** 1.2 (0.03)*** 0 (0.02)
DEM -0.61 (0.39) 0.59 (0.3) -1.22 (0.29)*** 0.07 (0.14) 0.3 (0.06)***
i 0.35 0.33 0.16 0.2* 0.17***
h 0.11 0.54 0.58* 0.1 0.08
R2 0.79 0.9 0.91 0.98 0.93
Table D.15: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP. They measure the effect sizes after 15 years. Each entry is
an effect size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance:
p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
D.4 Robustness Check for Cross-Sectional Regressions
Robustness test for the results in the previous section (Cross-Sectional Changes). The regressions
are rerun, but using a reduced sample consisting of 42 countries. These countries always yield
data points whether we set the time lag to p = 5 years, p = 10 years or p = 15 years. This makes
it easier to compare effect sizes across regressions with different time lags.
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 94 94 94 180 180
n 49 49 49 49 49
RAT 0.86 (0.07)*** -0.09 (0.07) 0.01 (0.09) 0 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
OPN -0.04 (0.07) 0.67 (0.07)*** 0.01 (0.1) 0.01 (0.02) 0 (0.01)
INS -0.05 (0.06) -0.05 (0.06) 0.73 (0.07)*** 0.04 (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)
GDP -0.06 (0.05) -0.01 (0.05) 0.23 (0.07)** 1.03 (0.02)*** 0.01 (0.01)
DEM -0.27 (0.24) 0.29 (0.22) -0.81 (0.28) 0.1 (0.08) 0.51 (0.05)***
i 0 0.13 0 0.02 0.08***
h 0 0.33 0.29 0.03 0.04
R2 0.78 0.85 0.76 0.99 0.85
Table D.16: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP, but using only the 49 countries that yield data for all time
lags (p = 5, p = 10 and p = 15 years). They measure the effect sizes after 5 years. Each entry is
an effect size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance:
p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 72 72 72 149 149
n 49 49 49 49 49
RAT 0.61 (0.09)*** 0.16 (0.09) -0.05 (0.09) -0.03 (0.05) 0 (0.01)
OPN -0.2 (0.1) 0.3 (0.09) -0.07 (0.09) 0.03 (0.05) 0.01 (0.01)
INS -0.05 (0.08) -0.07 (0.07) 0.71 (0.06)*** 0.06 (0.04) -0.01 (0.01)
GDP -0.02 (0.07) 0.14 (0.06) 0.22 (0.06)*** 1.02 (0.03)*** 0 (0.01)
DEM -0.54 (0.31) 0.13 (0.24) -1.16 (0.25)*** 0.25 (0.19) 0.03 (0.04)
i 0.24 0.32 0 0.18 0.15***
h 0.14 0.6 0.3 0*** 0.09
R2 0.77 0.91 0.83 0.98 0.94
Table D.17: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP, but using only the 49 countries that yield data for all time
lags (p = 5, p = 10 and p = 15 years). They measure the effect sizes after 10 years. Each entry is
an effect size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance:
p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
RAT OPN INS GDP DEM
N 69 69 69 104 104
n 49 49 49 49 49
RAT 0.57 (0.1)*** 0.03 (0.1) -0.06 (0.1) -0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.02)
OPN -0.19 (0.11) 0.42 (0.11)** 0.25 (0.1) 0 (0.07) 0.01 (0.02)
INS -0.06 (0.09) -0.08 (0.07) 0.65 (0.07)*** 0.06 (0.05) 0.01 (0.01)
GDP -0.12 (0.08) 0.07 (0.07) 0.29 (0.07)*** 1.12 (0.05)*** 0.02 (0.01)
DEM -0.5 (0.42) 0.46 (0.33) -1.41 (0.32)*** 0.23 (0.22) 0.2 (0.05)**
i 0.36 0.34 0.13 0.23 0.13***
h 0 0.54 0.61** 0.12*** 0.04
R2 0.78 0.9 0.91 0.98 0.91
Table D.18: Cross-sectional change regressions to establish the temporal relationships between
RAT, OPEN, INST, DEM and GDP, but using only the 49 countries that yield data for all time
lags (p = 5, p = 10 and p = 15 years). They measure the effect sizes after 15 years. Each entry is
an effect size with the standard error in brackets. Bonferroni corrected statistical significance:
p < 0.1(∗); p < 0.05(∗∗); p < 0.01(∗∗∗).
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